

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

By

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To Linda and Lieschen,
who waited

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This study has close ties with a growing body of post-behavioral literature. It deplores the seemingly inherent behavioral tendency toward total identification of indicator and concept, and it questions the inability of behavioralism to assess political significance beyond the notion of change. It also accuses the behavioral school of thought for an avoidable lack of creativity in its concepts, of failing to live up to its potential both in terms of concept formation and data collection; too often concepts are formed because of data which is seen as "there." In the area of political violence, this critique is seen as describing what is here referred to as the riot study perspective.

The attempt of this study to break away from this riot study perspective centers in the philosophical analysis of the concept of political violence, the examination of the concepts of violence and "political," separately and combined. The analysis includes how the terms are normally used and how they should be applied for consistency, clarity, and usefulness. The essence of violence is found to be approximately described

as socially disorienting action; that working definition expands the categories of actions to be called violence although it restricts the inclusion of property destruction within the concept of violence. The concept of "political" is delineated with emphasis upon its distributional, rather than power, aspects. The concept of political violence thus is seen as centering in the societal distribution of actions of violence. Violence having been developed as a negative value, political violence is the unequal or nonrandom allocation of socially disorienting actions upon those population elements having little actual or latent political power.

The validity and usefulness of the above philosophical analysis is demonstrated through empirical operationalization and testing. Violence is operationalized through the use of Gainesville, Florida, police arrest and general incident report records for the years 1960-1961 and 1970. Specifically included are persons (1) arrested for crimes of violence, (2) reporting crimes of violence, and (3) subjected to a "card arrest" or an arrest not resulting in a conviction. The distribution of these actions of violence is operationalized through the socio-economic, demographic characteristics of the persons involved and of the Gainesville population as a whole, as reflected in United States census data. Since the data represent nominal or ordinal measurement at best, statistical comparisons rely heavily upon the Chi-square statistic and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to systematically review and analyze what is meant by violence and political violence, to empirically support the resulting conceptualization within a specific local context, and to demonstrate within that context the usefulness of the conceptualization and its operationalization for further research.

Providing the Framework

Concepts of political violence, like most concepts, are not specific statements to be proven true or false, but analytical constructs encompassing whole categories of events and statements in the attempt^t increase our understanding of them. Thus the relevant question in regard to the conceptual chapters proper is not "is each step in its development proven," but "is the concept and the framework of analysis it provides useful in aiding our understanding of phenomena and their related concepts." Chapters II and III of this study are directed toward developing such a framework. The usefulness of the framework is to be found in its ability to identify strong similarities among various social actions and to relate those categories of actions to concepts concerning the operation of the political system.

Far too often in contemporary political science, the existence and nature of frameworks of analysis have been determined by the easy availability of quantifiable data. In terms of the existence of concepts, this legacy of behavioralism has been recognized by many postbehavioralists. Christian Bay bemoaned the reluctance of behavioralists to deal with what he saw as a very central concept of human needs.¹ Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz likewise scorned the avoidance of a concept they referred to as nondecisions.² Members of the Caucus for a New Political Science have published a book of "dissenting essays" exploring such usually-excluded concepts as community, authority, and legitimacy.³ Corresponding to the above critiques, most political scientists have found a need, as scientists, to avoid the concept of political violence and substitute a more readily categorized "civil violence" or "collective violence."

Where there is quantifiable data, it tends to closely define related concepts. Political scientists in such cases show a startling lack of creativity in dealing with the form and structure of the data. Most often, our concepts and our thought patterns become prisoners of the process of quantification.⁴ Our indicators invariably become synonymous with our concepts.

This transition appears to have occurred in the case of the riot studies of the late 1960's. By skimming off the readily-quantifiable aspects of obviously politically

relevant violence, those studies resulted in the distortion of the whole concept of political violence. To a political scientist in the United States who is discussing the domestic scene, political violence means riots, usually racial riots. To the degree that violence and political violence are cast in any conceptual framework, they are usually understood through the tradition of common law with much of its emphasis on offences against private property or through an emphasis on subcultural variation and autonomy. As is demonstrated in the two following chapters, both alternatives are inadequate.

To avoid the pitfalls outlined above, the framework herein employed for understanding the concept of political violence will emanate from systematic analysis, philosophical rather than behavioral.⁵ Distinctions as to what violence and political violence are or are not must be made carefully. Not to make sound distinctions results in, as Hannah Arendt has stated, not only "a certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to."⁶ Toward the end of developing a conceptual framework with sound distinctions, this study views political violence as the union area between the concepts of what is violence and what is political and proceeds with those issues, respectively.

Previewing the Development

The concept of violence is developed in Chapter II by examining relevant writings from numerous sources in an

attempt to isolate the essence of what is meant by violence. For purposes of analysis, violence is viewed as an action involving an actor and an object of the action. Each of these parts is examined to determine if it offers any central meaning to our understanding of violence. The ramifications of viewing violence as action and as a particular type of social action are contrasted with the ramifications of viewing violence as a state of being. Approaching violence from the standpoint of the actor, concepts such as intentionality, rationality, illegality, illegitimacy, responsibility, and blame are examined for contributions they might have for a working definition of violence. From the standpoint of the person acted upon, violence is discussed in the context of a violation of human rights. Within that context, terms such as intensity, harm, and pain are applied in sharpening the ongoing concept delineation. That delineation is carried beyond the stage of physical interaction to that of mental disorientation of social behavior expectations. The possible applicability of that disorientation to legally-defined perpetrators as well as victims is also discussed.

In Chapter III, the concept of violence developed in Chapter II is transformed into a concept of political violence. The approach aims at providing a conceptual framework in which to cast the empirical analysis of later chapters. The framework draws upon the views of political

writers as diverse as Aristotle, Harold Lasswell, and David Easton in developing an elitist view of the political system emphasizing the unequal distributions of values. Within this context, political violence is conceptualized through the use of a Marcusean "objective referent" stressing difference from a random distribution.⁷

The development in Chapters II and III must be considered in the realm of macro-theory, raising questions about directions, assumptions, and approaches within the discipline and its concepts on a broad scale. Yet much of the usefulness of conceptual frameworks stems from their correspondence to and consistency with what we know as the real world. Chapter IV serves as a transition chapter, reducing the concepts which have been developed into concrete actions within a specific context, allowing the concepts to be empirically evaluated. Utilizing Gainesville, Florida, Police Department records, various categories of violence are operationalized. Data recorded on various socio-economic, demographic characteristics are transformed into an ordinal scale representing political powerlessness within a context of social class.

Chapter V begins the micro-level analysis of the concept of violence in Gainesville. It is primarily oriented toward evaluating the empirical consistency of various parts of the conceptualization and their operationalization. Support for the various manifestations of violence must be sought in the

similarity of their distributional patterns. Chapter VI continues the concept verification by empirically testing the theoretical suggestion that legally-defined perpetrators should be included along with victims as persons experiencing violence.

The theoretical conceptualization contains two stages. The first derives the essence of violence and hence the type of actions to be counted as violence. Chapters V and VI, discussed above, examine the consistency of the distributional patterns among various actions counting as violence, the objective being the support of theoretically-defined similarities through the isolation of empirical similarities. The second stage of the conceptualization goes beyond making statements about what counts as violence to a statement about what the distribution of violence phenomena is among social class/political power differentiations in society at large. The two stages of the conceptualization, what violence is and especially what its distribution is, are not only part of the conceptual framework but are subject to empirical verification. Utilizing United States Census data for comparisons with violence data, Chapter VII undertakes this analysis. Is violence in Gainesville, Florida, in fact, political in the sense of a nonrandom distribution?

With the empirical verification of the conceptualization, the remainder of Chapter VII moves to another phase in the organization of this study, the demonstration of possible

uses of the conceptualization/operationalization in further research. Having tested whether or not violence in Gainesville is political, a test statistic is suggested to place the political nature of its violence on a continuum. Such a continuum would allow cross-sectional comparisons with other communities. Chapter VIII continues the examination of the usefulness of the conceptualization/operationalization by analyzing Gainesville political violence longitudinally. Such analysis has the potential of demonstrating most clearly the distortion in our perception of political violence brought about by the riot-oriented studies of the middle and late 1960's.

Chapter IX, the conclusion, reviews the parts of the threefold development and their relationship to each other: a) the conceptual framework; b) its empirical support, and c) its uses in further research. It also examines the implications of accepting the conceptual framework as supported by empirical analysis within a local context.

It is hoped that this preview will help orient the reader in his understanding of the chapters to follow.

Notes

¹Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," The American Political Science Review, LIX, No. 1 (March, 1965), 39-51.

²Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," The American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 3 (September, 1963), 632-642.

³See Philip Green and Sanford Levenson, eds., Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). There have been some traditionalists, like Hannah Arendt, who were never incorporated within the behavioralist movement and who continue to write about such aforementioned concepts in a traditional-philosophical way. For the most part, however, their insights have had little effect on the mainstream of the discipline. It would seem as though in order to move political science into a "post-behavioralist" stance, one must first have been encompassed by the behavioralist movement. One has to have been there to find the way out. ✓

⁴For a general discussion of the replacement of concepts by indicators see Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 84-123. For a specific example of the domination of concepts by readily quantifiable indicators, see Alfred B. Clubok, Norman M. Wilensky, and Forrest J. Berghorn, "Family Relationships, Congressional Recruitment, and Political Modernization," The Journal of Politics, XXXI, No. 4 (November, 1969), 1035-1062. Accepting the concept of political family ties in the United States as defined by the number of Congressmen who had relatives in Congress, this study concluded that the United States confirmed an established pattern of political modernization along with other related modernizing components. However, the exclusion of the United States population as a part of the kinship variable was nowhere adequately covered. The only consideration of a relationship between kinship and population was presented as a goodness of fit test. Because that test did not demonstrate any statistically significant relationship between population and Congressional kinship, the latter was seen as a viable variable in its own right (rather than asking why, in the United States, the logical relationship was not to be found). The number of Congressmen who had relatives in Congress was seen as hard data; it was important information to be analyzed because it was available-- it was there.

Nowhere did the article recognize that the number of Congressmen who had relatives in Congress is as much a conceptualization as the number of Congressmen who have relatives in Congress divided by the United States population (or some other estimate of Congressmen having Congressional relatives if those officeholders were selected randomly). Had one of the latter alternatives been chosen, the United States would, in all probability, have shown an increase in the importance of family ties. Thus the study could have raised some valuable and interesting questions for the concept of political modernization.

⁵That analysis (of the framework) falls in Cnudde and Neubauer's second level of theory "...definitional or conceptual expositions, examinations of the logical implications of concepts and their relationship to other concepts." Such concept delineation, those authors feel, is necessary before one moves to the third level of theory which is empirical. See Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 1, 10.

⁶Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 142.

⁷For the derivation of this term, see Marcuse, pp. 135-142.

CHAPTER II

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE

In developing a definition of any concept, the serious scholar, it would seem, is forced into one of two emphases: essence-seeking or boundary-defining. The former dictates a search for common denominators in the usage of the concept and establishes the definition from that core, leaving the boundaries somewhat hazy. The latter attempts to draw a circle around the concept, delineating what is included and what is excluded, but never really getting to the heart of the concept.¹ The macro-level analysis presented in this study is biased toward the essence-seeking approach. Some boundary definition of violence is of course both necessary and unavoidable to discovering its essence, but that emphasis will be supplementary, not primary. The actual definition of violence presented here contains several aspects: it is first a consolidation of the way the term is used today; second, it is a creative effort as is inherent in any conscientious conceptualization; and third, it is an implied recommendation that the concept in the future be understood as presented. Thus the definition, at one and the same time, tells how violence is used, how it is, and how it should be used.²

Violence as Social Action

At its most basic level, the term violence is almost always used to describe an event, a happening, which is bounded in time and space, having a relatively discernible beginning and end. This characteristic is highly visible in the paradigm case of aggravated assault resulting in physical injury. The actual physical confrontation specifically describes the event in time and place.

Yet it would also seem clear that violence describes something more definitive than any happening or event. Drawing upon the Latin root of violence translated as to "carry force" we might speak of a violent storm or a violent earthquake, but we would not refer to these events by themselves as violence. Rather, violence as a noun would seem to be appropriate only as applied to human events or happenings, not phenomena of nature.³ By human events two dimensions are implied. First, each event is a human action, a form, direct or indirect, of human behavior, with the human being attaching subjective meaning to his behavior.⁴ Second, the ultimate object of the action is another human being who is acted upon.⁵

Both dimensions must be present before violence can be said to have taken place. Absence of the first dimension is illustrated by the previously mentioned earthquake which, even in the case where it resulted in injury to persons, would not be called violence, being a phenomenon of nature. Absence of the second dimension, on the other hand, is

illustrated by the man who clears land using dynamite. Outside the effect of the explosions on other persons, no violence can be said to have been done. Even the argument that property damage is violence is based upon that damage effecting another individual, usually the owner, in certain undesirable ways. The physical destruction is, in itself, irrelevant to the designation of violence even within this context. The same building explosion could be the action of a student radical or a professional wrecker paid by the owner.⁶ Similarly, if an individual destroys a sandcastle which he built himself, no one would call that action violence. But if the same sandcastle had been built by a neighborhood child who was admiring it at the time, the term would probably be applied. Whereas this illustration may broaden the notion of property or ownership, it makes clear that even according to the destruction-of-property-as-violence thesis the difference between violence and nonviolent action lies in the ultimate object of a person. The value and meaning of the property to that person and his rights in connection with it-- not an independent monetary appraisal of the physical destruction-- is the justification for the label.⁷

It is, however, not always easy to identify the specific individuals involved in each of these dimensions in real actions, as will be evident in the discussion of systemic violence later in this chapter.⁸ Also, in the common case of fighting, it is extremely difficult to label one party

as actor and the other as object; violence is not always and perhaps not usually a one-way street; the arrows go both ways.⁹ The difficulty of identifying the actor especially in the case of systemic violence is the primary reason for using the term action rather than behavior in describing violence. In some instances of systemic violence, the immediate police behavior is not in itself sufficient to describe the particular social action; public policy defined by city officials makes them as much the actors as the police. The term action would seem to accommodate such notions better than behavior.

The concept of violence as action can be delineated one step further at this point. In the preceding paragraphs, we have described violence as an interaction process between persons, although some of the persons may not be easily identified. This description alone would be grounds for describing violence as social action.¹⁰ At the risk of redundancy, however, it would also seem to be a social action in that the subjective meaning of the action to the actor takes account of and is oriented by the behavior of others.¹¹ This "social" nature would seem to be manifest in all incidents we know as violence, including the actions of a psychopathic killer.

Violence as social action can be sharpened by a brief look at what is excluded from the concept. If violence is social action, actions which are not social and phenomena which are not action are not violence.

Nonsocial actions are probably best seen as a continuum of degrees due to a ubiquitous socialization process. Yet, on the level of trivia, it would be hard to imagine a man scratching his head in private as a social action. Yet this exclusion is not very useful, for if the same individual committed suicide we would automatically see that action as influenced by the behavior of others-- hence, a social action.¹²

In contrast, the exclusion of phenomena which are not action is highly relevant. The prime category of phenomena which are not actions are states of being, both on a societal and an individual level.¹³ Few scholars speak of violence in such a way as to include social states of being without reference to specific actions. One who does recognizes that what he refers to as structural violence is equivalent to social injustice.¹⁴ Whereas some violence may be social injustice, violence as social action dictates that all manifestations of social injustice are not violence. Some states of being illustrating social injustice may be better described as repression, oppression, or exploitation.¹⁵ Systemic, institutional, or structural "violence" is violence only when it is expressed in social action.¹⁶

Individual states of being which are excluded from violence are best illustrated by a person suffering from the psychosis of paranoia. There is definitely an object or victim and in all probability there are persons present putting him in a state of fright who could be loosely

considered actors (thus making the state of being a social phenomena), but there is no connecting action. All ingredients are present for violence except the action. The paranoic feels that violence is being committed, but there is no action to correspond to his feelings. Similarly, after playing the role of spectators at a mass streaking rally, two psychologists described for me feelings which all agreed were identical to those encountered in violence involvement, but there had been no action so there was no violence.¹⁷

In describing violence as social action, it is necessary to recognize that there is a back door into states of being, particularly on the societal level. Just as political scientists have come to accept nondecisions as a form of decisions,¹⁸ so must social inaction, if it can be limited in time and space, be considered a form of action. If social inaction is a form of social action, then under conditions which will be discussed, social inaction may be a form of violence. Thus the need for further development of the concept is indicated, along with the value of beginning the definition with the notion of social action.

Violence: Action and the Actor

If we were to diagram violence as it has been presented up to this point, analytically, we could distinguish three separate components: an actor or perpetrator, an action (social), and an object or victim. Description so far has

centered in the action with brief forays out to establish the existence of the other two elements. In order to further investigate the nature of violence it is necessary to link or analytically associate the action with the other two elements. Under this strategy, violence as a social action will be associated first with the actor and second with the object. The goal will be to ascertain which characteristics often assigned to violence are applicable to all its manifestations and useful in isolating it from other social actions.

Violence as Intentional Versus Responsibility for Violence

Academic literature on violence has focused almost exclusively upon intentional or purposeful acts of violence. That this generalization is applicable to all social science disciplines suggests that the intentionality of the actor in committing the act may be a useful ingredient in delineating what is meant by violence. If, in fact, intent on the part of an individual was a necessary and sufficient condition for violence, it would be de facto a part of the definition.¹⁹

The idea that intent could be so intertwined, however, can be quickly dispelled. It would seem that by raising hypothetical cases we can reach a point where intent to commit violence becomes disassociated from any action we could understand as violence. In a case of intent including premeditation, A waits in an alley for B to pass on his way to work and, when he does, A steps from his hiding place and

fires a pistol at B, seriously wounding him. In a slight variation, A waits, steps from the alley, fires, and misses B. In a third variation, A waits in the alley, but drifts off to sleep and does not see B pass. Fourth, A waits, but B calls in sick and does not go to work and is thus saved. Lastly, A does not hear his alarm clock and does not wake up in time to intercept B. In all these cases, A intended to perform an act of violence, shooting B, but only in the first case did he succeed. Yet we would call the first two cases violence, and the last three we clearly would not. The intent was the same in all cases; only the action differed. Surely intent is neither synonymous with violence nor a sufficient cause of it.²⁰

If, as we have said, there can be intent without violence, can there be violence without intent? Is intent a necessary and defining aspect of violence? The existence of actions which would be commonly called violence but with no intent on the part of an actor would dispel this connection. In searching for such examples precaution must be taken. Often an aggravated assault, a paradigm of violence, is a development from a fight which neither party anticipated. The violence, however, while not premeditated, was definitely intentional. Intentionality is inclusive of all actions except accidents (which may or may not be the result of negligence). Also, we should be aware that many times violence, once entered into, escalates to a level not intended

by either party.²¹ In the case of the above aggravated assault, serious injury may not have been the intent of either party to the fight. This case does not illustrate the presence of violence without intent, however; unintentional escalation or consequences or violence already engaged in are not the same. In contrast, if, upon witnessing an individual running through an alley in the vicinity of a ringing burglar alarm, a policeman shouted halt and then fired a warning shot over the running person's head which was so inaccurate as to strike him, that unintentional shooting would almost universally be called violence.²²

If more examples are brought into play, it becomes evident that most unintentional actions which involve negligence are (upon meeting other yet undiscussed criteria) subject to the label of violence. Examples of unintentional nonnegligent action are much less subject. If a man speeds his car through a residential area at sixty miles per hour and strikes a child in a crosswalk, it is violence; if he is driving twenty and the child darts from between two parked cars and is struck, it is not. If an individual unintentionally shoots a friend through horseplay with a supposedly empty gun, that is much more likely to be thought of as violence than if the friend tripped on a hunting expedition and was accidentally shot by the first individual who attempted to catch him.

It would seem that violence is an appropriate label for some actions whether or not they are intentional.²³

Rather, it seems much more determining if an outside observer can attach responsibility in the sense of blame for the action on a person or persons.²⁴ If there is no blame, responsibility, or negligence, then it is doubtful that there would be much agreement on the label of violence for the action. Perhaps this distinction helps us understand why acts of nature are not described as violence; it is difficult to affix the blame.²⁵ In conclusion, it does seem true that the social sciences concentrate their attention on the narrower category of intentional violence, but that seems to be because intentional violence offers much greater potential in terms of predictability and explanatory value, not because all violence is intentional. The notion of responsibility as blame is much more central in defining the concept.

Violence as Rational

Much social science literature also speaks of rationality and violence being closely tied together. Hannah Arendt states that all violence must be understood as instrumental in nature, i.e., useful in bringing about desired goals and hence rational action.²⁶ Harold Nieburg, taken literally, results in at least an equivalent position where all violence has a rational aspect for someone involved.²⁷ Another orientation of riot studies views riots as activities which not only furthered desired policies but were encouraged by persons who saw the connections between violence and

policy.²⁸ As in the case of intentionality, it is imperative that we examine the rationality of actions to see if any clues are offered for our definition of violence.

The analysis must take into account the fact that the meaning of the term rational is not always defined precisely, and may take one of several connotations when applied to violence: (1) to be the result of a process of reasoning [subjective], (2) to be the result of a correct, efficient, or pragmatic reasoning process [dependent upon the objective situation as much as the subjective evaluation of it], and (3) to enhance someone's interest [when viewed from a standpoint outside of any one of the participants]. It is necessary to see if any of these meanings is useful in developing a definition of violence.

Rationality is at its broadest when associated with violence in the third interpretation, since it does not refer to any mental process of a participant, but only to a situation in which violence is present; in addition, it pretends to be applicable in all cases of violence. There is doubt if this view of violence as rational is accurate. It requires us to see violence as a zero sum game in the sense that someone always wins and someone always loses. It seems more likely that, in many cases of violence, all participants lose. If, however, the "game" is amended to a point where we say violence is rational because one party does not lose as much as another, then violence as rational seems a

reasonable formulation. However, accepting this position to be accurate, does looking for rational actions in this sense help us to identify violence? Or, suspecting violence has occurred, does the fact that the action was rational confirm or verify our suspicions? It is hard to imagine any social action which is not less or more helpful to one party's interest than another's. Looking for rationality in social actions thus helps us no more than looking for social actions. This connotation of violence as rational is not useful to the degree that "not all social actions invoke blame" is useful.

At the opposite extreme is the first connotation which sees the rationality in violence solely as a result of the subjective reasoning process of a participant. Simply, violence is rational because, as a result of a reasoning process, someone believes it is beneficial for him to act in that manner. Certainly most premeditated crimes of violence fit this pattern, as does much of the violence done by protest movements. Yet this connotation of rationality can be rejected as an aid to definition primarily because, as was the case with intentionality, rationality in this sense is not present in all manifestations of violence.²⁹

At one level, violence as a rational action in this sense can be rejected by claiming that violence is prerational or instinctive behavior that is best explained without reference to any conscious reasoning process. Robert Audrey

makes this type of explanation by analogy of human behavior to animal instinctive behavior. Man is violent because of innate aggressiveness associated with a territorial defense.³⁰ The notion of innate human aggressiveness closely related to violence is found in writings by authors as diverse as Thomas Hobbes and Sigmund Freud. Whereas violence may be viewed as hereditary, a close variation can be found in tracing violence to early childhood experiences or to tendencies ingrained in societal living prior to the action--experiences and tendencies so deeply ingrained as to be almost instinctive in their manifestations. Marcuse's ideas of the United States as a repressive society damming up spontaneous and necessary human actions comes close to requiring the labeling of violence when it does erupt as instinctive.³¹

Large numbers of crimes of violence seem to fit more closely under the "crimes-of-passion" category than result from reasoning.³² Collective violence has historically been associated with psychological rather than rational motivations.³³ One recent riot study dealt with the concept of "issueless riots," riots where there was no generalized belief among the participants and their action was not instrumental in solving the group's problems. These were, in effect, examples of collective violence without reason as a thought process.³⁴ All manifestations of violence which could be described as spontaneous or automatic or reactive demonstrate

the inapplicability of the term rational in its connotation as the result of a reasoning process.

The second connotation of violence as rational is a combination of the two notions just discussed. Rationality as a correct, efficient, or pragmatic reasoning process combines the notions of reasoning and of a beneficial outcome. Since both elements of this combination have demonstrated their inadequacies in describing all manifestations of violence, the combination is even more restrictive in its application.³⁵ For one, it is often cast solely in the context of individuals reasoning about violence outcomes in an instrumental ends-means sense and excludes the concept of violence as an end itself.³⁶ Certainly some violent crime is planned and beneficial to the actor in material or status respects. Certainly some riots demonstrate both generalized beliefs and usefulness in furthering group goals.³⁷ Rational violence in this sense describes a significant subclass of acts of violence, but it is not helpful in defining the concept.

Violence as rational action, in all connotations discussed here, can be considered important types or classes of violence. To the degree that the positions of Arendt and Nieburg alluded to earlier call upon the investigator to examine all violence to see if or how it fits into these subclasses, the admonition that violence be understood as rational or instrumental must be applauded.³⁸ However,

violence as rational in any or all of these senses is, like intentionality, not useful in developing a definition.

Violence as Illegal, Illegitimate, Unjustifiable, or Wrongful

Violence, as used in ordinary speech, has taken on connotations associating it with, at the worst, criminality or immorality and, at the best, inappropriateness.³⁹ The connotations in turn can determine our use of the language, with the result that we become instruments of the language rather than vice versa. Inevitably the language becomes ideological to the point of excluding particular thought channels or processes.⁴⁰ Academicians, especially social scientists, geared to consensus as truth, become an integral part of the established order and the language of stability.⁴¹ Regardless of the role these connotations may play, they are real and must be examined to see if they offer any help in defining violence.

Beginning our analysis at the worst connotation level, it is easy to demonstrate that, regardless of its relationship with the established order, not all violence is illegal. An individual who does violence in self-defense is not judged criminal. Neither are many persons who initiate the violence: the shopkeeper who kills a would-be burglar, the police who use "excessive force" in quelling a demonstration, or even, perhaps, the professional boxer who steps into the ring and attacks. Certainly much, probably most, of the overt personal violence which forms the stereotype is illegal, but the

exceptions are too common to define violence as illegal action.

Somewhat more complex is the association of violence with actions that are illegitimate, wrongful, or unjustifiable. These concepts are much broader than simple illegality. Violence is commonly defined as the "illegitimate use of force" in contrast to Weber's concept of the state as entailing the legitimate use of force.⁴² In this country, seeing violence in this sense is reinforced by a Lockian heritage which, while it may permit the use of violence to establish a democratic government, views violence as unnecessary and inappropriate behavior while that government is functioning.⁴³ Legitimacy reduces to a general agreement with the values of the status quo. Rioters commit violence, but overzealous police officials do not.

Two basic points need to be made concerning the relationship between violence and legitimacy. First, and more obvious following the case of rationality, the relationship depends upon the definition of legitimacy.⁴⁴ If legitimacy is thought to hinge about citizen consensus, which is usually translated into acceptance or acquiescence, then to think of violence as only illegitimate actions would exclude thousands of racial lynchings or Indian massacres in United States history and the Nazi extermination of Jews under Hitler in German history from the concept of violence. On the other hand, if legitimacy is defined primarily as a

right or entitlement to action, it becomes extremely difficult to operationally distinguish legitimacy. At one extreme, it could be argued that all actions of the state are made legitimate by periodic elections, but the previous examples would apply and militate against this position. At the other extreme, it could be argued that legitimacy is only an ideological defense and is possessed by no political authority.⁴⁵ If all actions of the state are illegitimate, the concept of legitimacy means nothing and is of no use in defining violence.

Second, legitimacy is only used in cases where it appears the state is clearly either the actor in violence or the object of the action. If a man used violence in self defense against a personal physical attack, it would be stilted or inappropriate speech to say his violence was legitimate or illegitimate; we would probably say his actions were justifiable or not. Thus the label of illegitimate, even if it rather than legitimate, were exclusively applicable to violence, is not an appropriate label to apply to all social actions we would call violence.

A step broader than illegitimacy are the characteristics of unjustifiable and wrongful; these characteristics would seem to be linguistically appropriate to violence both between representatives of the state and other individuals and between private persons. However, it is reasonable to assume that, given the large volume of literature written justifying

violence in the abstract to the justification of specific instances, some violence is justifiable.⁴⁶ The justifications often include balancing of harm done between not doing and doing violence, the immediacy of the end toward which the means of violence are directed, and the theoretical public advocacy of the action to society.⁴⁷ For whatever reasons, most persons would say that a physical assault upon a complete stranger is unjustifiable, but self defense is justifiable. Most persons would say that the necessary police use of violence to halt a serious crime is justified, but the excessive use of force by the police is not. Some violence is justifiable and some is not-- a fact which does not aid in the development of a definition.

Furthermore, even in the broadest sense that we could call a justifiable action wrongful or evil, our definition of violence is not advanced. If wrongful was simply a defining characteristic of violence, surely pacifists would not feel called upon to develop elaborate arguments explaining what are complex moral judgments. Also, if violence meant wrongful, we would not continue to use the term to describe an action we had come to believe was "rightful." If we witnessed a policeman beating a man with club, we would call the act violence. However, if we learned that the victim of the beating had just knifed a woman on the street and was attempting to cut the policeman and escape, and that the policeman was unarmed except for his club and had no other

means to make the man submit to arrest, we would be convinced of the rightfulness of the act, but we would still call it violence.⁴⁸ Furthermore, within particular subcultural contexts, violence may be the rightful in contrast to other wrongful actions.

Violence is not necessarily legal or illegal, justifiable or unjustifiable, legitimate or illegitimate, wrongful or rightful. These terms, often used to describe violence, have advanced our understanding of the concept of violence by forcing us, in Socratic method, to consider and reject them as useful in a definition.

Violence as Force or Intense Action

In the discussion of illegitimacy, it was suggested that violence involved the use of force; in a recent argument, we referred to police "excessive force" as though it were synonymous with violence. Because of the common use of the concept of force in referring to actions classifiable as violence, it is imperative that we investigate the relationship between the two terms.

We should begin by recognizing that there is a difference in meaning between the noun, force, as in the use of force, and the verb, force, as to force someone to do something. The latter concept implies (1) an end toward which one's behavior pattern is changed through the application of varying degrees and types of pressure and (2) success in reaching that end. In this sense, to force is equivalent to the verb

form of coercion and has no direct relevance to violence.⁴⁹ Persons are forced and coerced often without any violence having been done, and very little violence entails coercion, much violence being an end in itself. The very fact that there is no analogous verb form for violence is instructive; you can force someone, but you cannot violence him. In contrast, definitions of violence as force refer to the noun meaning the application of physical strength.⁵⁰

Force is broader than the concept of violence in the sense that its application is not limited to human actions. Whereas violence is inappropriate to describe hurricanes or earthquakes, force is an appropriate word. Yet even when applied to human social actions, force has many uses where violence could not be substituted. Knocking a child from the path of an approaching car would be an act of force but not of violence.

The demonstration that some force is not violence does not rule out the possibility that all violence might involve force, a more substantial question. Surely force is used in the paradigm cases of violence such as murder and assault. Force would even seem to be present in squeezing the trigger on the gun which projects a bullet into a person's body, since the application includes the bullet striking. The problem with force as a defining characteristic of violence comes in the categories best described as mental violence.⁵¹ Suppose the above bullet missed. We would still call the

action violence, but there was no physical strength applied to another person. Similarly, the terrorist who throws a bomb which subsequently fails to explode into a crowded theater does not use force but surely his action is violence. In a very common case, robbery, no physical strength need be applied at all; the overt or implied threat of force is sufficient for the United States Department of Justice to classify the action as violence; a similar classification is included in the definition of aggravated assault.⁵²

In addition, many scholars consider a verbal assault as constituting violence.⁵³ In this case, there may not be even an implied or inferred threat of force. Also, the category of systemic violence rarely involves the use or threat of force.⁵⁴ A police arrest and detention of an innocent person could be considered an act of violence, but no force may have been used or no threat of force conveyed by the action. Thus it becomes evident that violence cannot be defined as the use or excessive use or even the threatened use of force because not all violence entails force or its threat.

Similar to, yet independent of, the concept of force is that of intensity. Many definitions of violence contain within them some notion of minimal intensity; an action must have before it can be classified as violence. Terms such as great force, severity, vigorous, or in the case of psychological violence, sharp, caustic, and savage, all connoting

a great expenditure of energy are used in the definition.⁵⁵ One author states that while all examples of acting violently are not violence, all examples of violence include the idea of acting violently.⁵⁶

Certainly, just as there is a need to distinguish violence from states of being, so is there a need to distinguish violence from less intense forms of social action. Violence is not having a conversation or making a purchase. Even including the notion of blame, violence is not ordinarily walking into someone physically or berating them verbally. Yet attempting to make the intensity criterion applicable to the actor side of the action raises more questions than it answers. Is murder by poison violence? How much vigor or great energy is required to place poison in food or drink?⁵⁷ The issue of intensity is made extremely complex by technological sophistication.⁵⁸ Is slowly pulling two pounds with the right index finger vigorous? Is it if what is being pulled is a trigger of a sniper's rifle? Is assembly of a time bomb vigorous? Is leaving it in an airport locker?

Another set of examples makes resolution of the issue clearer. Individual A is in a hurry to get to his favorite team's baseball game before the opening pitch. In his haste he shoves three people, all with the same expenditure of energy. The first is a young man on the sidewalk in line to board the bus. The second is in the aisle of the bus, an old woman who falls to the floor. The third is a young man

leaving the bus who consequently trips on the steps and lands on the pavement below. In all cases the action, the shoves, was identical in intensity from the standpoint of the actor. Obviously, however, the intensity of the action varied from the perspective of the object or victim. Thus there is a need to include the element of intensity in the definition of violence, but this element is best approached from the victim side of the action.

Summary-- Action and the Actor

The attempt to define the social action of violence from the actor side of the action is enlightening primarily in demonstrating ways violence cannot be defined. Violence cannot be confined to the intentional, the rational, the illegal, the illegitimate, the unjustifiable, or the wrongful. Examples of violence cut across all of these confines. On the other hand, violence does imply actor responsibility in the sense of blame. This notion of blame is broader than legal guilt but narrower than the general responsibility for most actor behavior such as shaking hands or handing someone an object. Lastly, although violence cannot be defined as force, before a social action can be appropriately called violence it must exhibit a minimal amount of vigorousness or intensity, but this characteristic can best be approached from the perspective of the victim.

Violence: Action and the Victim

Early in this chapter, violence was described as having three analytically distinguishable parts: actor, action, and object. In analyzing the object side of the action, the term victim will be used instead of object. As has been presented, the object of the particular social action of violence is a person. "Victim" portrays this personal aspect of violence much better than does "object." A second clarifying statement needs to be made, dealing with emphasis. Very few defining characteristics of violence were discovered by the investigation of the actor side of the action. This realization must lead to the conclusion that the essence of violence is much more entwined with the concept of the victim than of the perpetrator.

Violence as a Violation

Looking at violence from the ways people can be victimized involving blame and intensity moves our attention from the "carrying force" root to the derivative, violation. It would seem that violation may be more helpful in our definition than was the concept of force.⁶⁰ But in what ways does it make sense to speak of violence as a violation? Certainly it cannot be considered a violation of any restrictions originating outside the individual: it has been shown that violence is not defined by formal rules or social norms. The violation must be of the person or something inherent in him. But in what ways does it make sense to talk about a

violation of a person? What within a person is violated if a man sticks a knife between his ribs? Obviously, he is cut and hurt, but does it make any sense to say his rib cage was violated in the sense of being entered? It makes sense only if you accept the notion that the individual had a right not to be knifed in the ribs. The concept of violation and consequently of violence is dependent at some level of consciousness upon acceptance of a person as having rights which are intimately connected with his being a person, rights which cannot be given or taken away.⁶¹

That violence involves a violation of specific human rights is a theme that runs through many attempts to conscientiously define violence. The list of rights which are violated by the action of violence is, perhaps, as long as the list of authors delineating them. High on the list are dignity, autonomy, and the fulfillment of one's potential.⁶² However, it can be argued that most of these rights can be violated without violence also. Furthermore, this author would not advocate defining violence by listing rights susceptible to blamable, intense violation. The point is that the concept of human rights is necessary to understand the ingredient of blame. In the sense that there is no list of human rights to be found anywhere and a new right can be created for each situation, specific rights are superfluous. The concept of rights, while it may not be an overt part of the definition of violence is necessary for understanding that definition.

The development thus will proceed without directly mentioning actions of violence as right's violations.

The Common Denominator of Violence Victimization

"When sex is lied about, the result is pornography; the pornography of violence results from the denial of pain."⁶³ Indeed, the concept of violence seems to be intimately entwined with the notions of pain and suffering. To deny this aspect is to denigrate violence in a way analogous to not recognizing the object of violence as a person; it is to dehumanize and remove the sting from our pictures of what violence is all about. It would seem, however, that most definitions of violence, centering about the perpetrator, emphasize this pain dimension only when attempting to restrict the justification of violence.⁶⁴ Pain and suffering are more than consequences of violence. They are an integral part of the concept.

Similar to pain and suffering, yet having an independent aspect of its own is the notion of harm or injury. Pain and suffering are indicators of harm, yet the term introduces a more objective element into violence. All violence is harmful to the victim in some way, but it may, in addition, have beneficial effects. The boxer, knocked out in the first round, is harmed by action most would describe as violence, yet he is also benefited by the loser's part of the fight proceeds. The ascetic who has himself whipped to bleeding is harmed, but he benefits from an increase in status among his colleagues. In violence, the harm must be present;

the benefits may or may not be. Thus Ronald Miller includes the words harming and injuring in developing his definition of violence.⁶⁵ Implicit in Robert Audi's definition of violence is that it tends to involve or cause suffering or injury or both.⁶⁶ Robert Holmes' delineation of violence revolves around the diminishing of someone as a person by inflicting mental harms.⁶⁷ Bernard Harrison's essay on law and violence centers about what can count as suffering an injury.⁶⁸ Eugene Walter restricts the term, violence, "to the sense of destructive harm."⁶⁹ However, despite its almost universal inclusion in the definition of violence, as in the case of pain and suffering, there is harm and injury outside of violence.⁷⁰ Yet combining harm and pain and suffering with blame and intensity seems to be sending us in the right direction. At this point it is essential to further specify this description, since there are many ways to be harmed or suffer pain: some ways may not be violence, some may be examples of violence but not essential to a definition, and some ways may be violence and be present in all manifestations of it and thus contribute to our definition.

Perhaps the most obvious way a person may be harmed and caused pain and suffering from an action is to be physically injured by the action. In fact, as one author states, many alternative ways of describing violence are inseparable from the notion of physical injury. To blow open someone's leg

does not result in the blowing open of his leg; injury to the leg is inseparable from the violence in its impact on the victim.⁷¹ Indeed, most actions we commonly think of as violence involve physical injury of a person: assaults, homicides, fights, bombings (from planes and by radicals), and "legal" shootings. Yet there is an impressive body of literature which would lead us to believe that violence manifests itself in other ways than physical injury; the harm and pain and suffering we associate with violence may be mental as well as physical.⁷² In fact, one author notes that we use the same terms to describe mental as we do physical violence.⁷³

Some of the literature sees violence as having a dual dimension in an "either or" sense. Violence involves either physical or mental harm.⁷⁴ Another branch of the literature sees the concept of violence as singular with different ways the phenomenon can be manifest; our essence-seeking bias pulls us toward the latter. Whether a person is harmed and suffers physically or mentally is immaterial because the essence of violence is the same in both cases. For Johan Galtung, all violence is "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual."⁷⁵ All actions or conditions which frustrate individual potential are violence. Thus Galtung transcends the distinctions between physical and mental harm through his concept of human potential. He accepts neither type of harm as the essence of violence. In contrast, Chalmers

Johnson seems to view the essence of violence as a form of mental anguish which is inflicted whether the action was primarily physical or mental.⁷⁶ For Johnson, the harm, pain and suffering associated with violence are less complex ways of describing what is, at its basic, social disorientation. Violence is action which prevents the development of stable social expectations. Violence is thus not precisely social action, but anti-social action which is by definition disorienting action.⁷⁷ The pain and suffering of violence is the pain and suffering of the individual's disorientation to the world around him.

Accepting Johnson's formulation, the mental anguish which defines violence may be the result of a physical confrontation, a direct personal threat of physical injury, a verbal assault, or an action resulting directly from social organization, such as unwarranted incarceration.⁷⁸ Illustrating different types of disorienting actions is a task undertaken in the operationalization of violence in Chapter III. At this point, it is necessary to return and elaborate on the idea of violence as socially-disorienting action.

Violence as Disorienting Action

"Violence," says Johnson, "is not necessarily brutality, or insensitivity, or the antithesis of empathy; ...the capacity of human beings to adjust and orient themselves to these forms of behavior is almost limitless...."⁷⁹ Violence is distinct

in that, by definition, it includes only those actions to which it is impossible to orient oneself.⁸⁰ On the surface, one reason why there exists such a group of actions to which orientation is impossible has to do with the arbitrariness, irregularity, or unexpectedness of its occurrence.⁸¹ Even if a person's situation is such that he recognizes his presence on the front line in battle or membership in a violence-prone social grouping, the actual occurrence of violence cannot be anticipated. The issue of anticipation of violence is not a very complete explanation for why it is disorienting to the individual. To be more complete, it is necessary to isolate the feelings of the individual victim of violence. Violence, as we have been leading up to saying, is not an objective phenomenon apart from the individual.⁸²

Since psychological research has not been able to adequately recreate and study violence, much of the following analysis will be phenomenological,⁸³ utilizing descriptions of persons involved in violence. There are no right ways to get inside of actions of violence. As Norman Mailer makes clear, describing the aftermath of violence is simple, but describing the action in terms of a person experiencing it is not possible using normal techniques. In experiencing violence, an individual loses his professional consciousness and cannot observe it. The difficulty, according to Mailer, is enhanced by the fact that violence does not create a mood, but rather shatters a series of moods. To describe the

disorientation that is violence is in large part, then, by necessity, an act of creative writing.⁸⁴ While lacking scientific rigor, this approach seems to be the only way to capture the dynamism of violence in relation to the individual.

Perhaps the most easily-identifiable element present in violence victimization is an outcome which is crucial for the participant. "...One of us has got to get dusted, man, and it's better him than me."⁸⁵ That outcome most often involves his physical well-being but it may also involve his mental well-being, his physical freedom, or his family's fate. Not only is the outcome crucial, but it is unknown in the sense that it is uncontrollable by the victim.⁸⁶ If he is attacked, he does not know whether he will come out of the encounter alive, nor is he able to automatically control and direct the course of the encounter and perhaps ensuing fight.

In addition, the involvement of the individual in the violence victimization experience is total, in large part because of the crucial or vital outcome.⁸⁷ An individual can lose money on the stock exchange or have his car stolen while he is having a telephone conversation, but he will not casually talk on the phone while he is the object of violence. We cannot say that disorientation can take place without the total involvement of the victim. Totality of involvement would seem to approximate the notion of intensity which we attempted to analyze from the standpoint of the actor. The definition of violence is better served by the total involvement

of a person struck by a bullet than the intensity of a person pulling a trigger.

From the point of view of psychology, the most distinguishing characteristic of violence victimization is the immediacy of perception and concern on the part of the victim. The time dimension of the present and the future are collapsed into one. The future, as well as the present, has no meaning except in the immediate involvement. Time has no meaning within the involvement except as it relates to the end of the violence. A fight proceeds until it is over, and there is no meaning and no time outside the fight. The collapse of the time dimension as perceived by the individual magnifies what is usually an objectively rapid flow of action. "Yeah. Things were pretty hot."⁸⁸ The collapse of time further reduces the individual's sense of control over the situation.⁸⁹ "When violence is larger than one's ability to dominate, it is existential and one is living in an instantaneous world of revelations."⁹⁰

While trying to avoid describing mental anguish by isolating the presence of anxiety, it is imperative to note that violence victimization is accompanied by severe mental and emotional stress, usually expressed as fear or anger.⁹¹ "Well, I was scared actually, I was more scared than anything else."⁹²

In describing what is meant by a disorienting experience, violence victimization has been presented as action involving

an unknown and uncontrollable outcome, a total involvement, an immediacy of perception and concern resulting from a collapsed time dimension, and strong emotional stress manifest as anger or fear or both. It is an inherent assumption of this study that the above disorientation does occur in the vast majority of cases we now call violence. The above presentation can only make its case as suggestion and recommendation for our understanding. Likewise, there is no way to prove that disorientation through the above experience squares with our commonly held perception of violence as intimately related to pain and suffering, although on an intuitive level there is no doubt that the disorientation of such an involvement would be both harmful and painful. Certainly much violence contains physical and mental harm and pain and suffering beyond what has been described. What is recommended is that at the present stage we accept the above description as accurate of all actions we would agree to call violence; it is the essence of the action.

Implications of Violence as Social Disorientation: Perception of Action and of Disorientation

Defining violence as action socially disorienting to an individual has an important implication which cannot be overlooked. The definition, even including the concept of blame, is almost totally dependent upon the perceptions of the victim. If A, a sniper, fires at B, a corporation president, and misses, we usually call the action violence. Why? The usual assumption is that B realizes what is done, and thus

we can say he suffers the disorientation which we have just discussed. In this case, the shooting action would be equivalent to a perceived threat of physical injury or death. But what if B does not hear the shot and cannot be convinced that someone attempted to kill him-- would B be the victim of violence? No, of course not. But would we not insist that violence had taken place anyway? It would be possible that witness C, who observed the entire action, was disoriented by it and could be considered a victim of violence, but this introduction of an actual witness, C, begs the real question. The relationship between the action and the experiencing of the action as they relate to violence involves potential as well as actual observers and victims. In ordinary usage we would still refer to the shooting action as violence because we view the action as disorienting to persons in general, to ourselves as observers of the action or creators of the story in specific. B, who never perceives the action, is not disoriented. We, as other human beings who do perceive the action see it as disorienting both directly to us and in that it is capable of causing disorientation were it perceived by the intended victim. The shift in perception comes very close to the distinction made by Galtung between manifest and latent levels of violence, the latter being where situations are so unstable as to require little change to produce actual violence.⁹³

Shifting the role of the perceiver from the victim to us as observers is clearly a perversion of a more simple

concept, yet it remains a more accurate picture of the way we actually use the concept of violence. Indeed, it would seem that some perversion is inevitable on the way from abstract concepts to specific indicators. On the one hand, using the simpler concept of violence as the actual disorientation of a person, upon witnessing a brutal confrontation, we would technically have to interview the victim before we could clearly say whether or not the action we had observed was violence.⁹⁴ If we insisted on applying the pure concept we could only say that such confrontations were indicators that violence might have taken place. Obviously in concrete situations we do not follow such a cautious procedure. We call all fights violence because we believe that the "average person" would be disoriented by such action, although not all individuals in all fights are disoriented.⁹⁵ Thus, to delineate the way violence is customarily used rather than creating a new definition, a shift of emphasis in the concept as has been developed up to this point is indicated.

Socially disorienting action means action which would cause disorientation in the average individual as victim or observer if the individual were fully aware of the action. Instead of violence being action which is, by definition, impossible to adjust to, it is action to which our average perceiving individual cannot adjust. Rather than robbing the concept of its harsh, negative nature, the shift is better thought of as approximating our use of the term in empirical

applications. Some individuals may be capable of including some violence and its consequences in their behavior expectations of others. Some actions which we call violence may not be disorienting to the victim. The shift in conceptualization is necessary, however, to incorporate the fact that in normal usage we call all assaults violence.

In review, acceptance of the definition of violence as a socially disorienting action is based upon the inclusion of two variations: (1) actions which would be disorienting if the victim knew of the action, and (2) actions which would be disorienting if someone else (the average person) was involved as victim or witness. Because of these inclusions, the definition of violence as "socially disorienting action" might best be modified to "actions which are capable of causing social disorientation." Because of the first inclusion, the modification to "actions which are capable of" broadens the concept of violence much more than it increases our observations of its manifestations. We are not usually aware of violence until the victim tells us. If violence is that action which is capable of social disorientation, then many specific actions which are never publicly known are violence. However, application of this modification away from actual victim perception of actions only makes sense in the case of immediate potential physical harm-- the case of the bullet that missed. Disorientation from nonphysical action must be actually perceived by the victim before we say violence has

taken place. Otherwise, we would be confronted by the necessity of labeling all potentially disorienting actions in society violence. Otherwise, A's sleeping in the alley when his intended victim walked by would be violence. An infinite number of intentions accompanied by relatively inconsequential actions like A's loading a pistol before going to bed could become violence if we could apply the "capable of" modification to make B aware of the action. Such application would not conform to normal usage of the term.

Caution should also be exercised in limiting the modification to inclusions (1) and (2) above. It would not be accurate to say that a professional building demolition expert who was hired to raze a building does violence in his work because his explosions are capable of social disorientation if someone were in the building. Altering the situation or the location of the action is not permitted under the "capable" modification. In the remainder of this study the "disorienting action" definition will be used interchangeably with the "capable of" modification. The gerund "disorienting" has enough ambiguity in it to include the perception variations (1) and (2), and even the "capable of" modification must be qualified as has been demonstrated.

Implications of Violence as Social Disorientation: Perception of Blame and Systemic Violence

If, in fact, we use the term violence to connote disorientation which may not be felt by the victim, who decides

when the action meets the blame criterion mentioned in the early part of this chapter? We have said that the particular type of responsibility is indicated by the violation of rights, but who decides when rights have been violated? In most actions that form the stereotype of violence, the victim decides that blame is appropriate, often in conjunction with the legal system. But in many cases, as have been pointed out, neither legal systems nor moral codes help the individual victim in that determination. In fact, within some contexts, a moral code might lead a victim to determine that there was no blame and no violence, when in fact most outside observers would say definitely the action was violence.⁹⁶ It would seem that in common usage the element of blame, like disorientation, is assigned by the observer according to a "rational man" or "average man" thesis.

A very important by-product of this assignment of blame has been the development of the notion of systemic, institutional, or structural violence. This concept was practically nonexistent in this country before the popularization of the concept of institutional responsibility for social injustices beginning with the publication of Black Power in 1967.⁹⁷ Before the development of concepts of nondecisions along with an expanding appreciation of the powers of government and institutional structures, democratic societies were not blamed for the consequences of their social organization. The potential for alternate forms of social organization was

not recognized. Gradually the responsibility of society for violating individual rights has become accepted, even, at the extreme, to the point of reifying the "system" into unitary goals and objectives, thus making it as blamable as an individual for its actions.⁹⁸

The fact that blame was not assessed was as much due to the fact that there were no specific individuals to blame as because the system was not seen as blamable. Systemic violence is in Galtung's terminology a truncated version of violence in which there is no singular actor.⁹⁹ In a police sweep which nets an innocent man who is falsely charged with a crime, who is to blame-- the policeman making the arrest, the jailer, the police chief, or the state legislators or city councilmen who wrote or did not write the rules confining police sweeps? Understanding the institutional organization of society as blamable, even if not so perceived by the victim, allows the classification of some system actions as violence.

Disorientation: Victims and Perpetrators

In this chapter we have analyzed first the actor, then the victim side of specific social actions to derive a working definition of violence as an action capable of causing social disorientation. Both actor and, to a much larger degree, victim place constraints upon the types of actions to be called violence. Yet we would not totally understand the concept if we did not determine the analytical confines

the action called violence places upon the actor and the victim.

The notion of violence as a one way process is both necessary and misleading as a heuristic device. It is necessary to see violence as an action process between persons, and it is necessary, as is made clear by analogy to the legal system, to assess blame. On the other hand, the notion is misleading as it blocks out any notion of an involving dimension of violence developed by Norman Mailer.¹⁰⁰ One does not use violence without being acted upon by it. Violence involves the perpetrator as well as the victim. Hans Toch, in his entire study of Violent Men, presented violence as enveloping both parties in a web they had to pursue to the finish. Both the perpetrator and the victim, in the narrow sense, were trapped in action they saw no way of avoiding.¹⁰¹ This topic was indirectly bridged in the preceding section when the question of who was disoriented was first asked. The involving dimension of the action forces us to examine the evidence and determine if the perpetrator as well as the victim is socially disoriented.

On one level, the perpetrator can be viewed as a victim of violence of a larger scale, of social suffocation.¹⁰² His violent actions represent an attempt to fight his way out of his trap. Those actions represent an attempt to transfer his own victimization to others. Limiting our perspective to one particular action, however, the designation of actor

and victim is still inaccurate and misleading. Earlier the very small percentage of premeditated violence was mentioned, a fact which supports the position that the vast majority of violence is unplanned and spontaneous as in the case of a fight. Both parties employ violence and neither can be said to be the sole originator of the encounter. The participation of both parties in terms of action is identical. If a determination of perpetrator is made at all it is often made after the fight, on the basis of who receives the most physical injury.¹⁰³

Even if the motivation of persons initiating violence is different from those using violence in self-defense, if this distinction can be made in any particular instance, the actual involvement and disorientation which is violence may not differ at all. A previous section described the mental state of persons victimized by violence and thus broke down elements of the disorientation process. Quotations were given from Toch, illustrating the elements as described by persons involved in violence. All of the quotations given were taken from men who had been convicted as the perpetrator in crimes of violence. They were the core of Toch's Violent Men.¹⁰⁴ Yet the quotations were probably assumed by you, the reader, to be of the victims of violence.

What is being suggested is that violence disorients its perpetrators as well as its victims, that most persons involved in violence in either capacity are victims. It is not suggested

that this is always the case and thus should be made part of a definition of violence. There are many cases of violence where perpetrator involvement is not so intimate. This is made particularly so by the inclusion of actions of which the potential victim is not aware. In these cases, the perpetrator is almost universally not disoriented. However, in cases which are reported involving physical injury or the implied threat of injury, it would seem that the action of violence disorients in both directions. It disorients the perpetrator, if there is one, through the intimate actuality or possibility of immediate reprisal in kind. The action removes the situation from that in which there is any certainty of control.

Disorientation as Orientation:
The Question of Subcultures

Although there is a definite lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of a subculture of violence,¹⁰⁵ few scholars doubt that various subcultural norms do exist with varying constraints and sanctions toward the use and nonuse of violence. Subcultural groups as well as individuals who share similar values treat violence differently than does the dominant culture of the United States.¹⁰⁶ However ambiguous that dominant culture may be as to violence, there is little doubt that subcultures may go beyond it in permitting, even requiring, violence. The question of relevance here is whether our definition of violence as it

has been developed is relevant to such subcultural groupings. Certainly, as Toch points out, some individuals and groups in society are more likely to be involved in violence than others. Whereas those individuals saw no alternatives to violence in their particular situations, we in the dominant culture tend to view their involvement as a matter of choice. Does the high propensity toward involvement, perhaps even a tendency to use violence, make it any less a disorienting action?

One way to avoid the problem is to emphasize the "capable of disorientation" modification, i.e., it would be disorienting if the average man were involved. However to continually resort to this definition modification is to destroy the actual victim emphasis of the concept. To attack the issue directly, one need only recall the quotations of Toch's convicted violent men. Most came from violent subcultures, and the prison which was their home was certainly a violent subculture. Though they resorted to violence frequently, the disorienting nature of the action was evident. It continually overturned and redefined social relationships.¹⁰⁷ A rather graphic image can be developed of "the slum boy who seems to worship violence to control his fear of it...."¹⁰⁸ Whereas an action might need to be perceived more intensely to totally involve and thus disorient an individual from a violence-prone subculture or holding violence-prone ideas, the actual definition of violence as disorientation which contains the notions of harm and pain is valid.

What Violence Is Not

We have arrived at a definition which describes the essence of violence and communicates an approximate idea of which actions are to be included in the conceptualization. At this point, the conceptualization boundaries will be sharpened by examining some phenomena which are not violence.¹⁰⁹ The first such category to be investigated is that of other actions, both specific and general.

Property Destruction

At the beginning of this chapter, it was argued that those persons who believed property damage was violence did so because of the effect of the damage on the owner. It is now time to return to this issue. Many scholars of violence have chosen to exclude property damage from their studies. Wolfgang and Ferracuti dealt only with homicide and other assaultive crimes. Toch studied only interpersonal violence on the assumption that "...society is more damaged when one person injures another than when property is destroyed."¹¹⁰ To Garver, violence as "violating persons" may in one sense be inclusive of one's property as an extension of a person, "...but one should always bear in mind that a person can reconcile himself much more readily to loss of property than he can to loss of life."¹¹¹ Holmes was concerned with violence against persons rather than against things,¹¹² and Audi came to the conclusion that violence to property was on a morally different footing from violence to persons.¹¹³

The question which these authors skirted is here confronted directly: is property destruction damage violence at all? Is property destruction disorienting in the manner we have described?

In terms of the disorientation of the perpetrator there are some obvious differences between property destruction and interpersonal violence. In the former, there is no involving dimension created by an immediate apprehension of retaliation. The destruction is a one-way relationship. In the vast majority of cases the owner is not present. The only apprehension on the part of the perpetrator is a fear of being caught in the future. An integral part of the disorientation of violence is that there is no future apart from the present. The perpetrator of property destruction cannot be included as a part of the conceptualization of violence.

The real issue is not whether or not the action of property destruction encompasses the perpetrator, but whether the action effects or is capable of effecting the victim in certain prescribed ways. Certainly an individual has a right to the product of his labor. Certainly destroying a person's property violates his rights in a blamable way. But should we consider the action of property destruction violence? There are several significant limitations to be made to its inclusion.

First, most cases of property destruction are vandalism of a very minor scale. We would hardly expect a businessman

upon arriving at his office and finding a window broken or obscene writing on his bathroom wall to suffer a painful, total, and involving disorientation of his behavior expectations of others. It is true that the degrees of disorientation vary in interpersonal violence, but the experience of having one's finger slightly cut is not analogous to the broken window. As we have seen, interpersonal violence involves an escalating dimension with an unknown outcome. A broken window, discovered later, does not. Only nontrivial destruction would be capable of disorienting an owner.

Second, most property has a monetary value to its owner and thus can be, and often is, insured. If insured property of primarily monetary value is destroyed through violent action and can be replaced at no loss to the owner, is there disorientation? The act of destruction could be violence only if the object destroyed was in some way dear or irreplaceable to its owner.¹¹⁴ Otherwise, if the thing damaged was insured and replaceable, it would be difficult to determine the victim in the sense of someone being harmed. The situation would be, rather, one of business as usual.

Taking an example that avoids both of these objections, suppose an individual arrives at his or her home to discover that the house has been burned to the ground. It is safe to assume in most cases that homes are dear to people in ways not compensated by insurance, and certainly the destruction is not trivial. The action is definitely disorienting, but

is it disorienting in the same way as described in interpersonal violence? Is it disorienting because of the action or because one has a razed house? The separation is, of course, analytical, but it is instructive. Would not the owner be just as disoriented if his house had been burned as a result of lightning as arson? Disorientation due to physical consequences appears somewhat different from the violence we have been describing. By analogy, is an individual cut in an "unavoidable," i.e., no blame, automobile accident disoriented in the same way as an individual receiving the same cuts in a fight? Is the criterion the cuts or the cutting? In the case of property, the emphasis is on the former, in interpersonal violence, the latter.

The fourth and final argument against the inclusion of property destruction in our conceptualization of violence is a reducto ad absurdum argument. If violence is thought to include the violation of property rights, then the more property one has, the more specific rights one has in relation to that property. Thus the more property people have, the greater potential they have for suffering violence and the infinity of violence they could conceivably suffer is larger than the infinity of violence which could be suffered by nonpropertied people. Either this proposition is an absurdity or the distribution of violence actually suffered compared to the potential for suffering violence is more disparate than the mind can realize.

In no study of violence is theft ever considered an act of violence. This fact is evidence that scholars insist on viewing property violence as the destruction of things rather than in terms of impact on owners or users.¹¹⁵ If violence is conceived as disorienting action, then theft merits consideration as violence. However, in that case, the action of theft is subject to the same arguments raised above.

These arguments are not designed to say that in no case is the destruction or theft of property violence. Indeed, if an owner were to witness the destruction or theft of nontrivial property which was dear to him, it would be hard to argue that the action was not violence. Similarly if the action was or was capable of being interpreted as a personal threat, or even an immediate threat of more property destruction, the action could be validly counted as violence with the disorientation definition. The position of this study is not that the definition of violence excludes all property destruction, but that in light of the extreme rarity of the conditions in which the label could be accurately applied, our conceptualization of violence should be limited to interpersonal and systemic violence.

Brutality

It has already been demonstrated that force was not the same as violence, but there are other terms often used in connection with violence which can help clarify the concept

by their own analysis: brutality is such a term. Much violence we would describe is brutal in the sense of its being savage or cruel, yet there are obvious cases where violence would not be described as brutal. To knock a man who is attempting to stab you to the ground is not brutal, but it is violence.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, we use brutal in cases which we would not describe as violence. According to Johnson, people can orient themselves to brutality, but not to violence. Therefore not all brutal actions are violence.¹¹⁷ On another track, physical cruelty to animals is appropriately called brutality, but seldom violence. The use of brutality is probably the result of our denial of rights to animals although they may be disoriented due to brutal actions as are people.¹¹⁸ The fact that brutality is closely approximated by the excessive use of force idea demonstrates that the term is not so relational as are concepts like violence or power.

Aggression

Aggression is often made synonymous with violence,¹¹⁹ yet the concept of aggression suffers from the last-mentioned deficiency of brutality-- it is not relational in the same sense as is violence. There is no minimal response aggression illicit or is capable of illiciting from the "aggrieved." Aggression is in this sense similar to Arendt's concept of strength. It is a property of the individual, not of a relationship between individuals to the degree as is violence. Aggression is often used with the concept of frustration to

explain the occurrence of violence,¹²⁰ but it must be kept in mind that the explanation of aggression may not be adequate as an explanation of violence.

The Causes, Effects, Consequences, and Functions of Violence

This chapter has dealt with the philosophical problem of determining what violence is and what our conceptualization of violence should include. There are many studies of violence concentrating on other aspects, such as the causes of violence.¹²¹ It is not in the scope of this study to evaluate, for example, the frustration-aggression thesis most often associated in political science with Ted Gurr.¹²² Suffice it to say, such motivational concerns are not necessary or useful for defining violence. Not only are the causes of violence somewhat more problematic in an empirical sense than the concept definition, but the richness of our overall understanding depends upon the relationship of the concept of violence to concepts outside of it other than those in causal relationship to it.

Similarly, other phenomena causally related to violence have been excluded from the concept and viewed as empirical questions over and beyond the examination of how we use violence in speech. We have ignored the physical destruction consequences of actions of violence and the effects of its harm upon life styles and standards of living. We have largely avoided the question of the impact of violence upon the personalities of those involved. Does violence have a

depersonalizing effect on people as Ghandi, Martin Luther King, or A. J. Muste would argue or does it bring out suppressed humanity as Sorel, Fanon, or Jean-Paul Sartre would emphasize?¹²³ How does violence effect social change? Is violence the cement behind the state as Max Weber suggests? Does violence as a special case of conflict contribute to stability?¹²⁴ On the other hand, is violence dysfunctional, in opposition to the power of the status quo?¹²⁵ Is violence most often associated with reaction or revolution? All of these questions are best thought of as empirical, not definitional, and thus are not pertinent to the task before us. Definitions and causes and effects should be kept as distinct as possible; otherwise, empirical findings can be criticized as tautologies.

Alternative Frameworks for Violence

In discussing what violence is not, it is important to be aware of what frameworks for understanding violence have been eliminated. The conscious development of a conceptual framework should not conceal the prior existence of possible alternatives.

To the degree that political scientists have placed violence in any type of conceptual context, it has usually been within two broad positions. The first of these positions is best described through the tradition of common law. Organized society exists, in a Lockian sense, to protect the rights of men in a more orderly fashion than would otherwise

be possible. Such rights involve freedoms of speech, participation in an electoral process, and especially the ownership of property. Common law thus exists, not to promote or discourage equality, but to ensure equality of opportunity in a more narrow sense. Within this framework, violence is generally viewed as action disruptive of those rights and the institutions protecting them, and specifically violence is viewed as action disruptive of property.

Many reasons for rejecting this framework have been given in this chapter. The entire development of the violence concept presented here has pointed away from the common law emphasis on property toward a criminal law emphasis on personal interactions or confrontations.¹²⁶ The common law emphasis on property is simply not useful when large population segments are relatively "propertyless." Can we say that propertyless persons suffer no violence or even that they suffer less than those who have property? Furthermore, the common law tradition has become an ideological rationalization for the status quo and has lost its value as an analytical construct because of its foreclosing of social alternatives.¹²⁷ In what esteem can we hold the promotion of equality of opportunity when that value stands in the way of more substantive equality?

The second broad framework in which political scientists traditionally conceive of violence concerns the notion of subcultures or cultural relativism.¹²⁸ Actions in all

extra-legal societies are the consequence of various norms and accompanying informal sanctions. Actions which violate the norm structure of the subculture lend themselves to the label of violence. Actions which do not violate that norm structure are not usually called violence. Thus an action called violence in the dominant, white, upper middle class is not necessarily violence within the context of the poor, black, uneducated classes. Within the latter, action labelled violence within the former may be the expected, even required behavior in a large number of situations.

This framework has been rejected in this chapter primarily because it denies the reality of the experience of violence for large numbers of people. Toch's prisoners, though becoming trapped in the habitual use of violence, are not so different from the rest of us that they could not feel anxiety, fear, pain, and suffer harm. The subcultural thesis denies a near-universal desire to avoid personal violence involvement, a desire that is evidenced in the ghetto as well as suburbia. Success or failure in that avoidance is perhaps far more indicative of situational factors than one's evaluation of violence as a negative or positive value.

Political scientists have cast violence into these frameworks largely as residual categories of violence which they believe is only marginally relevant for their study. Insofar as common law is linked to the conservative maintenance of property, political analysts in the common law

tradition are primarily interested in violence as a disruption or threatened disruption of the entire system which protects property rights. The residual violence is action which affects an individual ownership as opposed to the system of ownership. Political analysts in the subcultural tradition usually find themselves in the role of system apologists, emphasizing the lack of system capability to alter subcultural behavior. The poor and the black are involved in violence because they want to be or are raised violently, or some other similar variant. Violence only becomes political when a culture or subculture tries to force its values upon another, as in the case of riots directed against "respectable" business establishments. The two traditions arrive at a similar standpoint, perhaps separable only by emphasis: does the rioter take the television home to watch or smash the screen in the store?

Just as this chapter demonstrates the restrictions of these two frameworks and rejects them in regard to violence, so will the following chapter analyze the essence of these frameworks with regard to political violence. As in this chapter, the analysis proceeds utilizing concepts cross-cutting the alternative traditions. It is hoped that in this way the examination will reveal greater depth.

Summary: What Violence Is

Violence, in this chapter, has been delineated as an antisocial action which disorients or is, in a limited way,

capable of disorienting a person as a victim. It is disorienting action in that it creates chaos in the individual's expectations of others' behavior patterns. The disorientation experience is sudden, involving, uncontrollable, total, crucial, harmful, painful, and blamable. Actions conceptualized as violence under the definition are physical assaults, psychological assaults including threats of physical injury, and the above disorientation when caused by institutional arrangements acting through and on individuals. Persons conceptualized as having suffered from or experienced violence are those normally identified as victims and perpetrators and others who are disoriented by the action.

Chapter II has thus defined violence and given broad illustrations of what counts within a conceptualization of violence; Chapter III will delineate how violence should best be understood as politically relevant. Whereas the delineation of violence has been largely a careful examination of how the concept is used, the delineation of political violence will emphasize more heavily conceptualization in the recommendation dimension.

Notes

¹Scholars engaged in conscientious conceptualization are very sensitive to "essence-missing" criticism and may raise the question themselves. See Robert Audi, "On the Meaning and Justification of Violence," in Violence, ed. by Jerome A. Shaffer (New York: David McKay Company, 1971), p. 62.

²For a discussion of definition by stipulation and attribution, see Cnudde and Neubauer, p. 17.

³Newton Garver, "What Violence Is," in Violence in Modern Literature, ed. by James A. Gould and John J. Iorio (Boyd & Fraser Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 46-47. See also Ronald B. Miller, "Violence, Force and Coercion," in Violence, ed. by Jerome A. Shaffer (New York: David McKay Company, 1971), p. 19.

⁴See Chalmers Johnson's discussion of Max Weber. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 7-8.

⁵See Johan Galtung's discussion of violence as though it were a mode of influence. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, VI, No. 3 (1969), 169. See also Hans Toch, Violent Men: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Violence (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p. 5.

⁶See Miller, pp. 17-18.

⁷Once the label of violence was applied, then the question of how much violence might be answered by an estimate of the physical destruction, but the physical destruction would not determine the application of the label. More will be said about property damage later. See Galtung, p. 170.

⁸This is an observation parallel to Galtung's notion of truncated versions of violence. Galtung, pp. 169-171.

⁹See Toch, p. 5. See also Alan Little, "How Violent is Our Crime?" Twentieth Century, CLXXIII (Winter, 1964/65), 23. See also Rollo May, Power and Innocence: A Search for the Sources of Violence (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 210-211.

¹⁰Toch, p. vi.

¹¹Refer again to Johnson's discussion of Weber. Johnson, p. 8.

¹²Of course while all violence is social action, obviously not all social action is violence. The types of social action which are violence have yet to be isolated. Only upon their identification could a determination be made as to whether or not suicide is violence.

¹³See arguments by Ernest van den Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 66.

¹⁴Galtung, p. 171.

¹⁵For the separation of violence and oppression, see Audi, p. 70.

¹⁶Acceptance of this position on the centrality of action requires rejecting mortality rates as measures of individual or societal violence. Whereas these rates are effected by violence, they may also be the result of other social injustices. See Michael Haas, "Toward the Study of Biopolitics: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of Mortality Rates," Behavioral Science, XIV (1969), 257-280. See also Galtung, p. 177.

¹⁷In this connection, see Audi's distinction of violence as something done. He develops the distinction to separate doing violence from acting violently. Audi, p. 50.

¹⁸See Bachrach and Baratz.

¹⁹Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 67.

²⁰Basically, this argument is parallel to Miller's "ways of failing to injure, damage or destroy." Miller, p. 15.

²¹This fact seems valid for both individual level violence and violence between groups of individuals committing organized mass violence as in war.

²²In many cases, though, it might be justified morally and legally. For further elaboration and examples, see Audi, p. 58.

²³See Johnson, p. 8.

²⁴See Audi, p. 58, and Galtung, pp. 171-172. See also Bernard Harrison's discussion of responsibility as H. L. A. Hart's "defeasible" concept. Notice the comparatively broad list of legally acceptable "defeating pleas." Bernard Harrison, "Violence and the Rule of Law," in Violence, ed. by Jerome A. Shaffer (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971), p. 149.

²⁵If it turned out that acts of nature were under the control of persons who either intentionally or negligently released those destructive acts upon individuals, then the label of violence would begin appearing to describe those acts-- whether they involved the release of germs or the seeding of clouds.

Unintentional violence may require some sophistication in affixing blame and therefore the actor in the violence. (For psychosis and blame, see Audi, p. 58. For law and blame, see Harrison, p. 149.) If a soldier clumsily drops a crate of antipersonnel mines he is unloading from a truck, killing himself and several civilians, has he done violence in his negligence, or the packers who crated the mines in their negligence, or the factory managers who set the policy allowing mines of such a fragile nature to be produced for shipment? In cases where the blame for the violence is too fragmented, the label of violence will probably be avoided. In cases where blame is easily affixed-- the irate shopkeeper who in his zeal to stop a fleeing thief shoots one of his own customers-- violence is readily applied as a label.

Galtung also makes the link between the intentionality of the violence and what he refers to as guilt-- the notion we are advancing but with more obvious ties to Judeo-Christian ethics and Roman jurisprudence. Galtung, pp. 171-172.

²⁶Arendt, p. 106.

²⁷H. L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, ed. by Joan V. Bondurant (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971), p. 78.

²⁸The groundwork for such a view can be found in Peter H. Rossi and Richard A. Berk, "Local Political Leadership and Popular Discontent in the Ghetto," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXCI (September, 1970), 111-127. See also Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

²⁹We also disposed of intentionality on the "sufficiency condition," that not all intentionality was violence. This argument does not seem necessary in the case of rationality.

³⁰See Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York: Atheneum, 1961) and The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966). See also Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, trans. by Marjorie Kerr Wilson (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966).

³¹See Sam Keen and John Raser, "A Conversation with Herbert Marcuse," Psychology Today, IV, No. 9 (February, 1971), 37, 62, 66. See also Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

³²For example, Wolfgang and Ferracuti cite the figure of 5 percent as the proportion of "rational" homicides. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 189.

³³See Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, intro. by Robert K. Merton (New York: Viking Press, 1960).

³⁴Gary Marx, "Issueless Riots," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; CCCXCI (September, 1970), 26-32.

³⁵An interesting illustration of the restrictive application of the concept of rationality is the fact that in Great Britain one half to one third of all homicide offenders are classified as legally insane (compared to 2 to 4 percent in the United States). See Wolfgang and Ferracuti, pp. 201-202. Can murder as a form of violence de facto be an indication of irrationality and insanity?

³⁶Miller, pp. 22-23.

³⁷Marx, pp. 26-30.

³⁸See Arendt, p. 176. It is, in fact, one of the themes of this study.

³⁹Robert Paul Wolff, "On Violence," The Journal of Philosophy, LXVI, No. 19 (October 2, 1969), 614-615. Wolff details four distinct connotations of violence in the United States, corresponding to socio-economic class, of which three fit into the above description. See also Lynne B. Iglitzin, Violent Conflict in American Society (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 25-26.

⁴⁰Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, pp. 84-87.

⁴¹Christian Bay, "Violence as Negation of Freedom," The American Scholar, XL, No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), 635. Bay uses the phrase "semantical fortifications for oppression" and states that a regime's "...scholars and teachers become more essential in its defense than its cops and soldiers." See also Garver, p. 45.

⁴²See Arendt, pp. 134, 151. See also Wolff, p. 606.

⁴³Harrison, pp. 139-140.

⁴⁴For a more complete discussion of the breakdown of legitimacy, see John H. Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science, ed. by Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 282-290.

⁴⁵Wolff, pp. 606-610, 613.

⁴⁶By the same token we must also recognize that much violence is not justifiable since it is only necessary to raise the issue of justification in questionable actions. See Bernard Gert, "Justifying Violence," The Journal of Philosophy, LXIV, No. 19 (October 2, 1969), 617-620.

⁴⁷See Audi, pp. 74-99; Arendt, p. 151; and Gert, pp. 622-628.

⁴⁸For both of these arguments see Miller, pp. 23-24.

⁴⁹For example, notice the use of the gerund, forcing, at the end of the previous paragraph. See Miller, pp. 27, 31-33.

⁵⁰Violence as the application of strength is close to the Arendt definition of violence but, recognizing the dual meanings of force in its noun and verb forms, she declines the use of the term. Arendt, pp. 142-145. This formulation differs somewhat from Miller, who includes the notion of "overpowering" within force. Miller, pp. 31-33. In the present formulation, force would not have to be overpowering or intended to overpower. The present formulation also differs from an interpretation offered by Robert L. Holmes, "Violence and Nonviolence," in Violence, ed. by Jerome A. Shaffer (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971), p. 68. If force were simply the expenditure rather than the application of energy, all violence would involve force, but so would every other action. Force as the application of physical strength also seems consistent with the concept presented by Bachrach and Baratz.

⁵¹See Holmes, pp. 111-113, and Galtung, pp. 169-170.

⁵²Uniform Crime Reports Guide Manual: Florida Uniform Crime Reports (Tallahassee, Florida: Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Uniform Crime Reports Bureau, 1971), p. 2.2.

⁵³See, for example, Audi, p. 54.

⁵⁴For a broader understanding of this category, see its rudiments in Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 41-44. For more contemporary usage see Galtung, pp. 170-171.

⁵⁵See Miller, pp. 19-20, and Audi, pp. 54-56, 60.

⁵⁶Miller, p. 19.

⁵⁷Audi, p. 53.

⁵⁸Miller, pp. 20-22.

⁵⁹The reader is reminded that the definition development being presented is essence-oriented. This orientation requires that violence has only one essence. Violence is something, not violence is this or this or this. Audi is concerned lest his definition of violence be seen as missing the essence and introducing three subsidiary concepts of violence. (pp. 62-63). The present definition development will not result in an Audi-type defense of separate violence concepts. There will be one concept with multiple manifestations. The rejection of "either or" definitions assures the rejection of actor-side characteristics which can be used to describe particular manifestations of violence but which are not definitional.

⁶⁰Garver, p. 47.

⁶¹Ibid. Only if rights are viewed as capable of being given up, are right's violations not descriptive of violence. In this case the boxer who voluntarily enters the ring suffers no violence since he waived his right not to be beaten. See Audi, p. 59.

⁶²See Garver, p. 48; Galtung, p. 168; and May, p. 31. Violation of dignity or integrity also explains some common derivative uses of the term violence concerning human actions and nonhuman objects. Examples are doing violence to the truth, to someone's intentions, or to a piece of music. See Holmes, p. 111.

⁶³Charles Thomas Samuels, "Doing Violence," The American Scholar, XL, No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), 695.

⁶⁴See, for example, Audi, pp. 80-81.

⁶⁵Miller, p. 17.

⁶⁶Audi, p. 60.

⁶⁷Holmes, p. 112.

⁶⁸Harrison, pp. 141-142.

⁶⁹Eugene V. Walter, "Violence and the Process of Terror," in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, ed. by Joan V. Bondurant (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, Inc., 1971), p. 92.

⁷⁰For an illustration of the difference between harm and violence, see Audi, p. 65. The difference in Audi's example, though, hinges from centering the definition of violence closely around the intensity of the actor's action, thus not taking into account technically efficient means of doing violence.

⁷¹Audi, p. 61.

⁷²See Galtung, pp. 169-170; Audi, pp. 54-55; Holmes, pp. 111-113; Garver, pp. 52-53; Johnson, pp. 8-10; and Iglitzin, p. 27.

⁷³Galtung, pp. 169-170.

⁷⁴Audi, pp. 54-55; Holmes, pp. 111-113; and Walter, p. 93.

⁷⁵Galtung, p. 168.

⁷⁶See Johnson, pp. 8-10. Johnson also viewed violence as the attempt to create mental anguish, i.e. to disorient, but that part of the definition must be rejected on the basis of the inadequacies of the characteristic of intentionality in violence definitions.

⁷⁷See Johnson, p. 8. Social action is action which is oriented by the expectations of the behavior of others. Violence and most other actions are social in this sense. Submeanings have more of a future than past connotation. In this context, social action is action which creates stable behavior expectations, and antisocial action prevents the development of such expectations. It is in the latter case that violence as a social action becomes violence as an antisocial action, i.e., a disorienting action.

⁷⁸Iglitzin, pp. 26-27; Garver, pp. 49-58; Audi, pp. 52-53; and Galtung, pp. 169-172.

⁷⁹Johnson, p. 8.

⁸⁰If Johnson's use of intent is limited to actions which are taken, rather than referring to a decision to commit a particular action, intent becomes more useful than its meaning rejected in note 75 and earlier in the chapter. Intending to shoot someone thus becomes broken down into components, firing the gun at the person and the desired result of disorientation, and only after the former can the possibility of violence based on the latter criterion be suggested. Intent becomes, not just intent of the perpetrator, but intent of the action which was taken. However, this modification requires the inclusion of trivial actions when accompanied by misjudgment on the part of the perpetrator. It also is inaccurate in imputing such sophistication on the part of the perpetrator. Most actors intend by their actions something far more concrete than disorientation.

⁸¹See Arendt, p. 106, and Wolff, pp. 612-613.

⁸²Norman Mailer, "Talking of Violence," Twentieth Century, CLXXIII (Winter, 1964/65), 109-114. Mailer views violence as the epitome of the existential experience-- an epitome which this chapter hopes to capture.

⁸³For a concise discussion of the phenomenological approach, see Michael Weinstein, Identity, Power, and Change (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971), pp. 213-214.

⁸⁴Mailer, p. 113.

⁸⁵See May, p. 188. May believes the importance of the physical aspect of violence in large part rests upon its symbolic representation of the totality of involvement.

⁸⁶In contrast to an earlier discussion, in the very immediate sense of not being subject to control through reason, all violence involvement has a strong irrational element. This element is also present in the time dimension to be discussed.

⁸⁷Quoted in Toch, p. 22.

⁸⁸Toch, p. 28.

⁸⁹May, p. 188.

⁹⁰Mailer, p. 111.

⁹¹May attempts to separate "fight, aggression, and violence" from "flight, anxiety, and fear." May, pp. 182-184. In contrast, Wolfgang and Ferracuti state that it is physiologically difficult to distinguish between anger and fear and that the emotion exhibited may be the result of chance. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, pp. 142, 196. For the purposes of this study, it is here suggested that violence victimization results in emotional stress which may involve either response or both.

⁹²Toch, p. 28.

⁹³Galtung, p. 172. See also his discussion of truncated violence, p. 170.

⁹⁴For a parallel situation and argument see Audi, p. 59.

⁹⁵Obviously, this shift simply moves part of the ambiguity of violence to the ambiguity or relative portrayal of the average person. It cannot be helped. The general notion of who is disoriented helps bring the case of homicide and instant death under the label of violence. In one sense, the physical victim can be seen as having undergone the

ultimate in disorientation and collapsed time dimension, but since there is no evidence on what is felt in instantaneous death such a statement borders on the absurd. The action is, however, disorienting to all who are close to it. It is disorienting to us as observers, as average individuals.

⁹⁶Such a situation might exist where A insulted B and knew that B was required to redem his status.

⁹⁷Carmichael and Hamilton, pp. 41-44. See also Johnson, p. 10. A variation of systemic violence is the primary theme of Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

⁹⁸Iglitzin, p. 107.

⁹⁹Galtung, pp. 169-170.

¹⁰⁰Mailer, pp. 109-114

¹⁰¹See Toch.

¹⁰²Mailer, pp. 109-114.

¹⁰³Uniform Crime Reports Guide Manual, p. 2.2.

¹⁰⁴For Toch's sample see Toch, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰⁵See Wolfgang and Ferracuti, pp. 140-163, 312.

¹⁰⁶For a view denying any difference in cultural and subcultural uses of violence, see Iglitzin, pp. 92, 99.

¹⁰⁷Toch, p. 44.

¹⁰⁸William A. Westley, "The Escalation of Violence through Legitimation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXIV (March, 1966), 120-126.

¹⁰⁹See the discussion of definition by exclusion or negative differentiation in Cnudde and Neubauer, pp. 17-18. For an example, see Giovanni Sartori, "What Democracy Is Not," in Empirical Democratic Theory, ed. by Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 23-40.

¹¹⁰Toch, p. 34.

¹¹¹Garver, pp. 48-49.

¹¹²Holmes, p. 109.

113 Audi, pp. 98-99.

114 Galtung, p. 170

115 In spite of the arguments advanced in this chapter, p. 12.

116 See Audi, p. 69.

117 Johnson, p. 8.

118 Peter Singer, "Animal Liberation," New York Review of Books, XX, No. 5 (April 5, 1973), 17-21.

119 Wolfgang and Ferracuti, p. 187, and May, pp. 182-183.

120 See Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," in Anger, Violence, and Politics, ed. by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 31-57.

121 For an emphasis similar to the present chapter, see Garver, p. 46.

122 See Ted Robert Gurr, The Conditions of Civil Violence (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1967), pp. 3-14. A similar perspective was accepted by both the Kerner Commission and the Violence Commission reports to be covered later in this study.

123 See especially Sartre's "Preface" to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 7-26.

124 See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 8.

125 See Johnson, p. 10. For a slightly different phrasing of the question, see Arendt, pp. 150-155.

126 This same shift is discernible even in some concepts employed to understand violence as riots. See the discussion of the shifting "patterns" of violence from Negro-dominated, property-oriented to Negro-dominated, person-oriented in Louis H. Masotti, Jeffrey K. Hadden, Kenneth F. Seminatore, and Jerome R. Corsi, A Time to Burn? (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 98-134.

127 See Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909). For more general development of the common law tradition, see also Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921); Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial

Process, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); W. C. Robinson, Elementary Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1882); F. W. Maitland and F. C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1915); and John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954).

128 For a concise discussion of the subcultural thesis and its implications with regard to violent subcultures see Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Preface to Violence," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXIV (March, 1966), 1-7.

CHAPTER III

TOWARD THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Literature attempting to squarely confront the question of the political significance of violence is practically nonexistent. As a rule, political scientists are much more likely to work within a more limited framework which specifically confines attention to particular aspects of the topic. Hence the literature abounds with references to collective violence, or mass political violence, or purposive political violence. Few authors have addressed themselves to the question of how violence can be most usefully conceptualized as political. In this chapter, a review of the various ways political violence has been viewed will attempt to isolate a trend, albeit not chronological, toward a more eclectic understanding of all the manifestations of the phenomenon. Such an understanding necessarily entails an overall view of how the political system operates as well as the place of violence in relation to that system. Such a view is necessary in terms of trends in the discipline described by Iglitzin.

...that political violence is an integral part of politics, that it does not consist of isolated acts done by 'sick' people but is institutionalized in the most basic structures and values of the society with effects which have ramifications upon us all--reflect one ripple of the 'new wave' of political science thinking.¹

Common Ways of Conceptualizing Violence as Political

However inadequately articulated, most studies of political violence derive those specific acts of violence they feel are relevant by emphasizing the particular nature of one of the analytical parts of violence presented in Chapter II. Analogous to the actor-action-object trichotomy, violence is considered political because of who is doing it, the nature of the violence being done, or to whom it is being done. The scope of the violent acts considered political is drastically reduced by applying criteria related to one or more of these areas.

Political Violence as Based on Who Does It: Political Violence as Collective Action

One important way of answering the question of which violence is political can be traced back to the nineteenth century and Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd.² Accepting the notion of politics as collective action, it perceives the violent activities of crowds or mobs as inherently political.³ There are actually two distinct dimensions of this mob or, in contemporary terms, riot, perspective of political violence. The first concerns the number of individual actors involved--the violence must be collective. Ted Gurr's work defines "civil violence," his substitution for the more problematic "political violence," as "referring to at least twenty people...."⁴ In a more recent study, Douglas Hibbs, dealing with mass political violence, makes a somewhat redundant

criterion that the activity must be "collective" or "mass" even though he recognizes that nonmass violent activity may be both the result of political arrangements and public issues in their own right.⁵ Ernest van der Haag states that group violence is always political in effect.⁶

The second dimension of political violence as collective action adds to the notion of the crowd as mob, having a mind of its own apart from individual mores or legal confines. The collective action of violence is political because, at least for a short period of time, it does not acknowledge the power relationship of the state or society over it.⁷ It is precisely this aspect which, perhaps more than any other factor, led political scientists to the study of riot behavior in the late 1960's. The rioters did not appear to be bound by the rules and norms of the dominant society in which they normally operated compatibly.

An important off-shoot of this dimension has been its development beyond spontaneous riots. Politically relevant violence usually includes the concept of subcultural systems discussed in Chapter II-- systems whose norms not only permit but may require the action of violence in a variety of situations.⁸ The problem of political violence in society thus becomes less temporal in terms of specific actions. Persons acting within their own normative subsystem structure against dominant values as well as persons temporarily exceeding their own value structure are said to be engaged

in political violence. Black violence against the status quo is political violence even if it is required of blacks within their own value subsystem.

A somewhat less structural variation of the crowd mentality differing from the subcultural theme can be found in the belief that political violence is intimately connected with an audience to which the actors play for encouragement and support.⁹ Ghetto riots might be a subcultural manifestation of violence, but the violence of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) is forced to rely upon and encouraged by individuals sharing some of the SLA values but not living in a subcultural situation with its accompanying norms and sanctions. That this idea of encouragement of violence by group values is an outgrowth of the collective behavior notion of political violence is indicated by the inclusion of assassinations on these grounds in Hibbs' study of mass political behavior.¹⁰ Iglitzin, speaking in the context of collective violence, also assumes this perspective in her attempts to distinguish between the violence values of various radical groups.¹¹ In summary, political violence, defined from the standpoint of the actor, revolves around numbers of persons participating in value encouraged or value overridden unrestrained activity.

Political Violence as Based on the Nature of the Activity:
Violence Aiming for Political Objectives

If political violence is often conceptualized around numbers of people engaged in unrestrained activity, it is just as often hinged to the nature and objectives of the actions. For Hibbs, the violence must be in opposition to governmental policy, antisystem in nature.¹² The Gurr study sees the relevant form of violence as "nongovernmental."¹³ Van der Haag sees it as political "...when used to control or influence collective policies or the distribution of power. Violence by individuals is political only when it has such social aims."¹⁴ Iglitzin sees political violence as "rational purposive behavior closely related to social change."¹⁵ Such behavior is possible by governmental, pro-governmental, and antigovernmental forces.

The paradigm of violence as political in the sense of aiming for political objectives is revolution. Riots staged for the purpose of drawing national attention to poverty are another example since the rioters have the objective of changing governmental policy. As is the case in collective violence, political violence as aiming for political objectives excludes violent crime in the usual sense of homicide, assault or robbery. It does so on the grounds that revenge or a personal readjustment of finances is not a political objective. Conceptualizing political violence in this way leads to seeing the confrontations of the sixties as relevant insofar as they were "provoked confrontations"

in an attempt to bring about political goals. This description might be illustrated by student violence at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

Political Violence as To Whom It Is Done: Involving Political People

The notion that political violence as a special case of violence might be delineated by the identity or role of the victim has not received much overt attention among political scientists. Yet if the delineation has not been articulated, it would seem to underlie the increased academic awareness of violence and academic interest in it. The concept of who qualifies as a "political people" in this way of defining violence as political is broad and has two aspects. On the one hand, if the victim is a public official, the violence may be thought of as political in a context similar to that described in the preceding section, i.e. an attack directed at changing public policy. An example would be assassination. However, more central to this notion is violence to persons who are in turn capable of fairly directly influencing public policy, whether they are public officials or not. In this sense, violence to powerful private individuals, or even the upper and middle classes of society would be political. Not just assassination but the kidnaping of corporation executives would be considered political violence.

There is an illustrative analogy which can be made with drug control and transferred to aid in understanding this way of seeing violence as political. In the early 1960's, as long as drugs were confined to the ghettos and slums, there was no "drug problem." It was only when white, middle-class teenagers became hooked that the problem was "discovered." Similarly, in the 1960's, politically influential people at many levels, however weak the objective basis, began to have anxieties about their possible involvement in violence, and violence became an increasingly popular topic of study among political scientists.¹⁶

Summary of Common Ways of Conceptualizing Violence as Political

Delineating political violence as that violence which victimizes politically influential people greatly increases the scope of acts which can be considered political violence. It and the other common ways of delineating political violence, however, have numerous limiting restrictions. Playing the numbers game with actors is artificial, even in terms of operationalization. Why cannot ten or five persons or one person be engaged in political violence? And what about actors rationally aware of laws and social norms, cannot they be involved in political violence? In the case of aiming for political objectives, intentionality seems more unnecessarily restrictive than it was in defining the original concept of violence.¹⁷ Are not "issueless" riots

political?¹⁸ Political violence based upon the person victimized makes possible the inclusion, as the other ways do not, of "normal" criminal violence and systemic violence in certain instances. Yet even this perspective is exclusive of repressive violence of the state used against persons who are not or who are only potentially politically influential in a very broad sense.

Placing violence in the influence model to determine its political nature can isolate important types or subtypes of political violence, but to do so is to inevitably ignore phenomena of violence with important political implications. Reducing description to a highly developed level may obscure as much as it enlightens.¹⁹ The common ways of viewing violence as political are too deeply steeped in specific aspects of the concept to grasp any overall meaning. Political violence may vary in its manifestations, but in our essence-seeking bias we are forced to step away and look from and for a broader perspective.

Stepping Back: The Societal Consequences of Violence

One of the few attempts to systematically isolate and elaborate the overall relationship of violence and the political process, written by H. L. Nieburg, sees political violence in terms of its societal consequences. Political violence is that violence

...whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or

effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.²⁰

If we ignore a rather inadequate treatment of what violence is, we can attach Nieburg's concept of political violence to the concept of violence presented in this study. As such, political violence would incorporate the disorientation, suffering, and harm of violence, but would go beyond immediate disorientation to other social effects. Recognizing that violence is both functional and dysfunctional in its social effects,²¹ Nieburg conceives of social effects or consequences in terms of bargaining relationships. In a sense, this notion of bargaining consequences is analogous to the influence relationship which structured the development of the definition of violence. Two characteristics seem sufficient to distinguish between the two constructs. First, the effects on bargaining do not form a stereotype where the actor enhances his position by his use of violence on a victim. The improvement of a bargaining position in any particular case may belong to the victim or to an uninvolved third party who finds his position enhanced vis-a-vis his noninvolvement. Second, the disorientation of violence is emphasized in its social, rather than personal, context. Violence is intimately connected with a larger dynamic context than its immediate situation.²² Political violence from this perspective is not perpetrators or victims or

actions, but an impact of these manifestations upon more generalized social relationships.

The usefulness of the Nieburg conceptualization is that it permits a high level of integration of political violence with what we know as the political system. That system is identified with a continual, dynamic bargaining process over concrete policy alternatives and outcomes.²³ Violence, to Nieburg, should not be seen as merely chaotic behavior, deviant to that prescribed by social norms. Rather violence and its accompanying disorder is a part of the political process which includes a continuum of political behavior.²⁴ Implicit in this formulation is not only a continuum of political acts of which violence is a part, but also a continuum of violence, part of which is political. In other words, not only is violence a phenomenon which is often a part of the political process, but there are varying degrees of how political that violence is. The ability to say "if" or "how" political an act is apart from highly restrictive characteristics of the act itself (such as numbers of participants) would seem to be a useful conceptualization. It recognizes, for instance, that normal criminal violence may be political. It recognizes that some level of violence is to be expected in political life.

We are led to doubt the Nieburg conceptualization, however, primarily because of the particular perspective of the political system it forces us to accept. We are led to

doubt the bargaining equation conceptualization of political violence not first because of what it says about political violence but because of what it says about the political process. Nieburg was right in integrating political violence with the political system, but can we accept, first, his political system and, consequently, his conceptualization of political violence? Are we, as he suggests, a democratic state which encourages pluralist power structures thus insuring that violence will not just shift the bargaining advantage, but change the bargaining equation? Is our society so responsive to political behavior, especially on the high risk violence end of the spectrum, that only token or potential or threatened violence is enough to change the bargaining equation? Is this sensitivity and responsiveness to inputs so high that a few instances of violence inputs are greatly exaggerated?²⁵ To consider political violence as primarily instrumental in this way, as recommended by Nieburg as well as Arendt, is to miss the meaning of political violence by accepting completely the myth of plural-democracy. If political violence is instrumental to someone in the dynamic social bargaining advantage sense Nieburg suggests, it is hard to explain why the relationship among the users of violence, the victims, and the noninvolved has remained so static.²⁶ Political personalities have varied and the form of laws has been altered, but in a Marxian sense the economic and social realities of which the state is a reflection show little significant change.

Stepping Further Back:
Political Violence as the Distribution of Violence

Politics and the Political System

Most conceptualizations of politics and the political system revolve around two dimensions: (1) the gaining and exercising of power and authority and (2) the distribution of scarce goods or values, i.e., what the power is used for and what are the consequences of its use. Nieburg, Arendt, Johnson, and most other political scientists have tended to view political violence from the first dimension. Political violence is a method to be used in gaining, influencing, or maintaining political power or access to persons with political power. As has been discussed, such a view often leads to an overestimation of the dynamism of our own political process. If it does not, it must confirm the instrumental insignificance of political violence in the United States. This study will conceptualize political violence as a part of the second or distributive dimension of the political system.

Awareness of the distributive dimension of politics can be traced to the writings of Aristotle. Aristotle recognized this dimension when he made one of the two classification criteria for government "in whose benefit" the rulers ruled.²⁷ Governments made decisions which affected, at a minimum, all persons living in that society. Looking at governments around him, Aristotle could see that those decisions inherently contained a bias. The bias of those decisions

and the very issues which were decided revealed the governments' role in the distribution of the objects of public decision-making. Aristotle saw that one man, a few men, or many men could rule in their own interest or in everyone's interest.

The same bias of political decisions has been noted throughout history. It is reflected in Anatole France's famous line, "The law, in its majestic equality, treats rich and poor alike for stealing bread and sleeping under bridges." It is also emphasized in the contemporary writings of E. E. Schattschneider.²⁸ The bias was given preeminence as the very reason for the existence of the state by Harold D. Lasswell who saw politics as the process whereby the influential determined who got what, when and how.²⁹ Such a perspective of the political process is often presented in any of a number of elitist positions as dichotomized against legitimacy/consensus positions. The former have received their most persistent support from the writings of Neo-Marxists such as C. Wright Mills, although elitist positions are certainly not limited to Neo-Marxist thought.

The suggestion that violence might be one of the "whats" being distributed forces an analysis of what the distribution aspect of the political system entails. David Easton defines the distributional dimension through his perception of the "allocation of values."³⁰ Values as used in this context may refer to regulations demanding behavior reflecting abstract

concepts such as loyalty or integration, or it may refer to more material goods such as subsidies or income taxes. As this latter example indicates, value allocations may be either positive or negative. The political system is usually linked to the allocation of collective goods, allocations which are nonexclusive in nature like law and order in contrast to market goods like Cadillacs or color televisions.³¹ However, the distinction is quite blurred. Structural mechanisms can encourage individuals or groups to supply collective goods and, more importantly, all societies are "nonoptimal" in supplying collective goods. Political decisions make the exploitation of some groups of people probable, and determine which groups.³²

However vast the scope of values distributed by the political system, there are two descriptive or defining characteristics of political allocations: the values are scarce or in limited supply, and they are distributed unequally throughout the society. Scarcity is easily visualized in the sphere of material goods. Obviously, not everyone can be given tax breaks or depletion allowances; to do so would destroy the state's income and make impossible the relative encouragement of one sector of the economy. Similarly, the relationship between scarcity and allocations can be seen in environmental controls. There were no political decisions on air pollution until clean air came to be viewed as a scarce resource.

Distribution by regulation is a scarce commodity in a more subtle way.³³ On the surface, there is no limit to the number of regulations which could be passed altering values. How is integration or a loyalty oath or new additions to the criminal code scarce? If political regulations simply codify existing value structures, they are superfluous and not really value allocations at all. If they allocate new values, as in the case of integration or prohibition or even Miranda decisions, there are enforcement costs. Given, however, that there is a large proportion of the population who, on a given range of issues, would accept a new distribution of values and require no enforcement costs, the scarcity of these regulatory decisions requires another explanation. It would seem that their scarcity can be best understood through Easton's concept of a reservoir of diffuse support.³⁴ There is a very finite number of such regulations which can be passed in any area without seriously eroding this reservoir of support. Thus nonmaterial regulation to allocate values is a scarce resource also, as former President Nixon discovered when he tried redistributing values within the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.

Lasswell described the influential as those who get the most of what there is to get.³⁵ By "what there is to get" he referred to the fact that the resources or values of society are unequally distributed. This latter point is so

obvious as to be a truism. No matter which stratification system is analytically applied, societal benefits will be unequally allocated.³⁶ Whereas a given level of personal inequality is dictated by scarcity, patterns of inequality are established through the political process. It is a mistake to visualize, as is often done in pluralist-democracy frameworks, a neutral government responding to the loudest voices which belong to those we consequently refer to as influentials. Rather, "...the state could be defined as an institutional complex which is the political embodiment of the values and interests of the dominant class."³⁷ It embodies these interests primarily because of the unequal distribution of our first aspect of politics, power, as manifest in access to or control over decision-making agencies and other institutions.³⁸ Thus, whereby it is possible to say that from some point of view bias and inequality are inherent in all political systems, the particular bias of any given political system cannot be viewed as accidental. Whereas some biases may be the unanticipated consequences of another decision, most specific biases and the overall pattern of bias must be viewed as intended and purposeful and political. Distributions are the result of distributing; they are, in a very real sense, allocations.

There are a number of issues implicit in what has just been said. First, seeing the political system as unequally allocating scarce values is easy in the abstract, but in

thinking about concrete actions, is inequality really the raison d'être of the system's existence? Do all political systems act in this way? These questions are inherent in our own socialization which includes myths about the state as the ally of the poor in controlling the rich. Is the direction of state functioning toward inequality or equality? Should we define political systems by their idealistic dimensions or by their actual operations? Are the equalities suggested by the supposedly nonexclusive nature of collective goods indicative of political direction or concessions perpetuated to protect and maintain a status quo?

Underneath these questions is another dimension previously mentioned in the discussion of an elitist perspective of political systems. The development so far has centered around the distribution of values and who benefits from that distribution. Perhaps underlying this sociological emphasis is the Neo-Marxian assumption that all capitalist governments are illegitimate in that any consensus on basic values which might exist is the result of a false consciousness. That is, that the politically poor would not, if aware of alternatives, freely choose and adhere to a system of values which required their own inferior status and political impotency. The important issue, from the Neo-Marxist perspective, would be legitimacy, which is not synonymous with consensus.³⁹ The question of whose values

are unequally distributed to the benefit of the politically influential is, however, not directly at issue in this study, either theoretically or implicit in the data.

The framework provided for understanding the data is that of an elitist model with varying degrees of consensus attained through political socialization patterns-- and with varying degrees of socialization being necessary for consensus on different issues. Such a framework is consistent both with studies emphasizing consensus of values as in Miller-Stokes' congressmen/constituency, vote/value congruence on civil rights decisions and general public acceptance of most value allocations⁴⁰ and with studies like McClosky's emphasizing the difference in values between elites and masses,⁴¹ supported by such highly visible unpopular response to various elite decisions such as school integration or interrogation of prisoners.

Two points need to be stressed. First, an elite model need not be dichotomous with a consensus model, and the question of the legitimacy of elite government is a totally different issue from that under study here. Second, to the degree that "nonconsensus" or "nonlegitimacy" is implicit in the framework provided, that part of the framework extends beyond the scope of the political violence data empirically analyzed herein (although the entire framework and the data would not be inconsistent). The central question examined in this study concerns the unequal/nonrandom distribution of

a particular value in society. Only in providing an overall framework is the question of who benefits by a particular distribution raised, and only insofar as it is implicit in the notion of unequal benefits does the issue of illegitimacy or orchestrated consensus become relevant enough to require mention.

The contemporary academic concern with consensus is in large measure an outgrowth of decision-making studies. This study has relevance to such an orientation only by providing suggestions as to the decision areas which should be studied. Scholars of decision-making have recommended that researchers "...make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it."⁴² Decision-making studies of the above Bachrach-Baratz school ask "Is the distribution of benefits and privileges highly unequal and, if so, why?"⁴³ This study relates to decision-making only as pre-theory; it asks about the distribution, but it does not ask the how or why. Within its framework, elites are not specifically those who are able to impose their will-- such inferences go beyond the scope of the empirical analysis. Elites are defined in Lasswellian terms as those who get the most of what there is to get.

Within this context, a number of questions are not asked. With regard to the overall pattern of "gets," it is not asked if the elite benefits were desired and actively

pursued by the elite members, an issue raised in the oft-cited case of doctors and Medicare. It is an assumption of the framework that the overall pattern of benefits is desired by the recipients. In addition, it is not asked if the pattern of benefits is the result of specific elite actions. The techniques or mechanisms by which the unequal allocations were acquired is not the subject of investigation, although various means are later suggested. The significance of the distribution is not felt to be altered by allocative techniques, including those relating to consensus.

Beneath the rejection of decision-making goals and techniques and the issue of value consensus as a subject of investigation is an assumption of the framework that such analysis is either redundant or secondary. When seen as redundant, one approximates a Neo-Marxian position and employs concepts such as "false consensus" to attach responsibility for the status quo upon societal elites in a rather unitary sense.⁴⁴ When seen as secondary, the rejection of the aforementioned issues is simply a part of a research strategy of delineating potentially important issue areas before examination. The ambiguity in the framework is the subject of further discussion in the concluding chapter.

Violence as a Political Allocation

Violence when viewed instrumentally is cast totally into the first dimension of politics-- a method to gain and

maintain power. With regard to influencing the distributions of values, the Nieburg conceptualization of political violence captures this dimension admirably. But if we consider violence as benefiting a noninvolved third party, the conceptualization weakens, and if we consider violence as an end value in itself, the conceptualization breaks down. Violence as an allocation and not primarily a method of allocation is centered in the distributive dimension of politics.

Violence, as was established in the second chapter, is a painful, disorienting experience which must be considered a strong negative value, in spite of the fact that it may have positive consequences, especially in some subcultures. If values are distributed unequally in society, it is logical to see violence, as a negative value, distributed unequally. As early as 1906 Sorel perceived violence as a class phenomena. Central to his thought was the notion that violence had been thrust upon the lower class, the proletariat, and that the upper classes had attempted to isolate themselves from violence.⁴⁵ The unequal class distribution of such actions is probably best demonstrated by visualizing the opposite of violence, safety or security, and seeing how the opposite is distributed in society, since we are more accustomed to speak of the allocation of positive values.

In Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Harold Lasswell lists "safety" as one of the three primary goals the influentials, or dominant class, are trying to obtain.⁴⁶

Safety or security would seem to be a rough approximation of the opposite of violence defined in general terms. As such, safety is not a means of allocation but an allocation itself. Safety would seemingly qualify also as a scarce value, not a matter of unlimited regulatory power. If it were a matter of mere regulations and not, for example, costly police protection, surely political leaders would have been far more successful in achieving safety for themselves than their record demonstrates.⁴⁷ It seems reasonable to assume that all societies manifest a varying level of violence as contrasted to perhaps safety, and that the violence will be distributed disproportionately heavier among the politically "lower" classes in contrast to the "influentials."⁴⁸

On another level, the state itself confirms its concern with violence. The passage of antiviolence laws, the expenditures on enforcement, and now the appearance of bills and laws compensating victims of violent crimes, as though the violence occurred only through the failure of state antiviolence measures, demonstrate this concern.⁴⁹ Thus violence as a political allocation is acceptable as an official definition by some political systems and subsystems themselves. Furthermore, once a state has intervened or shown itself capable of intervention in a given issue area, as illustrated above, it cannot depoliticize the issue by withholding it from the public arena. In such an instance, the lack of a decision is as much an allocation as if the issue were publicly resolved.⁵⁰

Violence as a negative allocation does not exclude the possibility that violence may have instrumental uses, although it does change the primary emphasis. Violence allocations in the system may result from a simple desire on the part of the politically powerful to avoid painful disorientations as suggested in Note 48. On the other hand, they may serve to maintain the status of the influentials vis-a-vis the violence-prone population. Or, those allocations may result in rebellion of violence-prone populations who, because they receive few positive allocations, are forced to employ negative values as methods of bargaining.⁵¹

It is, in other words, very difficult to affix singular reasons for the general occurrence of violence allocations apart from the reasons for any other allocations. In terms of any change in bargaining advantage or bargaining equation, violence may have very little visible impact. Riots in America have not caused significant reorderings of public priorities-- probably not even in law enforcement agencies. Such actions could have that effect only upon demonstrating society's permanent inability to cope with violence in normal ways. Similarly, the reduction of overt police violence over the past several decades has not effected the distribution of public goods. Such violence was largely "overkill," duplicating the effects of socialization.⁵² Both government and antigovernment violence has not budged us from the present plateau of relative class influence. Borrowing from theories

of development, Nieburg's dynamic bargaining advantage notion may be theoretically salvaged using a stage theory of instrumental violence, but since we cannot discern different stages, that salvation is superfluous. It seems far more reasonable to see violence in terms of allocations which in turn may have different instrumental uses. At its essence, however, it is a negative value pushed off on those with little political power to resist.

Violence and Equality

Having established that political allocations are made of scarce values, that those values are distributed unequally in society, and that violence is an allocation, it follows that violence is distributed unequally in society. Whereas the nature of social life and the nature of scarce resources dictate an inequality in distribution, the political process dictates that the allocations will manifest a systematic bias toward the values of the decision-makers.⁵³ What we would expect to empirically find, understanding violence as an allocation, is an unequal distribution in the specific sense of nonrandomness among social stratifications. What is distinctly political about violence is not that one person suffers while others do not, but who that person is in terms of social class and its limitations upon political power.

The perpetual class inequality of both market and collective goods prevents the entrenchment of any notion

connecting the state with equality.⁵⁴ Such inequality militates against the image of the political system represented by the state as, in reified terms, well-intentioned but powerless to bring about equality. It rejects this image because the image views the political system or the state as a third party to the conflict, rather than as an integral part of social domination.

However, there is an intermediate position to be refuted which sees the state not as operating solely within an equality/inequality realm, but as attempting to make that dimension mute. The political system thus operates not solely to distribute violence, but to remove that value from the scarcity list (i.e. its opposite) and thus from the political arena. Thus as clean air once was, safety or security should become. Laws compensating violent crime victims can be interpreted in this light as well as in an equality dimension. Yet to see the role of the political system in this light is surely inaccurate and unuseful. That political system is so overwhelmed in its allocations of scarce values, that to see it as eliminating scarcity is to misinterpret or misestimate its functioning. An analogy can be made with Thomas Dye's primary study on policy outputs.⁵⁵ In it, he concluded that economic factors were more important in determining governmental spending levels than were political factors. This conclusion was only startling

if one conceived of the government or political process in terms of creating more resources than in distributing those in existence.

It is an assumption of this study that the primary effect of the political system is in cutting the "value pie," and not in baking new ones. This assumption applies to violence as well as economic resources. This assumption finds support in the suggestion by Galtung that the balance of structural and personal violence is constant.⁵⁶ It is also supported by Barrington Moore's thesis that all nations, regardless of political system, manifest high levels of systemic violence somewhere in their developmental process.⁵⁷ Violence is more of a constant than a variable within the perspective of a single society.

There is a recurring theme in much violence literature that even if the state could be conceived as functioning to eliminate violence throughout society, it would be sharply limited in its successes. The state could attempt such a reduction only through a highly organized program; and, according to the theme, it is the organization, the social suffocation, the "severe frustration of the faculty of action" because of a high level of bureaucratization which led to much of the violence in the first place.⁵⁸

To the degree that violence is an allocation of the political system it is distributed unequally, and all unequal violence distributions are political. To see the

distributional concept of political violence in its most useful format, however, requires the isolation of two aspects: (1) a direction to the conceptualization whereby we can compare political systems or subsystems cross-sectionally or longitudinally and decide that one distribution is more political than another, and, (2) a cut-off point which would make a consistent if somewhat arbitrary distinction between unequally distributed political violence and equally distributed nonpolitical violence.⁵⁹

The direction dimension is supplied in part by our delineation of the political process as the process whereby influentials get the most of what there is to get in ways consistent with an established societal value structure. Hence, the more of the scarce goods such as safety the influentials distribute to themselves, the more "political" we can say the allocations are.⁶⁰ Both that same direction and a cut-off dimension can be derived from the philosophy of Herbert Marcuse.⁶¹ Marcuse holds that the most valuable concept is not one which attempts to be identical with what we are describing, but one which goes outside our observations and thus establishes a tension between the observed and the "real" or "objective" referent. This mode of comparison would seem similar to some of what are known as "classical" theories. It views concepts not as an unreachable ideal, but as the potential inherent in a given state of affairs. Thus the notion of potential rejected in

Galtung's definition of violence is reintroduced in relation to the political system.⁶² The political significance of violence is directly related to the choice of an objective referent. The most appropriate referent in terms of potential to be used in connection with American democracy would seem to be a product of its own myth: equal protection under the law, and, in an area of diversified institutional responsibility, equality or even its perverted form of "equality of opportunity."⁶³ Violence in America is political inasmuch and insofar as it is unequally, in the sense of nonrandomly, distributed among social class stratifications representing potential political power.

Political violence can be more usefully conceptualized, not by attaching the political label only to acts of a particular nature, but by understanding the political to refer to a distributional dimension of violence. Particular acts of violence may have particular political significance beyond their distribution, and should be separately categorized and studied. Yet violence is much more political than could ever be recognized through the study of riots or assassinations. Such conceptualizations are far too exclusive to delineate the underlying relationship between the political system, particularly in the United States, and violence. Some of the dimensions of that relationship will be analyzed below.

How the Political System Allocates Violence⁶⁴

There seem to be a number of ways that the political system distributes violence. Before examining them, we must recognize that the political system distributes concepts of what violence is as well as distributing an action. Laws define most actions of overt personal violence, and we are all socialized into thinking of violence solely in physical terms. Violence is murder, assault, battery, rape, or robbery. If an action is not physical and not illegal, we tend to discount it as violence. Because of the confines of state definitions of violence, actions which may be violence as disorientation have nowhere to be reported. A person who has had intense, mental anguish thrust upon him in a blamable way is stymied in any attempts for criminal justice because of state nonrecognition of the action causing his disorientation. Consequently, there are no records on non state-defined violence. Circularly, the lack of records or evidence of legal violence reinforces the state or legal definitions of the same.

However, recognizing that there are no official records on legal violence and that absence of such records dulls our sensitivity and ability to perceive violence as disorientation, it is possible to proceed with the role of the political system in actual allocations. Those allocations may be direct or indirect, and the result of decisions or non-decisions. Direct governmental allocations of violence are

usually manifest in the form of systemic violence, ironically considered a subtle form of violence. We will suggest, and develop the suggestion in the next chapter, that an innocent person's being arrested and detained for a serious illegal action is violence. As in the case of most systemic violence, some level of innocent arrests is inherent in all conceivable social organization, yet secondary law regulating the behavior of public officials effects the level and distribution of systemic violence manifestations.⁶⁵ A clear example is the Miranda decision which, by assuring that the suspect is informed of specific rights, reduced the incidence of false confessions. Also, by including the offer of legal counsel to indigents, Miranda attempted to shift some of the false arrest violence away from its strong indigent bias. A contrasting example involves direct allocation of violence through nondecision.

In 1965 the claim by the FBI that it had no authority to protect civil rights demonstrators in the South, in spite of legal arguments to the contrary, resulted in considerable violence to protestors, both through local law enforcement actions and inactions. Violence was allocated to persons whose socio-political position was so low that they could not claim their first amendment rights of speech.⁶⁶ Systemic violence as a system allocation has many manifestations. Laws permitting home eviction, refusal of hospital admission, or job dismissal might well structure actions into

this category as well as regulations prohibiting a fire department from extinguishing a home fire one block outside the city limits. In one sense, all violence allocations may be viewed as direct since the entire market economy operates in a framework provided by the law.

However, as seen through socialized eyes, the political system allocates most violence indirectly, as a consequence of other allocations. The combined total of other distributions such as education, job opportunities, taxation policies, welfare and unemployment compensations acts to determine where in society disorienting actions will occur most often. In a very real sense, allocating positive values in such a way as to deny their benefits to particular social categories of persons, leaves those persons no other choice but to relate to their peers and the outside through the use of the few values which they have, most of which are negative. Violence becomes a more probable form of interaction because of the absence of alternatives.⁶⁷

Nowhere is the indirect allocation of violence more evident than in some subcultures. In those groups which have suffered from the systematic denial of positive allocations over long periods of time, individual values growing out of the use of violence become transformed through differential association into subsocietal norms.⁶⁸ Violence becomes the expected and required behavior in a number of situations.

In spite of the fact that no formal sanctions or enforcement agencies exist assuring the use of violence, it becomes prevalent throughout the subculture.⁶⁹ Even if the denial of positive values to the subcultures could be instantly reversed, the high incidence of violence would not immediately recede.⁷⁰ Over long periods of time the norms, including the propensity to violence, become an integral part of the socialization process. "...Children inherit a subculture of violence where physically aggressive responses are either expected or required by all members sharing not only the tenement's plumbing but also its system of values."⁷¹

The argument assessing blame for subcultural violence upon the political system must penetrate as deeply as do the roots of the subculture. Insofar as there is a subculture of violence⁷² whose maintenance has achieved some independence from positive allocations of jobs, education, and the like, system blame must be directed deeper than those contemporary positive allocations. It is necessary to recognize that the distribution of power in society is more than a social stratification-- it is a determinant of not just specific distributions but of the entire pattern of allocations. In short, the political system is in itself a determinant of both social class and subculture development.⁷³

Summary

Because of the stability of the United States political system, political violence is best understood as an allocation

rather than as a bargaining technique. Most United States violence does not have any significant bargaining effect, prosystem or antisystem, nor is any such effect intended. Rebellion through violence is for the most part ineffective, and repression is superfluous. Violence involvement is a negative experience which is allocated to noninfluentials primarily in the effort of the influentials to avoid violence themselves. The politically powerless are often involved in violence because they are politically powerless. They are kept politically powerless only marginally through their violence involvement.

Violence allocations are partially direct and partially the indirect result of the denial of other positive value distributions. Violence-prone classes or subcultures are themselves at one and the same time products of the allocative process and reflections of the power realities expressed through the political system. Allocations of violence follow the pattern of other negative allocations. As the opposite of a scarce value, violence would automatically be distributed in a nonequitable way, yet as a political allocation, we would expect its distribution to follow a pattern of other negative values to the politically powerless. Violence is political insofar and inasmuch as it is nonrandomly distributed among social class stratifications which themselves represent a continuum of political power potential

or powerlessness. Violence is political insofar and inasmuch as that action is directly or indirectly allocated heaviest upon the most politically powerless stratifications.

Notes

¹Iglitzin, p. ix.

²See Le Bon.

³See Elliot Curris and Jerome H. Skolnick, "A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Behavior," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Collective Violence, CCCXCI (September, 1970), 34-35.

⁴Gurr, The Conditions of Civil Violence, p. 28.

⁵Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 7.

⁶van der Haag, p. 60.

⁷See Le Bon, pp. 160-161.

⁸Wolfgang, pp. 5-7.

⁹Westley, p. 121.

¹⁰Hibbs, p. 7.

¹¹Iglitzin, pp. 55-73.

¹²Hibbs, p. 7. This topic was touched upon in the Chapter II analysis of violence as illegal and illegitimate action. Rejected as inappropriate to defining violence, it must again be confronted in deciding which violence is political.

¹³Gurr, p. 28.

¹⁴van der Haag, p. 60.

¹⁵Iglitzin, p. 102.

¹⁶H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 5.

¹⁷"That a collective activity such as a riot is 'aimed at' a redistribution of power is, no doubt, one factor bearing on the extent to which it is political in character, but there are certainly others, some of which may be more

important." James S. Campbell, "The Usefulness of Commission Studies of Collective Violence," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXCI (September, 1970), pp. 172-173.

¹⁸See Gary Marx, pp. 21-33.

¹⁹Whereas this argument is not directed against reductionism as normally used, it is analogous to such an argument. Johnson makes a similar case with a different emphasis, that reductionism blurs violence distinctions rather than overwhelming us with them. Johnson, pp. 76-77.

²⁰Nieburg, Political Violence, p. 13.

²¹Ibid., p. 9.

²²Ibid., p. 15.

²³Ibid., pp. 57-59.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 5-7, 15.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 130, 159.

²⁶In some places, Nieburg recognizes this problem, as when he states that the "sheer unproductive power to inflict pain and grief..., while ambiguous in its use, is often used." Ibid., p. 15.

²⁷Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 114-115.

²⁸E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 71.

²⁹Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridan Books, 1958), p. 13.

³⁰David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 406-408.

³¹Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 3.

³²Ibid., pp. 5, 59-62, 115-116, 141-142.

³³For the raising of this issue see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 199.

³⁴See Easton, p. 249, concerning the concept of diffuse support and the related specific support.

³⁵Lasswell, p. 13.

³⁶For a discussion of alternate stratification systems to be used in analyzing class inequality, see Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 16-17.

³⁷Ibid., p. 27.

³⁸Ibid. See also Galtung, p. 171.

³⁹For a discussion of the differences, see Scharr, pp. 282-290.

⁴⁰Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 1 (March, 1963), 45-56.

⁴¹Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII, No. 1 (March, 1964), 361-382.

⁴²Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962), 952.

⁴³Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 106.

⁴⁴For a critique of this position, see Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," American Political Science Review, LXV, No. 4 (December, 1971), 1074-1076.

⁴⁵See Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence (New York: Collier Books, 1961). Sorel primarily saw violence as a weapon to be used in conjunction with the General Strike, however, to demonstrate the futility of the middle and bourgeois class isolation from violence.

⁴⁶Lasswell, pp. 13-14. This is not to say that nonelites or even subcultures do not strive after safety or security also, perhaps less successfully; Lasswell is concerned only with elites. Lasswell also analyzes violence in a purely instrumental sense, so caution should be exercised in assigning "credit."

⁴⁷See Lasswell, p. 14. The failure of political officials in this regard must be attributed to their high visibility, not to any lack of desire for safety.

⁴⁸Analyzing violence through its opposite does create a different perspective, however. Violence distributions may be intentional only in the sense that the system capacity for safety was or was seen as limited; violence may be the absence of state supplied safety. Violence may not be created by the state, but only not erased. A particular distribution of violence might be made because it had to go somewhere, and better there than here.

A totally different view of the class distribution of specific types of violence can be the result of perceiving violence instrumentally (although such a result is not logically required by that perception). One author believes many types of violence have never been characteristic of the lower classes, but are historically elite and nonlower class group actions. See Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), pp. 427-434.

⁴⁹In the area of governmental acceptance of state responsibility for criminal violence through victim compensation both in the United States and historically since 1775 B.C., see Crimes of Violence: A Staff Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 787-792, 801-803. For a more detailed discussion see Gilbert Geis, "Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes," Volume 13 of the above publication.

⁵⁰Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 90.

⁵¹Nieburg, Political Violence, p. 85.

⁵²This emphasis on government violence can be found in Arendt. "In a contest of violence against violence the superiority of the government has always been absolute." Arendt, p. 147. Arendt does limit the validity of this statement to as long as the governmental power structure remains intact.

⁵³Whether or not there is mass consensus concerning that distribution.

⁵⁴For a discussion delineating these terms see p. 89. Chapter III.

⁵⁵Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

⁵⁶See Galtung, pp. 180-181. Galtung does, however, strongly question this suggestion.

⁵⁷See Moore.

⁵⁸See, respectively, Little, p. 28; Mailer, pp. 109-110; and Arendt, pp. 178-180.

⁵⁹For a brief discussion of another author dealing with the problem of how to compare political violence manifestations see Fred R. von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 6. Concerning these two specific aspects of comparison in dealing with a related measurement problem, see Cnudde and Neubauer, p. 514. See also the discussion of the question of thresholds in Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, "Basic Principles for a Model of Democracy," in Empirical Democratic Theory, ed. by Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 19.

⁶⁰There is a strong analogy, perhaps even an isomorphic relationship between the framework being presented here and that developed within one branch of empirical democratic theory. Ranney and Kendall propose political equality as a condition of democracy (p. 19). In discussing this condition of political equality, Cnudde and Neubauer note that it is a "meaningless" concept insofar as it has no empirical referent--although it does provide the basis for developing a measure of how close political equality (and hence, given other conditions, democracy) is approximated within political institutions (p. 11). In fact, Ranney and Kendall's democratic model is presented as a pure type fixing one end of a spectrum along which institutions (including nation-states, communities, etc.) could be ranked (p. 44). To link parallel theory development, if political equality is a characteristic of democracy and if political violence is a reflection of political inequality, then higher levels of political violence are by their existence indicative of an undemocratic system. However, such linkage requires accepting political equality as a dispositional concept, a state of being and not a way of making decisions as Cnudde and Neubauer insist (p. 60). It requires viewing the opposite of and criteria for measuring democracy as much more in the "classical liberal" dimension than Sartori is willing to concede in his procedural "autocracy" a contrario definition of democracy (pp. 23-40).

⁶¹Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, pp. 135-142.

⁶²See Galtung, pp. 168-169.

⁶³If anything should have demonstrated the vast difference between equality and equality of opportunity to "middle America," it would be the presidential nomination of George McGovern by the Democratic Party. For a general discussion of the differences between these two terms see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 83-92.

⁶⁴This section is intended to suggest dimensions of the problem and not to explore decision-making per se.

⁶⁵H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 26-43.

⁶⁶Howard Zinn, SNCC: The New Abolitionists (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 243-244.

⁶⁷Nieburg, Political Violence, p. 85.

⁶⁸Crimes of Violence, pp. 485-486.

⁶⁹For a more complete discussion of the relationship between norms and their enforcement, see Michael Barkun, Law Without Sanctions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 60-62.

⁷⁰Explanation would of necessity shift from "opportunity theory" to "subcultures." See Crimes of Violence, pp. 485-487.

⁷¹Wolfgang and Ferracuti, p. 298.

⁷²Ibid., p. 312.

⁷³For a discussion of power as a separate dimension of stratification see Parkin, pp. 44-46. This position, held by sociologists like Dahrendorf, moves out of the mainstream of Neo-Marxism by treating the political system as somewhat of an independent variable.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

As Pretheory

In 1964 Harry Eckstein called for a pretheory to develop descriptive categories for the essential features of internal wars so that structural concepts or classes could be developed, making the comparison of the manifestations of internal war possible. He recognized that these categories and concepts might be only temporary in terms of their usefulness, but still felt the undertaking necessary for the progression of our understanding.¹

"Pretheory" as it has evolved has come to represent a new conceptual ordering of a given phenomenon for the purpose of obtaining new insights not available to academicians utilizing older frameworks. For the most part, it is not "theory" in the contemporary sense; it does not have as its primary objective the empirical verification of a suggested relationship. Put colloquially, it is a trying out of new concepts to get their feel to see how they fit into a given body of knowledge. The motivation in attaching the label "pretheory" is the premonition that future development in your concept area will make your own work seem crude and unsophisticated. However, if one's own work has the

potential of providing the stepping-stones to more sophisticated studies, the label of "pretheory" would seem justified as far more than an excuse.²

The operationalization attempted here is not aimed primarily at "proving" how violence is political. That relationship is as much a part of the conceptualization as a part of an empirical test. As in the development of any pretheory, the operationalization is a part of trying out new concepts, of demonstrating their relationship to more traditional conceptualizations. The new conceptualization must recommend its own viability on an empirical as well as a theoretical level. Vast differences in the manifestations of the concept, should they occur, would seem to set definite limitations upon the new conceptualization. On the other hand, the commonality of the manifestations would seem to indicate the relative worthlessness in the present study of many distinctions required by traditional analysis.

Nature of the Data

As should go without saying, the object of interest determines the type of data to be gathered. This study posits that the political nature of violence lies in its distribution. That distribution is conceived in terms of "class," loosely defined by demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals. Since interest was centered upon the class of those persons involved in violence, data was desired for those persons, alone. A grounds for

comparison to class distribution in society was found in aggregate data from the United States Census. The range of demographic and socio-economic information obtainable on violence-involved persons is, of course, limited by the source where the data is procured. This limitation applies not only to the type of information available, but the form of that information; this study had to rely almost entirely upon nominal, or at best, ordinal data.

In the cases chosen as examples of violence, the available information most relevant to developing the conceptualization of political violence was age, race, and occupational status. These variables were seen as relevant first, because they delineate as closely as possible a class structure in United States' society. By class structure, I am referring to loose socio-economic, demographic categories, not necessarily inclusive of awareness or consciousness. Class as such is sufficient to demonstrate a nonrandom distribution of violence in society and thus support the conceptual framework on one level.

However, the framework also attempts to identify the individuals it states will receive the heaviest allocations of violence as "politically powerless." Thus, not only are the socio-economic variables mentioned above taken as loosely defining a class structure, they are also presented as defining a class structure largely isomorphic with a political power continuum. In the sense that it considers socio-

economic class the primary resource of community political power, as contrasted to organization or leadership skills, the sociological or perhaps Neo-Marxist perspective of the analysis becomes evident.³ Socio-economic class is, however, not equated with political power, only its potential. With the resources of a given socio-economic position a person could, especially perhaps if aided by other resources which followed from his position, exercise political power.⁴ Without the resource of a particular class standing, this perspective views the individual as politically powerless, both actually and potentially. Class is thus used as an indicator of community political power.

Age as a variable in such a power continuum is suggested by the fact that no study of community political power, no list of political or economic elites, has ever suggested anything other than an inverse relationship between age and political power, at least until the middle age categories. The ages coded were dichotomized in the analysis into the politically powerless, age thirty and below, and the potentially politically powerful, above thirty.

Within the United States and the South particularly, Matthews and Prothro notwithstanding, I suggest race is still an appropriate indicator of political power. In keeping with the data sources, race was also dichotomized-- Negro or black was equated with political powerlessness, Caucasian or white with potential power.

Socio-economic status as reflected in the nature of an individual's occupation was also taken as an appropriate indicator of political power.⁵ The occupational information was divided into two parts. The first was that of the specific job performed, dichotomized into a white collar/blue collar classification. A blue-collar occupation was viewed as an indication of political powerlessness, white collar, potential political power. The second part was drawn from the more general employment status of the individual. If the individual was unemployed, or if he described the nature of his work in such general terms that "occupation" was recorded as laborer, that individual was also considered politically powerless on socio-economic grounds. The presence of either of these conditions, unemployment or laborer classification, was also felt to reveal another more psychological state, best described as functional alienation.⁶ Such alienation suggests a psychological as well as objective removal of the individual from the power structure of the community.

For most empirical tests, these four variables, age, race, occupation, and employment status, were combined into one ordinal scale. At one level, this scale simply represents a technique of collapsing the socio-economic, demographic class data into a more manageable form. At the other level, this scale must be taken as an ordinal continuum of political power within a class context. The scale was created by awarding a point to an individual for each indicator-

characteristic of political powerlessness he possessed. Was the individual thirty years of age or younger, racially black, in a blue-collar occupation, or functionally alienated (unemployed or laborer)? Thus each individual involved in violence has a number from 0 to 4 indicating his position on the political power/class scale. The creation and development of the scale is reviewed and elaborated prior to its use in Chapter V.

Geographical Area and the Sample

It is suggested here that the misconceptualization of political violence has been in large the result of overconcentration of academic attention upon big city riots.⁷ It is the present contention that such concentration moves us toward an understanding of an "a-typical" manifestation of violence, however important in its own right. To free myself from such dangers and to start anew with a situation I could, in a phenomenological sense, consider more "typical," I decided to shun secondary analysis of nationally collected data-sets, even though that data might be more "complete" in terms of information than any I could produce. I limited my study to an analysis of the class characteristics of persons involved in violence within the city of Gainesville, Florida, a city with a population of 64,089 in 1970.

As will be explained in the remainder of this chapter, most of my data consisted of raw police reports and arrest records. As I had little conception of how many levels with

which I would want to work, and little notion of how many of each type of incident were on file, neither systematic nor random sampling seemed appropriate. Therefore, a decision was made to code each relevant case encountered. The data is a sample of the violence in Gainesville, but it represents a universe of the incidents selected as indicators.

The Indicators, As Drawn From Police Records

In the truest sense, political violence, as it has been presented here is not a dispositional concept and therefore is not operationalized through indicators in the usual sense.⁸ Rather, incidents have been selected as examples of political violence. These are incidents in which a person would experience violence as was defined in Chapter II. Because of the modification included in that definition, the reduction of violence to an experience involving perception was necessary only phenomenologically for the operationalization. If not for the definition modification, a closer fit with the conceptualization would necessitate starting with incidents and then interviewing to establish what the person experienced; this step would be inestimably time and resource consuming. The incidents selected, being examples of violence from which data on involved persons is taken, are not truly operational indicators though they serve the same function for our quantification.⁹ Similarly, they are subject to the same danger as indicators-- that of being mistaken for the whole phenomenon being investigated.

General Incident Reports

The first example of violence selected was the reports of persons who had been the victims of harm inflicted by another person and reported to the police. Whereas for an incident to be so reported, the victim would have to desire to report it and/or the police be notified and feel that the act was illegal. While not all violence or even all violent crime is reported, the structure of nonreporting can and will be introduced. Furthermore, in this context, the inclusiveness of victimizations in police records must be strongly defended in some areas. If resulting physical harm was serious enough to require hospital treatment, the duty nurse would call in the police as required by law. Also, using victims from police reports results in a sample of mental as well as physical harm. Crimes such as robberies and rape are examples of "violence" incidents yet no physical harm may result; on the other hand, physical harm is covered by reports of homicide, aggravated and simple assault. While the severity of mental anguish in violence is incalculable in police reports, the severity of the physical harm can be estimated by information as to whether or not the victim received medical treatment and, if so, whether or not he or she was admitted to a hospital.

Arrest Records

The second type of incident used in the operationalization was recorded on arrest cards in the police department--

arrests made for the same type of incident reported by victims.¹⁰ In addition to homicide, assault, robbery, and rape, the following arrest categories were included: disorderly conduct when it involved physical contact, resisting arrest with violence, and reckless display of a firearm.

For purposes of comparison outside the violence conceptualization, incidents were also recorded which involved the destruction of property. "Property violence" was operationalized through charges of vandalism, destruction of private property, and destruction of public property. Such operationalization was made to enable distribution comparisons with violence as conceptualized.

Within the incidents selected, a determination was made as to whether or not the event could be considered "political" in the context of any of the common ways of defining violence as political as described in the previous chapter. Such "political" violence was, like "property violence," coded for comparison purposes only, being outside the conceptual framework. Based on the criteria of ten or more persons involved, any political objectives of the incident, and who the violence was directed against, "political" violence included resisting arrest with violence or other physical confrontations with the police, fighting during racial disturbances or integration-related property destruction, and interference with nonpolice city employees. Even collapsing these criteria of "political" violence into one category resulted in statistically few occurrences of such incidents.

It is true, however, that the "involving political people" side of the category could not be adequately covered: that classification revolved around the involvement of policemen in violence. The only other possible available indicator of a politically influential person in this direct sense was a white-collar occupation-- hardly a foolproof indication. The direct involvement of policemen in violence usually lay somewhere in between the idea of political objectives and involvement of political persons, as for example in a high school race riot.

In any event, classification of incidents as "property violence" or as "political" violence was only undertaken so that comparisons could be made. "Property violence" is not conceptualized as violence in this study. The "political" violence classification depended primarily upon what objects were destroyed or who was harmed with what objective. In the first case, the incident is again not considered violence within the conceptualization; in the latter, it is violence since it resulted in injury: who was injured or for what reason is immaterial.

As was the case with the victim data, the police arrest data has some strong points as a source of quantifiable information. Within its legal context, it is inclusive of both physical and mental violence, and it is inclusive of both intentional and nonintentional violence, the latter illustrated by the case of negligent manslaughter.

The third type of violence examined was what was here classified as systemic violence, the violence of institutional or structural organization. The indicators selected were twofold: card arrests and arrests without convictions. Both originate in police arrest records. Card arrests are arrests for which it soon becomes apparent to the police that there are insufficient grounds for holding a suspect, so he is released. The arrest is processed no further; it remains confined, and available, on the arrest card only. In the past, the technique was used as a rather intimidating way of bringing persons to the police station for questioning. The second indicator, arrest without conviction, is more obvious. The assumption is that the legal process is working properly, separating the guilty from the innocent, perhaps a large assumption. If such an assumption is made, however, it becomes evident that an arrest without conviction is another indicator of an arrest made without sufficient justification. In either case, such an arrest would involve being arrested, escorted to, and detained at the police station. If we assume, in addition, that a lack of substantial evidence is an indication of innocence, then, especially concerning a serious crime, such an action would indeed be a disorienting, existential experience-- an example of nonphysical violence brought about by the institutions of society, a public institution in this case.

As was discussed in Chapter III, viewing the impact of this study in terms of whose values are distributed rather than what the distribution is leads to unnecessary complexity which is beyond the scope or intent of the study to resolve. The use of police data in the context of whose values are distributed raises a third position, an alternative to the elite/consensus dichotomy discussed earlier. Are the values those of the police themselves, a separate subcultural system distinct from either the elites or the masses? The writings of scholars of varying ideological persuasions on the subject of police behavior strongly suggest this position. James Q. Wilson states the "...deliberate community choices rarely have more than a limited effect on police behavior...", that most police policies are determined by the police themselves, and that police work is a craft learned by apprenticeship and guided almost exclusively through colleague approval or disapproval.¹¹ Albert J. Reiss, Jr. identifies the notion of a "police culture" as the best explanation of police use of force.¹² Similarly, Arthur I. Waskow sees the police as having gained autonomy outside of democratic control through "professionalization" and quasi-unionization.¹³ In the light of these descriptions, it becomes imperative to examine the potential impact of the notion of a police subculture upon the police data gathered as indicators of violence within the context of an elite-favoring distribution system.

In the case of the victim and violent crime arrest data utilized in this study, the influence of such a subculture would be minimal. In the first instance, the police were primarily a recording agency, hearing and transcribing complaints of citizens. Even nonreporting is usually a deeper subcultural pattern than the result of immediate police behavior. In violent crime arrests, there is more leeway for the intrusion of police values, yet even here a large proportion of police actions are upheld by another societal institution, either the legal prosecution or the courts or both, which do not operate within any police norm subsystem. The leeway for police value intrusion is prevalent only in the case of systemic violence operationalized through the arrest of persons not collaborated by any other societal institution. In card arrests, the police themselves recognize the inappropriateness of their action (from a legal standpoint), and do not even submit the case for "confirmation" by a judge or prosecutor. In the case of nonconvictions, the police action is deemed inappropriate by the prosecutor in a refusal to prosecute the individual (*nolle prosequi*),¹⁴ or a judge who dismisses the charges or finds the individual not guilty (the latter action being occasionally performed by a jury also). In short, in analyzing the possible impact of a police subculture influence conflicting with the framework of analysis, attention can be confined to the data on systemic violence.

Within this context, the best answer to the assertion that the indicators of systemic violence only measure a dimension of police subculture lies within the data itself. The empirical analysis of the following chapter demonstrates that police systemic violence distributions are indistinguishable from other violence distributions operationalized within the elitist framework. That two separate indicators of systemic violence fail to indicate an independent police subculture is strong evidence that with regard to the data collected, there is no independent police-value dimension.

In general, insofar as the framework is forced into the questions of whose values are reflected in decision-making, it sees the police department, like society at large, as somewhat imperfectly reflecting values which benefit the elite-- rather than enforcing a set of values uniquely their own. What the police do is not all that different from what they are paid to do and what is expected of them.¹⁵ Although surely police actions during the emotional stress of arrest and interrogation go beyond specific elite approval, the class prejudice allowing these emotions to be vented is a reflection of existing socio-economic realities.¹⁶ To concentrate on the imperfection is to ignore the reflection dimension. To understand political violence as police violence is equivalent to seeing political violence as riots; both exist, but in a larger context.

Beyond the issue of who benefits from the violence distributions, the conceptual framework does not distinguish as to the path that cues actually take or who the police take their cues from in case of a divergence in elite/societal cues.¹⁷ Insofar as the distribution of the police-influenced violence operationalizations is found to be consistent with the other operationalizations, the question of the origin of the values is not directly raised. If it is implicit in the framework that the elites dominate, then one more qualification needs to be made. The indicator of systemic violence is intended as something more subtle than overt, elite-police repression. If such violence is to be considered repression it must be kept in mind that it is mediated/accomplished through institutional organization within a context of legality.

Interview Data

As a supplement to this study, an attempt was made to relate the distribution of violence in society to the distribution of the fear of violence. What has made violence more important to political scientists over the last decade? Has it been a change in the distribution of violence or a change in the fear of violence? For this evaluation, interviews were given to a systematically-selected sample of Gainesville residents. However, due to problems encountered in the administration of the interview in the black community, the results are only suggestive and are reported primarily in Appendix D.

Weighting of Selected Indicators

It has been argued that previous studies of violence have been misleading since they dealt with specific indicators within a fragmented concept of violence. In large part due to conceptual limitations of my own, I have selected examples of similar specific types of violence in an attempt to combine them into a new conceptualization. How does this combination take place? How much importance should each factor have? The argument that the riot perspective of violence was misleading was based on the fact that a very small proportion of those persons experiencing violence ever had any contact with a riot.

The answer in combining incidents of violence in this case would not seem to lie in weighting. Since my study using police records is based on a "universe" and not a "sample," except insofar as all violence manifestations in Gainesville are concerned, it is expedient to let each type of violence determine its own contribution to the concept by the number of experiences it contributes. This "natural" weighting is a matter of choice, not default. It necessitates the evaluation of each violent experience as equal in importance regardless of the severity of any harm produced. This evaluation would seem to be reasonable at the level of pretheory, rather than attempting to say some experiences are more violent than others.¹⁸ The selection of incidents was based upon an assumption of a violent experience; to

assume that some events are more individually and socially disorienting other than the number of persons involved must be left to future studies.

Omissions and/or the Potential of the Framework

As probes into possible data sources for the operationalization of political violence were made, because of time and red tape, the collection of data became confined to the in-itself overwhelming job of coding from police reports and arrest information. It is believed that for the scope of this study such material was adequate, but it would be a disservice not to suggest the potential for concept operationalization in this area. To begin, the cut-back in data access did weaken the collection of data examples in two related areas.

There was no data recorded on persons involved in violence which resulted in physical harm, but where there was no intent or negligence in a legal sense on the part of the person or persons responsible for the harm. To use an earlier example may be helpful. If there were a blind intersection where "unavoidable" automobile accidents happened with some regularity, it would be helpful to know the demographic, socio-economic characteristics of the persons being hurt.¹⁹ It is possible that children of a particular class are more subject to accidents around the home, for another example. None of this violence could be found in police records.

Secondly, there was no opportunity to sample nongovernmental systemic violence of a basically nonphysical basis. The two "measures" of systemic violence were the results of a public agency, the police department. Systemic violence, the violence of institutional arrangements, is perhaps of more or equal significance in its nongovernmental aspects.

These weaknesses in the operationalization are not inherent in the enterprise. Accidental violence where there was no legal violation can be "measured" with data from hospital records; those records are probably available if the researcher has the resources, time and patience to outlast hospital administrators. To some, the additional information might seem a trivial supplement at best. It has been suggested that no sense could be made of a tree limb falling on a person in a storm; from my perspective, however, it would seem that most "Acts of God" are reducible to acts or "inacts" of men. The above example might suggest the lack of public tree cleaning in specific sections of town or the irresponsibility of slum landlords.

The lacuna of nongovernmental systemic violence could be eliminated with bank or finance company evictions or repossessions-- or with state unemployment compensation records on job firings. The latter course was pursued until escaping from the bounds of red tape was estimated to take longer than the time available. Either of these data sources could supply data on the crucial economic power of

nongovernmental institutions and suggest the contribution of the economy to systemic violence.

Filling the gaps of nonillegal accidental and nongovernmental systemic violence would help to round out the empirical meaning of violence and the political nature of its manifestations as presently conceptualized. Why are these incidents considered violence instead of others? From a phenomenological standpoint these incidents appeared to have a strong relationship with violence as described in the second chapter. There are indubitably other incidents which could be substituted or added. Such alternation would, of course, have an impact on the empirical analysis; the "natural" weighting of indicators which have been selected does not answer weighting questions raised by the very selection of those indicators. At this point in pretheory, it is impossible to know the scope of violence manifestations. Selecting enough data sources to cover traditional concepts which were being transcended seemed the most reasonable approach.

With the strong inclusion of systemic violence, the operationalization of political violence bears marked resemblance to the approach of biopolitics in the analysis of mortality rates.²⁰ Certainly there is considerable overlap of violence as here conceptualized with measures of life expectancy and injustice and probably other societal aspects. As was suggested in Chapter II, the prime difference

why political violence cannot be equated with and "measured" by mortality rates is the inability of the latter to say anything about violence as an action apart from the whole of life itself. Just as the concepts of "nondecisions" and "political socialization" are both viable while holding much in common, so are the distributions of "violence" and "life expectancy" overlapping but distinct.

Having set forth the aim, the potential, and the limitations of the present operationalization of political violence, the remainder of the study will be devoted to showing first, for most purposes, the validity of the conceptualization presented here contrasted with the irrelevancy or harm of traditional distinctions in contributing to an understanding of political violence in a community context. Second, it will be directed toward showing just what is the distribution of violence in Gainesville, that our label of political violence be justified. Third, even though longitudinal trends do not measure potential, an attempt will be made to analyze any changes in violence distribution over the past decade.

Notes

¹Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War, Problems and Approaches (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 23.

²The lack of such stepping-stones is primary reason pretheory is needed. Cnudde and Neubauer seem to see imprecise analytical and research tools as large an impediment to even theory development as is the difficulty of the subject matter. Cnudde and Neubauer, pp. 2, 13.

³The assumption that socio-economic stratifications are prior to political stratifications is common even to many scholars studying the latter. See Ian Budge, J. A. Brand, Michael Margolis, and A. L. M. Smith, Political Stratification and Democracy (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1972), pp. 264-265.

⁴For a discussion of whether political power should be understood as entailing use or only capability, see Wolfinger, p. 1081.

⁵Some analytical perspectives define class almost solely upon occupation. See Hamilton, p. 153.

⁶See, for example, "Needs, Production, and Division of Labour" in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. and ed. by T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 168-188. See also Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 17-35. For a linkage between occupation and alienation (and power), see also Richard H. Hall, Occupations and the Social Structure (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 54-61, 380-381; Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 6-31; and Arthur Kornhauser, Mental Health of the Industrial Worker (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 154-155.

⁷For example, six of the eight profiles presented in the Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders were of large metropolitan areas, and the other two had close connections with the Newark, New Jersey area (pp. 22-61). Surely if violence of political relevance is delineated by the participation of twenty or more persons, the concept is reduced to insignificance for most communities. Even within the riot notion of violence, there is concern with the effect of size upon violence propensities although the concern over size and other stratification varies from author to author.

Contrast Bryan T. Downes, "Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities: A Comparative Study," Social Science Quarterly, XLIX (December, 1968), 504-520, and Seymour Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternate Explanations," American Sociological Review, XXXV, No. 4 (August, 1970), 627-649.

⁸For a more complete discussion of dispositional terms, see Frohock, pp. 8-9.

⁹In fact, they serve that function better than most indicators used in violence studies. I would argue that most men, upon witnessing most instances of the incidents I selected for study could say, "That is violence." In contrast, most men observing others reading newspapers would not say, "That is frustration, because it is creating unobtainable expectations." Or, hearing a Congressman say he has no relatives in Congress say, "That is political modernization."

¹⁰Note that in the case of a crime involving violence being committed and cleared (an arrest made) the same year, the incident would in all probability be recorded at least twice. No controls were used to "correct" this multiple coding. If people are the measure of violence, who is to say that violence involving ten persons is not five times as important as violence involving two?

¹¹James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 227, 230-231, 283.

¹²Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Brutality... Answers to Key Questions," Law and Order: Police Encounters, ed. by Michael Lipsky (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), p. 76. Most of the police-related research of Lipsky has this orientation.

¹³Arthur I. Waskow, "Community Control of the Police," Transaction, VII, No. 2 (December, 1969), 4.

¹⁴It has been suggested that nolle prosequi cases exhibit a strong class or dominant culture bias, but this author has seen no such evidence. In Jerome Skolnick's book covering the topic of such dismissals, such a bias is never mentioned. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 182-203.

¹⁵Edgar Z. Friendenberg, "Motown Justice," The New York Review of Books (August, 1968), 27.

¹⁶On this point, compare John Hersey, The Algiers Motel Incident (New York: Bantam Books, 1968) with Reiss, pp. 72-76.

¹⁷The experts themselves are not certain. Wilson, who is strong on police culture, also talks of the influence of the political culture of the community, and in a more limited and more specific sense of the influence of the "brass." Wilson, pp. 232-233, 280. Richard Quinney sees the police as strongly influenced by conservative middle America, in opposition to both the poor and the affluent, educated upper classes. Richard Quinney, The Problem of Crime (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1971), p. 183.

¹⁸There is certainly ample precedent within the discipline for making such an assumption. For example, in the study of mass political violence by Douglas Hibbs, he assumes that Deutsch's five indicators of social mobilization are equal in value and creates a simple additive index. Hibbs, p. 56.

¹⁹There has been some study done on the relationship between violence involvement and involvement in accidents not usually considered violence. See Julian Waller, "Accidents and Violent Behavior: Are They Related?" Crimes of Violence: A Staff Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 13 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1525-1559.

²⁰See, for example, Haas, pp. 257-280.

CHAPTER V

PERSONAL, PROPERTY, "POLITICAL" AS VIOLENCE TYPOLOGIES

In the first two chapters of this study we have spoken of the numerous interpretations and definitions of the concept of violence. In the diversity of meanings some variations must be confronted in order to have development in the present operationalization. Personal violence is used in this chapter as a term to represent the core of violence conceptualized as centering in the individual's victimization and social disorientation, in contrast to the terms of "property violence" and "political" violence which are also employed. The personal violence concept as manifest in Gainesville has several possible internal variations, hinging about the probability of physical injury and its severity. The empirical testing of the internal consistency of the conceptualization will first center around those suffering various levels of physical injury, including the objectively justifiable fear of that injury, as in the case of an armed robbery victim. Secondly, actions which do not involve even the immediate danger of physical injury but which produce essentially the same social disorientation in the person involved will be included. An example of the latter would be the arrest, detention, questioning, and possibly charging

of a person with a crime of which he or she is not guilty. The analysis of personal violence thus includes victims of both physical injury and various forms of mental anguish.

On a theoretical level, we have argued that property violence ought to be excluded from the broadened concept of violence as it does not seem to represent the same personal and, in terms of behavioral disorientation, social experience. Logically, individual acts of property violence could result in that experience, but at the present level of investigation these cases could not be isolated from property destruction in general.

It has also been argued theoretically that political violence as defined by the number of persons involved, the objectives of the act, and the political status of the persons involved is not necessarily synonymous with violence. Only insofar as political violence is also personal violence should it be considered violence at all. For example, the bombing of a vacated ROTC building would be an act of political violence, but not violence within our conceptualization. The example is, more properly, of property destruction.¹ On the other hand, a race riot or an attack on a policeman would be political and would also result in the experience described as violence. That action would be specifically labelled violence in this study, however, because of the involvement of persons and not because one or more of those persons represented public authority.

Following such limiting ideas on what makes actions political would result in the exclusion of many actions categorized as relevant by the conceptualization presented in this study.

The above common notions of property violence and political violence are empirically analyzed in this chapter for the purpose of comparison with violence as has been conceptualized: specifically with the concept of personal violence. Data overlapping and differing from violence as conceptualized was collected and coded for these comparisons. Support for the conceptualization will depend upon the reconciliation of its distribution with those distributions of the data gathered for comparison and contrast.

This chapter and the chapters to follow attempt to draw an empirical picture of the concept of violence and political violence analogous, if not isomorphic, to its theoretical development. The theoretical development was divided between Chapters II and III: the conceptualization of violence as a socially disorienting action and the conceptualization of political violence as the unequal distribution of that violence in society. The empirical analysis of this chapter concentrates on the first part, the conceptualization of violence.

At the empirical verification stage, this study, centering around the conceptualization process, diverges from most empirical studies. The conceptualization of violence is not simply being operationalized to determine if it has a singular particular distribution which may be called

political. The relationship of distribution to theory is as much a part of the conceptualization as it is a part of the empirical test. Therefore, the data sources will be clearly and openly rearranged to fit the theory, perhaps more often than the theory itself is modified.² It will be up to the reader to determine if the modifications destroy the meaning of the conceptualization of political violence or demonstrate its viability.

In order to make empirical comparisons, it was first necessary to build a socio-economic, demographic class scale, representing a continuum of political power. The scale created was ordinal in nature having five points representing a combination of the following variables: age, race, occupation, and functional alienation. One point was awarded by the computer to each individual for specific powerlessness determining characteristics of each variable he possessed: age, if he was under thirty; race, if he was black (nonwhite); occupation level, if he was blue collar; and functional alienation, if he specifically named his occupation as the generalized "laborer" or was unemployed.³ Each case or individual, then, could have a scale value from zero to four. If he were over thirty, white and employed in a white-collar occupation, he would receive a scale designation of zero; if he were thirty or younger, black, blue collar, and answered the police question about his occupation as "laborer," he would be classified as a four; the designations between

zero and four refer to the number, not the type, of the listed characteristics possessed. After such a ranking, class comparisons of persons involved in different kinds of violence can be made.⁴ For example, the class of persons who are victims of inflicted injury can be compared to the class of persons arrested but not convicted of various crimes. Rephrased, the distribution of these manifestations of violence within society can be compared.

Personal Violence

Applying this scale to building an empirical picture of violence, the first area of development will be concentrated upon the core concept of personal violence. Should the occurrence of, or severity of, injury provide distinctions within that core concept? Does empirical data support the theoretical notion that personal injury should also include systemic violence where there is not even any immediate fear of physical harm? In other words, what kind of violence as usually conceived should be considered violence at all and thus be potentially relevant to the conceptualization of political violence?

In making the conceptualization of political violence more precise, it is necessary to empirically define not only the boundaries, but the area within them as well. The existential, socially disorienting experience has been described as a totality, with the residual impression of

internal homogeneity left intact. However, even within the personal-violence-on-victims core of our violence concept there are, as has been suggested, distinctions which can be made. We may be justified in assuming that the existential, socially disorienting experience is similar in nature for all classes, but there is statistically a more objective basis in terms of severity of injury for ultimate concern on the part of the most politically powerless class configuration. Of those persons reporting crimes of violence against themselves, the physiological severity by class is indicated in the following table.⁵

TABLE 1
SEVERITY OF INJURY

class severity	0	1	2	3	4	
no medical treatment	66	142	67	18	3	296
medical treatment, no hosp. adm.	26	70	91	57	5	249
hospital admission	4	10	18	12	3	47
	96	222	176	87	11	592

The table distribution results in a Chi-square value of 74.597 with a critical value of 15.51. Among violence victims there are statistically significant class differences in severity of injury.

Whereas it would be reasonable to assume that the decision to admit a patient to a hospital is purely medical, the decision to receive medical attention at all might be partially influenced by a bias of the investigating officer or a bias of the victims themselves toward medical treatment. To confirm that the reported Chi-square significance was not the result of such influences, the table was broken into two parts and reanalyzed with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test.⁶

TABLE 2
SEVERITY BREAKDOWN

class	0	1	2	3	4	
severity						
received medical treatment	30 .101	80 .372	109 .740	69 .973	8	296
did not receive medical treatment	66 .223	142 .703	67 .929	18 .990	3	296
"D"	.122	<u>.331</u>	.189	.017		
	$x^2=64.860$		critical value=5.99			

class	0	1	2	3	4	
severity						
hospital admission	4 .085	10 .298	18 .681	12 .936	3	47
no hospital admission	91 .172	208 .565	152 .853	70 .985	8	529
"D"	.087	<u>.267</u>	.172	.049		
	$x^2=12.308$		critical value=5.99			

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample one-tailed test is utilized here with the alternative hypothesis that the more politically powerless classes receive more severe injury than the potentially politically powerful, among those of all class configurations reporting violence inflicted upon themselves. The one-tailed test requires a conversion of "D," the maximum difference in cumulative frequency, to a Chi-square distribution through the formula $X^2 = 4D^2 \frac{n_1 n_2}{n_1 + n_2}$. In this case, the Chi-square value exceeds the critical value and the null hypothesis must be rejected. Of those persons subjected to crimes of violence, the most severe injury is thrust upon the politically powerless classes.

Because the data is structured into crime categories, it is possible to carry the severity analysis one step further to a control for the type of crime designated by the police officer at the time of arrest. However, even breaking down the analysis to the level of the two most often reported violent crimes, simple and aggravated assaults, does not alter the results. Within those reporting each crime, the most severe injury is distributed heavily upon the politically powerless classes.⁷ The position taken in this study, however, is that the differences isolated here do not theoretically necessitate altering the conceptualization. There is no available data correlating level of disorientation with severity of injury (although that suggestion is made in a later chapter). The presentation of distribution differences is

made to show the reader that there are internal empirical variations within the conceptualization. Pursuant to the comparison of those persons involved in violence with those who are not, all physical injury levels are included in the core concept of personal violence.

Systemic Violence

Working on the theoretical assumption that violence is a class phenomenon, it was necessary to also support the inclusion of nonphysical violence. By nonphysical violence, we are referring to systemic violence which, for the most part, is not conceived of as inflicting injury in the same sense as a knife fight. The two indicators or examples used here are card arrests and arrests without convictions.⁸ The personal violence on victims data which has been established as the core of the personal violence idea will be used as a benchmark.⁹

TABLE 3

SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE: CARD ARRESTS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data type						
personal violence	96	222	176	87	11	592
victims	.162	.537	.834	.981		
card arrests	23	59	56	38	8	184
	.125	.446	.750	.957		
"D"	.037	<u>.091</u>	.084	.024		

Since victims are the core or theoretical distribution it is possible to utilize the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test, in much the same way as Chi-square is used to measure goodness of fit. At the .05 significance level to be applied throughout this study, with a sample "n" of 184, the critical value which the maximum difference in cumulative percentages, "D", must equal or exceed in order for the null hypothesis to be rejected is .10; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected since "D" was .091. Card arrests have the same class distribution as the core of our developing concept of violence manifestations, that is, as victims of personal violence.

To the degree that the data is viewed as the universe and not a sample at all, significance is not simply statistical. All relevant police records were examined, coded, and analyzed. The previous table with its accompanying test treated the victim data as a theoretical distribution which we are hypothesizing applies to all violence manifestations and the card arrests as a sample of other manifestations. However, to the degree that this data collection is projected as a sampling of violence in Gainesville or a sampling of specific manifestations of violence in medium-sized cities, then "victims" as well as "card arrests" becomes a sample. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test then becomes more appropriate. This statistic utilizes the same data but arrives at a slightly larger critical value of .114, and, again, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. With some sensitivity toward

committing a "type II" error and accepting the null hypothesis when it may be false,¹⁰ we have no choice but to accept the empirical evidence that in terms of class distribution there is no significant difference between personal violence and systemic violence in the sense of card arrests. The empirical grouping reinforces the usefulness of the theoretical framework, combining many traditionally-conceived forms of violence. In future chapters the distinction between the two manifestations of violence will not be made except for special purposes. However, for the purpose of making inclusions or exclusions more parallel, comparisons in the remainder of this chapter will rely on the personal violence victim core.

The other sample of systemic violence was those persons who were arrested by the police, but their cases were not prosecuted by the prosecutor, or their cases were thrown out or resulted in a not guilty verdict in a court of law. This sample of systemic violence did not show the same class distribution as personal and card arrest violence as Table 4 demonstrates.

TABLE 4
ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTIONS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data type						
personal violence	96	222	176	87	11	592
victims	.162	.537	.834	.981		
arrests without	36	201	51	33	7	328
convictions	.110	.722	.877	.978		
"D"	.052	<u>.185</u>	.043	.003		

With a critical value of .096 (two-sample), the null hypothesis of no difference between the two data types must be rejected. However, from its formulation this variable has had two potential flaws: (1) the influence lawyers might have in the court verdict regardless of guilt or innocence (violence would be present only if innocent persons were made to go through the court process), and (2) the large percentage of traffic arrests which biased this sample toward those who had cars and reflected rather arbitrary judicial findings, as anyone with traffic court experience would well attest.

The first problem is not correctable, given the data sources utilized. The dimensions of that problem can only be suggested. Is the arrest of a person which does not result in a conviction an indication of an "improper arrest" or of a lawyer's skill in the courtroom-- or a judicial or prosecutor's bias toward the white, upper-middle class structure?¹¹ The only way possible to estimate the lawyer influence/judicial bias with the available data, however, involves the use of occupation or race and thus renders class comparisons dependent on the same variables impossible.

The other problem is that wrongful arrests for some crimes would seem to be less indicative of systemic violence than others. A traffic ticket for running a red light which carries a maximum fine of, say, fifteen dollars, may be harrassment, but it would not seem to be the critical

experience central to our conceptualization of violence. In 1970 there were 9,871 total arrests, 3,685 of them for traffic violations. Of 328 recorded cases of arrests without convictions, 206 were for traffic violations. In an attempt to rescue "arrests without convictions" as a data source, traffic violations were omitted. Whether or not statistical analysis supported its inclusion in the violence data configuration was to determine its future use.

TABLE 5

ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTIONS: NONTRAFFIC

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data type						
personal violence victims	96 .162	222 .537	176 .834	87 .981	11	592
nontraffic arrests without convictions	13 .107	50 .516	29 .754	24 .951	6	122
"D"	.055	.021	<u>.080</u>	.030		

The maximum "D" is .080; the critical value is .136. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Arrests without convictions excluding traffic cases are empirically inseparable from the personal violence core concept. Since controlling for the traffic problem resulted in the same class distribution as personal violence on victims, it seems reasonable

to assume that the first problem of lawyer influence or judicial bias is not significant in terms of this study.

Thus along with the card arrest data, the arrest-without-conviction-excluding-traffic-cases-data will be included in the conceptualization of violence. The modification of this category is justified on three grounds:

(1) traffic case court decisions are notoriously arbitrary, making difficult a valid determination of the impropriety of the arrest, (2) the bias of this group of cases toward citizens who own cars, thus skewing each class probability of arrest, and, (3) the inconsistency of traffic cases with the conceptualization of violence, an improper arrest with a maximum fine of fifteen dollars hardly being a cause for social disorientation.¹²

Property Violence

Whereas it will not be until the next chapter that the argument for including arrestees for violent crimes in the distribution of violence will be advanced, it is necessary at this point to utilize such arrest data to show the distinctions between the core idea of personal violence under development and the notion of property violence. This reliance is necessary because usually the only persons directly involved are the perpetrators and they do not become known until arrest and/or trial. In order not to raise the issue of victim versus perpetrator at this time,

the comparisons to personal violence will be made to arrestees rather than victims. The class distributions of both types of "violence" are as follows:

TABLE 6

PROPERTY VIOLENCE

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data type						
personal violence	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
property violence	2 .091	10 .545	8 .909	2	0	22
"D"	.035	.325	<u>.381</u>	.118		

Since one of the data samples is under forty cases, we must convert the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test into a Chi-square distribution. This conversion is also suggested by the fact that property violence appears to be not simply different but much more characteristic of more politically influential classes than does personal violence.¹³ Therefore a one-tailed test is more appropriate, also necessitating the conversion to Chi-square. The conversion results in a Chi-square value of 11.862. With a critical value of 5.99, the null hypothesis must be rejected; property violence is empirically different in its manifestations than is personal violence. The theoretical distinction made earlier would appear empirically supportable.

"Political" Violence

In addition to excluding property destruction from the concept of violence, our theoretical conceptualizations also denied the usefulness of the traditional ideas of political violence as violence directed toward political objectives or persons. Only as such traditional manifestations coincided with manifestations of our new conceptualization of violence would it be included in our analysis.¹⁴ Empirically, however, it would seem to be reasonable to test to see if those inclusions of political violence vary significantly in class distribution from "nonpolitical" distributions of the same phenomenon. In light of the ambiguity of alternative hypotheses-- whether rebellion is to be expected from the politically powerless, those recently gaining political power, or upper-middle class students and other potentially influential intelligentsia-- a two-tailed test is appropriate.¹⁵

TABLE 7

"POLITICAL" PERSONAL VIOLENCE

class data type	0	1	2	3	4	
"political" personal violence	5 .128	8 .333	15 .718	8 .923	3	39
"nonpolitical" personal violence	11 .045	39 .202	73 .498	93 .874	31	247
"D"	.083	.131	<u>.220</u>	.049		

The result of the Komogorov-Smirnov two-sample test is a critical value of .23⁴ and a maximum "D" of .220. In terms of class distribution, those experiences of personal violence normally classified as "political" are not significantly different from those experiences of personal violence normally classified as "nonpolitical." This lack of difference holds true within specific variables of age, race, occupation, and, disputing the outside agitator theory, place of residence.¹⁶

Summary

In the operationalization of the concept of violence in this chapter, much support of the viability of the conceptualization has been found and the area within the concept clarified. First, there are class distribution differences among various levels of inflicted injury victims, although the assumption was made that those differences did not warrant separate analysis. The assumption depends upon the analysis of a future chapter that class differences between those involved in violence and those who are not is more significant than the differences among those involved.

Secondly, the theoretical inclusion of violence cases not involving criminal physical violence was justified for card arrest data and for arrest without conviction in non-traffic cases in terms of similar class distributions. Thus the expansion of the violence concept to the idea of systemic

violence would appear warranted by these two data sources-- because they had the same class distribution as victims of personal violence.

Thirdly, the theoretical exclusion of property violence was supported by the empirical evidence that such destruction was committed by a more politically-influential class of persons-- persons not usually involved in violence as defined in this study. Indeed, property destruction would appear to be a middle-upper class phenomena which may be a substitute for involvement in the prevalently youth/lower class phenomena of violence.

Lastly, traditionally-defined political violence, insofar as it may be also classified as personal violence, is empirically inseparable in terms of class distribution from "nonpolitical" personal violence. Thus such a distinction is not warranted in terms of the meaning of this study.

Except for special reasons, future comparisons with other categories of violence or nonviolence will rely upon an aggregate of data based upon the various incorporated data types and sources. Such special reasons will be evident in the next chapter when the question of the value of the traditional separation of perpetrator and victim will be examined-- an issue which was of necessity glossed over in the use of both data sources in this chapter.

Notes

¹That destruction may, of course, have some political impact, but not because it is violence.

²In fact, many empirical studies participate in this exercise-- somewhat covertly, without any justification.

³The black versus nonwhite distinction never became an issue in the Gainesville records, as race was apparently conceived as a dichotomy. The characteristics of occupation and functional alienation are not completely independent in this scale. If a person was listed as a laborer he received points for both categories.

⁴Apart from its comparative uses, the evidence and its conclusions are slightly conservative in nature since it was unfeasible to eliminate missing data cases on all dimensions. If a variable was missing, the assumption was that the individual was not young, not black, not blue collar, or not functionally alienated. The assumption in turn rests upon the conclusion that there is no significant bias in the occurrence of missing data (usually less than ten percent)-- or that the bias is a constant.

⁵Refer to Chapter IV if the class breakdown is unclear.

⁶Most statistical tests involving class distribution in this dissertation will utilize the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test in its one- or two-tailed variations. For a more complete discussion see Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), pp. 131-135. Also, unless otherwise indicated, the tables will use 1970 data. The tables will include both the frequency count and, where appropriate, the cumulative frequency expressed as a decimal fraction of the whole.

⁷In order to provide a significant number of cases and make the data comparable, severity was dichotomized into medical treatment or no medical treatment. With a critical value of 5.99, simple assault exhibited a Chi-square of 12.655 and aggravated assault, 20.233.

⁸See Chapter IV for a discussion of these two indicators. In elaboration, card arrests are identifiable by a police decision not to press charges. Arrests without convictions involve a decision not to press charges by the prosecuting attorney, a dismissal of charges by the judge, or a not guilty verdict.

⁹The reader should be aware that the "indicators" of systemic personal violence involve the use of arrest as contrasted to general incident report data. General incident reports are completed by a police officer for a person complaining that someone has broken the law in a way affecting them. (The obvious exception to the role of the complainant is homicide.) The general incident reports were the source of the victim data. In contrast, the arrest records concentrate upon information about the arrestee rather than the victim and are the source of data for card arrests, arrests without convictions, arrests for crimes of violence against property, "political" violence, and arrests for crimes of violence against persons.

¹⁰For a more complete discussion see Dennis J. Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 121-124.

¹¹Such a bias on the part of the prosecutor is suggested and rejected in Note¹⁴, p. 137, Chapter IV.

¹²One area where this last justification might not apply would be the relatively infrequent case of improper arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, this being a comparatively "serious" offense. A contrast of these cases, if they existed, with other "improper" traffic arrests would have been interesting. However, distinctions in the types of traffic violations were not coded.

¹³Several months experience reading comments on arrest records leaves the definite impression that property violence or destruction is not only a propensity of the more politically influential classes as defined by the coded data but more generally a middle-class phenomenon. If a middle-class individual did not like a neighbor's tree hanging over his house or car parked blocking his drive, he cut the tree or the tires, not his neighbor.

¹⁴Such manifestations of the new conceptualization include inflicted injury or an objectively-justifiable fear of its infliction, arrests and detention which are soon reversed by the police, arrests which do not result in convictions, and, on the level of an assumption until Chapter VI, for use in property and political violence comparisons, persons involved in violence by virtue of their being arrested as perpetrators of that action.

¹⁵The reader is again reminded that as in the case of personal versus property violence, this analysis was forced

to rely on arrest data. Examples of "political" violence which are also personal and are thus included in this analysis are race riots occurring as a result of the integration of public schools and resulting in inflicted injury on at least one person, and fighting a police officer with enough determination that a charge of aggravated assault or resisting arrest with violence was entered.

¹⁶See Appendix A for tables.

CHAPTER VI

VIOLENCE: VICTIMS AND ASSAILANTS

Without notable exception, scholars of violence have persisted in distinguishing between perpetrators or assailants in violent acts and the victims of those acts. This distinction has been isomorphic to the legal concepts of guilt and innocence. It is based upon the usual study objective of determining the "cause" of a violent event. In earlier chapters the suggestion has been made that there is much more of a connection between the assailant and the victim than was formerly supposed. However, this suggestion is not the primary reason why it is here being proposed that the above distinction be dropped. This study is not designed, as were most riot studies, to isolate the cause of incidents. The object here is to assess the nature of the distribution of an action.

Theoretically, as presented in Chapter II, the burden of proof would seem to fall upon those who would advocate that the nature of the violent experience is essentially different for the innocent and the guilty. Aside from motivation, there seems little reason to believe that the assailant in most violent crimes is not as consumed by the experience he initiates as is his victim. In fact, in most

incidents of disorderly conduct arrest, the most common of the violent crime arrests, both parties of the conflict are charged. The illegality is, in this case, in the experience and not in the initiation. For this study, the essence always lies in the experience, not in the initiation. On the level of theory, then, the argument being formulated is that in most cases in terms of what the participants experience, there is no significant difference between victim and assailant. They both experience an existential, socially disorienting action.

However, coupled with this theoretical position there is an empirical argument even more central to the subject here. In speaking of the distribution of violence in society, it would seem to make little difference as to whether the victim-perpetrator distinction is made at all. Both are victims of the allocative process which distributes the phenomenon of violence. The nature of the distributive common denominator was revealed on a national level by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. It found that "...the victims of assaultive violence in the cities generally have the same characteristics as the offenders."¹ The remainder of this chapter is devoted to confirming or rejecting this conclusion on the level of a medium-sized urban American city; the analysis is necessary because, as has been stated earlier, the various Commission studies aggregated data and conclusions biased toward large

cities where riots took place.² If, in fact, the Commission conclusions are upheld, there are strong empirical as well as theoretical grounds for dropping the distinction in the context of the present conceptualization. The analysis will utilize the same class index developed in the first part of Chapter IV and Chapter V and will center around isolating what, if any, empirical support can be found to support the flow of the theoretical arguments.

The most basic step in undertaking the victim/perpetrator distinction analysis is to accumulate the various indicators of victim-related violence justified for inclusion in our overall violence index in Chapter V. They were the victims of crimes of violence and the victims of the systemic violence of card arrests or arrests without convictions excluding traffic cases. The frequencies of the class distributions of each indicator can simply be added together to form a composite index.

TABLE 8
COMPOSITE VICTIM INDEX

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data type						
victims (crimes of violence)	96	222	176	87	11	592
victims (card arrests)	23	59	56	38	8	184
victims (arrests without conviction minus traffic cases)	13	50	29	24	6	122
total victims	132	331	261	149	25	898

This composite victim class index, thus compiled, can be compared with the class index of all persons arrested for committing crimes of violence (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, disorderly conduct [by action, in physical confrontations], resisting arrest with violence, reckless display of a firearm, kidnapping, aggravated battery [sic], and assault and battery). In analyzing the ordinal class scales, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample, two-tailed test will be used to determine if these two samples of persons involved in violence are drawn from the same class distribution.

TABLE 9
VICTIMS, ALL, AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
victims	132 .147	331 .516	261 .806	149 .972	25	898
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
"D"	.091	<u>.296</u>	.278	.091		
critical value=.092			"D"=.296			

The null hypothesis that the victims and perpetrators were drawn from the same population sample in terms of class distribution must be rejected. On a broad level, if both victims and perpetrators are to be thought of as undergoing the same violent experience, we must recognize that at least

on the surface, these two groups are somewhat dissimilar with regard to class characteristics. For future reference, however, this difference does not preclude them both (either individually or aggregated) from showing decisive differences from the public at large which was not involved in violence in any way, a topic which will be covered in the next chapter.

At the same time, given the analysis done in Chapter V, we would be derelict to allow the victim/perpetrator analysis to stop at this point. In the preceding chapter, it was demonstrated that there are significant class differences among victims suffering various levels of inflicted injury. Yet in Table 9, we grouped victims of all levels of injury with those who were not even in danger of immediate physical injury and then compared the aggregate with persons arrested for inflicting or threatening to inflict injury. The comparison was total at the expense of not being parallel. The first logical step in the continuation of the analysis would be to compare the perpetrators to only those victims of the same types of crimes for which the arrests were made-- that is, eliminate the card arrest and arrest without conviction data.

As is evident in Table 10, the value of "D" exceeds its value in Table 9. It would appear that this alteration of the victim category makes it even more "politically influential" relative to the perpetrator category than

previously. Giving direction to the alternative hypothesis and using a one-tailed test, Table 10 reveals that the victims are significantly from a more politically influential class than the arrested assailants.

TABLE 10

VIOLENT CRIME VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
victims	96	222	176	87	11	592
(violent crimes)	.162	.537	.834	.981		
perpetrators	.16	47	88	101	34	286
	.056	.220	.528	.881		
"D"	.106	<u>.317</u>	.306	.100		
critical value=5.99			$\chi^2=77.512$			

In attempting to explain this divergence of the victim from the perpetrator category, a logical explanation seems to lie in the inclusion of robbery victims within the former group. Robbery victims, as might be assumed, more preponderantly consist of persons who have something to rob, and are thus usually more middle-class and more politically influential than other violent crime victims.³ On the whole, robbery victims are older, "whiter," in more choice occupational positions, which with regard to the class index also makes them less functionally alienated. To illustrate with 1970 Gainesville data: 47 percent of the robbery victims were over thirty years of age compared to 34 percent of

other violent crime victims; 85 percent of the robbery victims were white as opposed to 45 percent of other violent crime victims; 62 percent of the robbery victims held white collar occupations compared to 20 percent of other violent crime victims; and only 9 percent of the robbery victims were functionally alienated compared to 23 percent of other violent crime victims. All of these differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.⁴

In an attempt to see where this line of reasoning leads empirically, the victims of robbery are excluded from the violent crime victim index. The process of reducing the victim category to determine at what point, if any, the class characteristics of victims and perpetrators are inseparable is thus continued.

TABLE 11

VIOLENT CRIME VICTIMS, MINUS ROBBERIES, AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
violent crime victims minus robberies	58 .124	165 .478	149 .797	84 .976	11	467
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
"D"	.068	.258	<u>.269</u>	.095		
critical value=.102		"D"=.269		must reject H_0		

Whereas this exercise reduces the maximum cumulative distribution difference, "D," there is a highly significant difference in the two distributions statistically. To say that our reasoning was correct but it was not carried far enough leads us to compare the arrestees for violent crimes with the victims of the stereotype of the violent crime, aggravated assault.

TABLE 12

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
aggravated assault victims	34 .131	78 .432	82 .749	57 .969	8	259
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
"D"	.075	.212	<u>.221</u>	.088		
critical value=.117		"D"=.221		must reject H_0		

Once again, the "D" is reduced, but not to a statistically insignificant level. It would be possible to argue that in this last reduction we were once again comparing experiences which were not parallel-- that if we use aggravated assault victims, we should compare them to those persons arrested for aggravated assault, only. However, that exercise, also, is not productive.

TABLE 13

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT: VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
victims	34 .131	78 .432	82 .749	57 .969	8	259
perpetrators	2 .043	4 .128	16 .468	21 .915	4	47
"D"	.088	<u>.304</u>	.281	.054		
critical value=.215		"D"=.304		must reject H_0		

Having broken the analysis down to a "within crime" comparison and still not discovered the anticipated similarity, it would appear on the surface that this particular aspect of the theoretical distinction is without empirical support. Yet there is another way to categorize victims which has not been applied. In the first part of Chapter V, it was demonstrated that there are statistically significant differences among various levels of injury. Hypothesizing along these lines carries with it a bit of logic, as crimes receiving most police attention would be those where the most physical injury was incurred-- and consequently we would anticipate a higher arrest percentage. There should be some connection of severity of injury with the type of crime the victims reported, though, and indeed there is.

As our empirical analysis of victims shifted from all victims, to actual physical injury victims (excluding robbery), to those reporting serious attacks on themselves (aggravated assault), there was a noticeable shift in class distribution toward the politically powerless (number 4) end of the scale (with the exception of the second, which gave robberies relatively more impact). The same shift was evident in the one reduction in the perpetrator category, from arrests for all violent crimes to arrests for aggravated assault. In Table 14, the reader should look for the decreasing cumulative percentages in each column.

TABLE 14

SHIFT IN CLASS DISTRIBUTION WITH CRIME SEVERITY

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
all victims	132 .147	331 .516	261 .806	149 .972	25	898
violent crime victims	96 .162	222 .537	176 .834	87 .981	11	592
violent crime victims minus robberies	58 .124	165 .478	149 .797	84 .976	11	467
aggravated assault victims	34 .131	78 .432	82 .749	57 .969	8	259
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
aggravated assault perpetrators	2 .043	4 .128	16 .468	21 .915	4	47

But certainly in many cases when an arrest is made, the charge is not the same as filed in the victim's general incident report, aggravated assault often being changed to disorderly conduct. In other words, whereas the above breakdown for analysis may suggest a trend, perhaps the reduction has not followed the lines of the most accurate information. It is entirely possible that the variable of injury severity may be a better indication of violence severity than is the crime type reported and/or recorded. Two levels of injury severity are available in the data set: one, whether any medical attention was received, and, two, whether the victim was admitted to a hospital.

TABLE 15

VICTIMS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
victims treated	30 .101	80 .372	109 .740	69 .973	8	296
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
"D"	.045	.152	<u>.212</u>	.092		
critical value=.113		"D"=.212		must reject H_0		

Whereas this treatment of victims in Table 15 demonstrates a distribution more toward the "4" end of the scale than any

other, there remains a significant statistical difference between victims and perpetrators. However, as is demonstrated in Table 16, there is no significant statistical difference on our class index between those persons arrested for crimes of violence and those persons hospitalized as victims of those same crimes.⁵

TABLE 16

HOSPITALIZED VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS

class	0	1	2	3	4	
data sample						
hospitalized victims	4 .085	10 .298	18 .681	12 .936	3	47
perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34	286
"D"	.029	.078	<u>.153</u>	.055		
critical value=.214		"D"=.153		cannot reject H_0		

In rationalizing and interpreting this empirical result, it is appropriate to resuggest that police efforts are directed at "closing by arrest" the most serious cases, a category approximated by hospitalized victims. For the vast majority of cases, even of violent crimes, there is no equivalent arrest. In 1970, there were 592 recorded victims and 286 arrests for the same type violent crimes. Invariably, few arrests take place on crimes reported as simple assaults, often occurring among school children. In 1970, the percentage of cases closed by arrest was 6.4 for simple assault as

compared to 20.8 for aggravated assault and 80.0 for homicide. Arrests are, in fact, concentrated in the serious violence end of the spectrum.

Moving outside the confines of specific crimes to "level of injury" or "severity of injury" as a means for determining the seriousness of the violence is also supportive of this interpretation of the data. Of all those victims reporting violent crimes, 18.2 percent resulted in arrest; of those victims receiving any type of medical attention, 19.1 percent resulted in arrest; and of the victims hospitalized, 51.1 percent resulted in arrest.⁶

Breaking down these categories so that they are non-inclusive of each other, it becomes evident that medical treatment without hospitalization is not useful in supporting the hypothesis of increased arrests with violence severity, but that hospitalization is extremely supportive. It may be, as has been suggested previously, that the decision to obtain medical treatment in relatively minor injury cases is determined more by one's social class than the severity of the injury. The duty nurse at a hospital may be required by law to report anyone desiring treatment for inflicted injury, but many, especially from the politically powerless classes, may choose not to be treated, whether or not the police have investigated the case. In cases necessitating hospitalization or resulting in a dead body, however,

this decision factor does not intervene. Even with the inclusion of medical treatment cases in an ordinal rank of crime severity, there is a statistically significant relationship between violence severity and arrests. The following table utilizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test in comparing the actual distribution of arrests with the hypothetical distribution which would result if arrests were made randomly, that is, in accordance with the number of cases in each severity level.

TABLE 17

VIOLENCE SEVERITY AND ARRESTS

	no medical treatment	medical treatment but no hospitalization	hospitalization	
actual	52 .481	32 .778	24	108
hypothetical	.505	.921		
"D"	.024	<u>.143</u>		
critical value=.130 "D"=.143 must reject H_0				


Simply restated, arrests are concentrated on perpetrators involved in violence which hospitalizes victims by a ratio of greater than three-to-one over crimes involving nonhospitalized victims. The more serious the violence, the higher the arrest rate.

Carrying the argument one step further, just as there are victimless crimes, so are there violent experiences in

which there is no record of a perpetrator-- as far as our data are concerned, a victim without an assailant.⁷ But just as it has been demonstrated that the range of violence victims toward the less physical crimes resulted in a movement toward the politically influential classes, so must we hypothesize that if there was or could be a recorded perpetrator in those less physical events, that data would similarly influence our perpetrator class distribution. This explanation of the data is best demonstrated through illustration, in Figure 1.⁸

FIGURE 1

ILLUSTRATIVE VICTIM AND PERPETRATOR CURVES



The total white areas under the solid line in both victim and perpetrator curves represents the empirical data which has been analyzed. As was the case with the empirical data, the victim distribution reaches further into

the politically influential class than does the perpetrator distribution. Only when the victims are limited to those hospitalized (white area under the inner dotted line) do the two distributions resemble each other.

However, the argument being advanced here is that if it were not for inherent biases in the data, the area and distributions of the two curves would be roughly equal without qualification. Data have already been presented demonstrating the low proportion of arrests in "nonserious" violent crimes as defined either by the legal criminal charge or by whether or not hospitalization was required. The addition of a more equal proportion of arrests would invariably extend the perpetrator curve more into the potentially politically influential classes as illustrated by the shaded area under the dotted line.⁹

The second bias inherent in the data concerns the victim curve. It has been estimated that on the whole only about one-half of the violent crimes occurring in this country are ever reported to the police, and perhaps only one-fourth of the ghetto violent crimes are ever reported.¹⁰ The mass of nonreporting may be politically-powerless-class related for many reasons: cynicism in police desire or effectiveness, the belief that the violence once over is not a police matter sometimes closely connected to an aversion to reporting someone to the "man," a lack of knowledge and time with regard to mechanical reporting procedures, and fear

of the police or reprisals of the assailant.¹¹ Nonreporting of crimes of violence is not only primarily a lower or "powerless" class phenomenon, but it also varies with the severity of the injury inflicted. In 1965, 65 percent of the aggravated assaults occurring were reported to the police; in contrast, only 46 percent of the simple assaults were reported.¹² If, in fact, all violent crimes were reported, the victim curve would be greatly broadened at the base as is illustrated in the shaded area under the dotted line in Figure 1. This hypothetical increase in crime reporting would cover the spectrum of violent crime except for murder and hospitalization cases where present information is relatively accurate, and the increase would be heaviest from the politically powerless classes.

The alterations in the two curves suggested by the biases inherent in the use of victim reports and arrest data would result in relatively the same class distributions among all persons involved in violence-- whether they experienced the violence as victims or assailants in a narrow sense. The argument follows that if we define the experience of violence as similar for victim and assailant (Chapter II) and are empirically convinced that the distribution of that experience in society is similar, then there is no need of attempting to make the distinction, unless we are attempting to talk about legal guilt and perhaps in a narrow sense, social causality. Otherwise, the concept of the "violent man"

as a direction to social research does not seem to have much to recommend it. The concept of the violent experience or simply violence supersedes the notion of the violent man. In terms of understanding the phenomenon of violence it directs us toward a sociological instead of a psychological vantage point.

Notes

¹"The Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," in Violent Crime, ed. by Daniel P. Moynihan (New York: George Braziller, 1969), p. 42.

²The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, pp. 22-60, 61.

³"The Report of the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," pp. 42-43.

⁴See Appendix B.

⁵Whereas the smaller sample size accounts for the increase in the critical value, it in no way effects the greatly reduced "D." Even doubling the victim sample size does not alter the test result.

⁶The use of "closing cases by arrest" is intended only as a means of suggesting an underlying similarity between arrest and victim class characteristics. It is not completely accurate as a measure of police efficiency as it ignores cases where it was determined no crime had in fact taken place and no arrest was needed, cases where warrants were signed and turned over to the sheriff's department to be served, cases where the victim refused to sign a warrant against his assailant, and cases where juvenile citations were issued.

⁷Notice that this argument will stop short of attempting to name perpetrators of systemic violence. It stops short for two reasons. First, if you could record the policemen, the city councils, and, in a broader sense, loan company officials and insurance salesmen as the perpetrators of such events, that would require the alteration of the theoretical description of the violent experience; these persons are not so involved. Secondly, if that inclusion were made, one would be left with the rather naive suggestion that the politically influential in society demonstrate the same class characteristics as the politically powerless.

⁸See also Appendix C for further graphic representation of the observed and actual victim/perpetrator curves.

⁹For example, among the reports of violence by victims, those classified as simple assault had by far the lowest "closed by arrest" rate of 6.4 percent. That the victims of such reported simple assaults came from the potentially

politically influential end of the scale can be empirically demonstrated from the data (see Appendix B, Table B6). However, in those few arrests which were made in this category, the assailants were charged with disorderly conduct and thus made empirically indistinguishable from arrests in, for example, ghetto bar fights. Thus the reader can be given no "hard" presentation that the "arrests not made" were preponderately from the more politically influential segment; he must rely upon the author's impressions of assailant descriptions in the general incident reports and the fact that the victims in the arrests not made for reported violence category were more politically influential, coupled with the knowledge that in most violent crimes the victims and assailants are at least acquaintances of each other, greatly increasing the probability of class similarity.

¹⁰See "The Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," p. 35. See also Ramsey Clark, Crime in America (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), pp. 29, 30, 34.

¹¹A 1965 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) random survey of 10,000 households listed the reasons victims gave for nonreporting as (1) held cynical attitudes toward police effectiveness, 55 percent, (2) thought the incident was a private, not police, matter or did not want the offender to be harmed by police action, 34 percent, (3) did not know whether or not to call the police, were too confused to call, or did not want to take the time and trouble, 9 percent, and, (4) feared reprisal from the offender's friends or, in the case of property damage or theft, cancellation or increases in insurance rates, 2 percent. See Phillip H. Ennis, "Crime, Victims, and the Police" in Politics/America, ed. by Walter Dean Burnham (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1973), pp. 322-323.

¹²Based on the 1965 NORC data. See Ennis, p. 322. Of course, this variation in rates of reporting greatly magnifies the impact of the arrest variations discussed on pages 171, 172 and 173. If only 65 percent of the aggravated assaults were reported and of those reported only 20 percent were closed by arrest, then only about 13 percent of all aggravated assaults which occur result in an arrest (to say nothing of a conviction). In contrast, if approximately 45 percent of simple assaults are reported and 6 percent result in arrest, about 3 percent of all simple assaults end in arrest, less than $\frac{1}{4}$ as many as aggravated assaults. These figures demonstrate not only the bias in the data, but also the tip of the iceberg effect, especially with regard to arrest data.

The biases in the reporting of crime nationally are the focus of a new ten-million-dollar-a-year survey project of the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

CHAPTER VII

THE DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY: POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Chapters V and VI have dealt with the problem of delineating the experience of violence as it is manifested in the empirical world. Their objective was to establish some core areas and boundaries of violence as manifested and to demonstrate that the class characteristics of the persons involved in the various manifestations are, for the most part, statistically the same. In other words, violence in its several investigated forms involves the same group of people, as defined by sociological terms. This conclusion is important for two reasons: it supports the viability of the concept as developed theoretically and it confirms the validity of the operationalization.¹

The issue which this chapter will raise concerns the identity of this group of people experiencing violence. All that can be suggested so far is that if there is a group which can be identified as experiencing violence, then conversely there are people who do not belong to that group. Whereas this bit of logic hints at a different distribution of violence according to class status, by itself it does not compel us to conceive of violence in Gainesville as political because of its distribution. The necessity of

viewing violence in that way becomes apparent only by comparing the class characteristics of the group involved in violence with the same class characteristics of the people in the community at large.

The shift in focus in this chapter thus changes from within-group variations to variations between the group and those not in the group. Whereas the characteristics of the class scale suggest that violence victims may be different from society in the sense of being less politically influential, it is not until this chapter that this suggestion is explored. If the persons involved in violence in the community are statistically different from members of the community as a whole, then Aristotle, Harold Lasswell, and David Easton in their stress on the allocative function of the political process and the nature of those allocations are applicable to violence distributions, at a minimum from a sociological perspective.² If violence is experienced predominately by a single group or class relative to society as a whole, then that experience is political in the sense of an allocating process.

The Evidence

In order to determine if the persons involved in violence could have been drawn randomly from the community population, it is necessary to utilize the data in the form of comparable units. Since the United States census data is aggregate in

nature, it is not possible to create a class scale as was used in Chapters V and VI.³ Rather, it was necessary to break the scale data on persons involved in violence into its components to take advantage of census data.

The first component of the scale was age. In order to make valid comparisons, it was necessary to restructure each data set. First, three of the four manifestations of violence are not applicable to children in their early teens and younger; there was no record of arrests in Gainesville of persons younger than sixteen years of age. Therefore, the age comparison took place only among those fifteen years of age and older. The census data on age distributions below fifteen was not utilized. Therefore, in this instance, it was also necessary to eliminate some 57 cases of victims of crimes of violence because the victims were less than fifteen years of age. With this limitation on minimum age, the age distribution was compared in six ten-year age brackets and a seventy-five years of age and over category. If persons experiencing violence are no different than society in general, it would be expected that the age distribution of violence-experiencing persons would be statistically indistinguishable from the distribution exhibited by the population. Since, in this case, the census data is used to compute a theoretical distribution rather than to serve as an independent sample, the table below does not list the raw population figures, and

the one-sample rather than the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used.

TABLE 18

AGE: POPULATION AND VIOLENCE INVOLVEMENT DISTRIBUTIONS

	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75--
population	.459	.643	.753	.855	.930	.975	--
violence involvement	511 .490	234 .714	121 .830	108 .934	46 .978	18 .995	5 --
"D"	.031	.071	.077	<u>.079</u>	.049	.020	
critical value=.042 "D"=.079 must reject H_0							

The age distribution of those involved in violence is significantly different than it would be if violence was distributed randomly throughout the population. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test is two-tailed and does not give direction, as is evidenced by the cumulative frequencies, violence is distributed heaviest among the young. This was the same conclusion reached by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The former concluded from probability sample interviews of riot area residents in Detroit that over 60 percent of the rioters were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. A little over 30 percent in that age bracket classified themselves as non-involved. Actual arrest figures confirmed the accuracy of

these responses, as over 50 percent of the actual riot arrestees were in the fifteen to twenty-four years of age category.⁴ Keep in mind, though, that this study dealt with a very limited conception of what has frequently been equated with political violence, that is, riots. On the other hand, the Violence Commission which was concerned with violence beyond mass rioting noted in agreement that in crimes of violence such as homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, many more persons were arrested in the fifteen to twenty-four age group than any other. This Commission also stated that victims of "assaultive violence" have the same characteristics as the offenders, that is, in this case, they are young also.⁵

Whereas the Commissions' conclusion was the same general conclusion reached through my data, there are basic differences which need to be stressed. My collection of violent events did not occur in a large metropolitan area, nor from an area plagued with major riots. Rather, the data was drawn from what must be conceived of as a much more typical cross-section of life within the United States political system. Also, the data include more than just rioters or arrestees for violent crimes, or even passing mention of their victims. In addition to itemizing the latter, the data include examples of systemic or institutionalized violence which neither Commission undertook to study as violence. Therefore, whereas the

Gainesville data confirm various national findings and vice versa, that data goes far beyond a mere confirmation of other findings by adding new dimensions to the body of knowledge already available. The confirmation and extension is applicable not only to age but also to other class characteristics to follow.

A second characteristic which went into the compilation of the class scale was race. Although this variable is nominal rather than ordinal in nature, we are similarly attempting to determine if the racial balance observed in those involved in violence could be the result of a random selection process from a population with the racial balance exhibited in the Gainesville census. Working with this limitation and objective in mind, the raw population racial data was transformed into the same number of cases as the violence data to approximate the racial distribution we would expect to find if violence was randomly (or proportionately) distributed racially. To further explain: there were 1,183 racially distinguishable violence cases and 64,089 racially-distinguishable persons in the Gainesville census count. The fraction $1,183/64,089$ multiplied times the 52,048 census whites and 12,041 census blacks would lead us to theoretically expect 961 whites and 222 blacks in our 1,183 violence cases. The discrepancy between the theoretically expected and the observed is analyzed below using Chi-square.

TABLE 19

RACE: POPULATION AND VIOLENCE INVOLVEMENT DISTRIBUTIONS

	white	black
expected	961	222
observed	590	593

$$\chi^2=763.231$$

critical value=5.99, must reject H_0

There is no question that racially the persons involved in violence are significantly different from those persons in the community at large. Blacks made up less than 20 percent of the Gainesville population in 1970 but comprised over one half of those persons involved in violence. Again, the comparison with national violence-related inquiries is supportive. Over 80 percent of the persons arrested in the 1967 riots were black.⁶ Urban arrest rates for various crimes of violence were ten to twenty times higher for blacks than for whites.⁷ In 1968, for example, blacks comprised almost one half of the aggravated assault arrestees, 61 percent of the robbery arrestees, and 47 percent of the rape arrestees, and most often these crimes for which the arrests were made were directed against other blacks.⁸

The same technique used with race was used in comparing the occupational status of persons involved in violence with those living in the community. In the case of the blue-collar

characteristic, the violence data yielded 125 white-collar workers and 484 blue-collar, sixteen years old and over. This total of 609 enables us to reduce the 15,878 white-collar and 8,262 blue-collar census cases to 401 and 208, respectively.

TABLE 20

OCCUPATION: POPULATION AND VIOLENCE INVOLVEMENT DISTRIBUTIONS

	white collar	blue collar
expected	401	208
observed	125	484

$$\chi^2 = 556.195$$

critical value = 5.99, must reject H_0

As was the case with both age and race, there is a statistically significant difference between what we would expect to find in the violence cases under an assumption of randomness and what was actually observed. Blue-collar workers experienced violence far out of proportion to their numbers in the population.

The fourth characteristic used in construction of the class index was the presence of functional alienation as indicated by an individual classifying himself or herself as a "laborer" or "unemployed." In the 1970 violence data, 144 persons were listed as laborers and 140 as unemployed

for a total of 284 persons functionally alienated out of a work force of 773. The United States Census records 1,154 as laborers and 977 as unemployed for 2,131 functionally alienated out of a work force of 25,232.

TABLE 21

FUNCTIONAL ALIENATION:
POPULATION AND VIOLENCE INVOLVEMENT DISTRIBUTIONS

	functionally alienated	not functionally alienated
expected	65	708
observed	284	489

$\chi^2=805.603$ critical value=5.99 must reject H_0

The national commissions dealing with violence did not attempt to derive two types of information from an occupational classification as the class index does. For the most part, they tended to view occupation as a scale in itself, ranging from higher white-collar jobs to lower blue-collar, skilled and unskilled manual, to unemployment. Seeing occupation in this way and reviewing the commission findings lends support to the information presented in both Tables 20 and 21.

Approximately 30 percent of the 1967 rioters, as revealed both by interviews and arrest data, were unemployed, and over 60 percent said they had been unemployed for as long as a

month or more during the previous year.⁹ Studies by the University of Pennsylvania, utilizing Philadelphia police data, found that between 90 and 95 percent of the violent crime offenders could be classified occupationally on a range between and including skilled workers to the unemployed. More than 40 percent of the major violent-crime offenders in Washington, D. C., were found to be unemployed by the District of Columbia Crime Commission. And a St. Louis inquiry discovered that aggravated assault was almost entirely a blue-collar crime.¹⁰

On each separate dimension of the class index used in previous chapters, the group of persons experiencing violence is statistically different from people in the community as a whole. Violence, as a value allocated directly or indirectly by the political system is distributed very unequally among members according to their socio-economic, demographic standing.

The in-depth interview data referred to in Chapter IV tend to add support to these conclusions although there were not enough cases to result in statistical significance. Respondents were coded as to their experience with violence in the year immediately preceding the interview: (1) had they been involved in violence, (2) had a close friend or relative been involved, (3) had someone they knew been involved, or (4) had neither they nor any of their acquaintances

been involved? The response closest to the individual was recorded in case of multiple responses. The four categories were dichotomized into two groups. The first, consisting of the involvement of either the individual or a close friend or relative was considered experience with violence. The second two categories were not.

If we consider all family incomes below \$7,000 per year as "low" and \$7,000 or above as high, then 44 percent of low income persons experienced violence, but only 21 percent of high income persons did so. Similarly, 40 percent of those who rent their living quarters experienced violence compared to only 18 percent of those who own. Thirty-three percent of the respondents thirty years of age and under reported experience with violence, whereas those over thirty years of age only reported a 21 percent involvement.¹¹ Assuming a close correlation between income or standard of living and age, race, and occupation, these percentages, taken from a random data sample suggest the same conclusions as does the police data which has high statistical significance.¹² Not only are various forms of violence allocated most heavily upon the same class of persons, but that class is highly distinct from the society at large.

Thus the hypothesis follows that violence in America, or more specifically, its subunits, is distributed so unequally that its manifestations must be considered political.

Violence becomes, in a justifiable conceptual sense, political violence. This is not to say that each and every manifestation of violence can be usefully analyzed as political; such a suggestion would be absurd. What is political about violence in Gainesville is the pattern of its manifestations. While it may not be helpful to talk about specific acts as political, it is helpful to conceptualize the violence in society as politically allocated.¹³

Making Political Violence Comparable

Applying the techniques utilized in this chapter, it would be possible to compare the level of political violence in Gainesville with that of other communities where the same operationalization had been undertaken. Since the use of census data would not be necessitated, such a comparison could utilize the class distribution scale employed in Chapters V and VI, and compare the distributions of violence within the two cities under study.¹⁴ However, to the degree that the class characteristics of the two city populations varied, the conclusions of such a comparison could be questioned. The increases in the random odds of political violence in cities with larger politically powerless classes could not be taken into account. If city A had more youth, blacks, unemployment, and functional alienation than city B, the level of unequal violence distributions at which we could

apply the label of political violence would be different; we would have to anticipate more inequality in city A on the basis of randomness alone.

The standardization of political violence operationally defined for specific cities can only be attempted when controls for population class structures are introduced. This control was introduced in this chapter through the use of census information. The calculations using expected or anticipated violence occurrences make possible comparable calculations in other cities. The only factor thus still impeding comparisons is the strong influence of N (number of cases) in Chi-square calculations. This impediment can be eliminated by using a statistic such as the phi coefficient which controls for N. Applying $\phi = \frac{X^2}{N}$ gives us a comparable statistic. Thus converting the Gainesville X^2 s, we have comparable statistics on the four class dimensions: age,¹⁵ .022; race, .645; occupation, .913; functional alienation, 1.029.¹⁶ Various cities could be compared and contrasted using these statistics as data. Comparisons would be possible on each distributive dimension of political violence.

In addition, it should be remembered that the class scale was developed upon the assumption that all class characteristics forming the scale were equal in importance and thus could be combined. This assumption is just as appropriate after controls for population characteristics as before. The phi coefficients were all extracted from the same table structure

and thus have the same theoretical minimum and maximum, lending themselves to combination. Thus, utilizing the mean phi coefficient, Gainesville political violence can be rated at the .652 level. This overall figure is comparable to other community political violence levels similarly developed.

The development of comparable political violence indices for communities in turn opens a new area of empirical research. Cross-sectional studies of communities could be undertaken correlating levels of political violence with other political characteristics, such as form of government or levels of public participation, in an effort to discover the intervening variables between class-based political powerlessness and allocations of violence as a negative value.

Notes

¹If each manifestation demonstrated a different distribution it would be possible to argue that the theoretical conceptualization of violence was useless because it related to different phenomena or that the operationalization of a viable concept was faulty for the same reason.

²If a political scientist deals exclusively with the intricacies of the policy formulation process, saying that an unequal distribution of violence is political is to him or her like going from A to C without mentioning B. How, he might ask, can we talk about a political system and an allocation within it without telling specifically how the allocation takes place? However, at an early stage in the study of any allocation, this seeming gap is necessary. The direct linkage between the political system and the distribution of violence suggested in Chapter III can only be confirmed by policy studies, which are beyond the scope of this investigation. Before such policy studies could assume any nontrivial significance, though, they would have to be directed by an understanding of what political violence is. The object of this dissertation is to provide that perspective.

³For the census data used in this chapter, see U. S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population and Housing: Census Tracts, Gainesville, Fla., Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-7.

⁴Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 74.

⁵"The Report of The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," pp. 39, 42.

⁶Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 74.

⁷"The Report of The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," pp. 39, 42.

⁸Clark, p. 35.

⁹Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 75.

¹⁰Cited in "The Report of The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," p. 40.

¹¹Because of very few persons who were coded as blue collar and no respondents coded as laborers and only one as unemployed, it was impossible to give figures on the societal dimensions of occupation and functional alienation.

¹²The percentages should not be taken as indicative of the scope of violence in society. First, there was no follow-up as to what the respondent was considering violence in answering the question. Secondly, those considered having had experience with violence included the close friends or relatives of the person experiencing what the respondent considered violence. In actuality, only two of 48 respondents claimed to have been involved in violence themselves; 10 more claimed that close friends or relatives had been.

¹³Political violence as a distribution of violence has strong conceptual ties with the "militant" notion of black prison inmates as "political prisoners." However, the usual reduction of that position to every incarcerated black being a political prisoner is not easy to follow because it is the distribution, a somewhat dispositional term, that is political. It seldom makes sense to say that any one incarceration (or violent act) is "political" except insofar as it is connected to the whole.

¹⁴This is the technique which is utilized in the longitudinal analysis of Chapter VIII.

¹⁵The information tested in the powerful Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test must be reformulated to be subjected to a Chi-square test equivalent to that used on the other characteristics. That reformulation follows the pattern of the other characteristics.

	<u>young (15-34)</u>	<u>old (35→)</u>	
expected	671	372	$\chi^2=22.881$
observed	745	298	

¹⁶In "within" comparisons it thus becomes evident that the most significant dimensions of political violence distributions in Gainesville are, respectively, functional alienation, occupation, race, and age (although it must be borne in mind that the first two are not completely independent).

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CHANGE OVER TIME

The selection of a random distribution of violence as an objective referent or benchmark creates in the concept of political violence a dynamism which permits the analysis of change over time. If the conceptualization stopped with any distribution of violence as political, then the concept would be static; there would be no way to compare levels of political violence and to distinguish between which violence could be usefully considered political and which could not. By including randomness or equality in the conceptualization we create a quantifiable variable of deviation from the referent-- a variable of how political violence should be considered. The more the allocation of violence differs from an equal in the sense of random distribution, the more political it is.¹ In an important way, this political violence variable conceptualization is far more useful than the riot political violence concept. That concept, usually based upon a number of people jointly participating in particular illegal acts defies usage in most United States' communities. There are either no such acts or so few as to rule out statistical analysis. Are we to say political violence does not exist

in those communities? The conceptualization of political violence developed in this study encourages perception of the phenomenon as occurring along a continuum, detectable in all communities, though more significant in some than in others. That continuum is, of course, applicable to longitudinal as well as cross-sectional analysis.

The conceptualization of political violence developed here also permits a more useful understanding with regard to its change over time because it encourages the examination of nondecision-making. The encouragement is due to the fact that the conceptualization starts with distributions as the consequence of allocations and is not bound by establishing direct linkages with, for example, the Congressional passage of bills or the adoption of measures by a city council.

In contrast, the riot perspective of political violence shows a remarkable coincidence in its labeling of violence as political at the same time that it is becoming frequently discussed and an important subject of the legislative process. This interpretation comes dangerously close to attributing the "political" nature of violence to its saliency. To take this step is to exclude the entire nondecision-making process from politics. It is to say, for example, that the United States' intervention in Vietnam in the early sixties was not political whereas in the early seventies it was. It is the same as saying that regulations which did not limit air


pollution in the past decade were not political whereas present regulations which do are political.

The implications of the two conceptualizations lead in two different directions. The riot perspective would lead us to believe that violence should be thought of as becoming more and more political throughout the decade. Violence is seen as an important topic of legislation, in turn because it has involved, at least vicariously, more middle-class and politically influential people. In contrast, the conceptualization of violence presented in this study may lead us to believe that violence at present is no more "political" than it has been for the last ten, twenty, or fifty years. In fact, to the degree that violence has shifted toward the involvement of the more politically influential classes, it has become less, not more, political. In the light of such implications, it becomes imperative that we analyze the actual change in violence over the last decade to determine if the implications of our political violence conceptualization can be squared with our other conceptually-based beliefs surrounding the period in question.

Due to the tremendous resources consumed in reading all police reports for a year and selecting, coding, and recording examples of violence, only two points in time are utilized in the longitudinal analysis. In order to justify 1960 and 1970 as "typical" violence years for the decade, police summary data for each year of the period is presented in Figure 2.

Those summary figures for criminal violence victimizations, criminal violence arrests, and the composite of the two, criminal violence involvement, approximate the recorded violence data in those categories although, as Figure 2 indicates, are not identical with them.²

FIGURE 2
DECADE TRENDS, SUPERIMPOSED^a



^aAlthough the data presented here are discrete, for legibility and ease of representation, interconnecting lines have been used.

Whereas there are some fluctuations, varying with city consolidations and police policy, the years 1960 and 1970 are reflective of the trends of the decade. The increased emphasis on victimizations and their recording in the late 1960's is reflected in the 1970 data. The trend in violent crime arrests appears more steady. In fact, interpreting the decade in terms of police officer years and arrests for violent crimes, the two trends are statistically inseparable at the .05 level as Table 22 demonstrates. As police force size is highly related to city population growth, in the arrest for crimes of violence category there are no atypical years in the decade.

Utilizing 1960 and 1970 data, the longitudinal analysis will compare the distributions of the total concept of violence as it has been developed in this study. That is, the concept includes victims of physical or mental violence as defined by crimes of violence, victims of systemic violence as defined by card arrests and arrests without convictions in cases other than traffic, and perpetrators of violence as defined by police arrest records for specific crimes of homicide, assault, battery, robbery, rape, kidnapping, disorderly conduct by action where it involved physical contact, resisting arrest with violence, and reckless display of a firearm. Since the class scale which has been used in conjunction with the 1970 data is also applicable to the 1960 data, that scale will be used in the comparisons beginning with Table 23.

TABLE 22

YEAR SELECTION VALIDATION

	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	total
# police	42	48	56	62	68	71	83	87	89	97	105	808
officers	.052	.111	.181	.252	.342	.429	.532	.640	.750	.870	-	
# of arrests, crimes of violence	281	237	241	261	326	268	381	374	435	408	472	3684
	.076	.141	.206	.277	.365	.432	.541	.642	.761	.872	-	

"D" .024 .030 .025 .025 .023 .003 .009 .002 .011 .002 -

critical value=.053 "D"=.030 cannot reject H₀

TABLE 23
1960/1970 VIOLENCE COMPARISON

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 total violence	148	378	349	250	59	1184
involvement distribution	.125	.444	.739	.950	-	
1960 total violence	28	94	83	98	42	345
involvement distribution	.081	.354	.594	.878	-	
"D"	.044	.090	<u>.145</u>	.072	-	
critical value=.083		"D"=.145	must reject H_0			

Analyzing the above distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample, two-tailed test, the null hypothesis that there is no difference must be rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis that there is a difference in the distributions. Carrying the analysis further, we can construct a more specific alternative hypothesis which is consistent both with the actual distributions and common notions about the expansion of violence. Thus the alternative hypothesis that violence has shifted into new, more politically influential, areas of the population over the decade permits a one-tailed test. Converting "D" into a Chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom results in a X^2 of 22.468 with a critical value of 5.99. The alternative hypothesis must be accepted; violence has become more of a phenomena of the potentially powerful classes.

Using this hypothesis as a conclusion, it would be possible to create an explanation for the increasing attention,

both public and scholarly, to the role of violence in American society. In fact, it might be possible to argue, within limits, that there is no real conflict between seeing "political" as that which increases formal legislative activity to alter or preserve the status quo, and seeing "political" as that which differs from a benchmark and is subject to legislative activity. The problem may not be conceptual, but semantic.³ Yet to accept the above alternate hypothesis as a conclusion would be premature at this point, since it is based on a commonly held theory which sees only one aspect of violence invading and disturbing the middle and upper classes. According to that widely held belief, the number or at least the threat of victimization has increased, but little is said about the persons committing the crimes. The ramifications of that alternative hypothesis need to be empirically examined. The first division of the violence index is into perpetrators of violence and victims of violence. The following table presents the change over time of the former, about which the alternative hypothesis has little to say. Therefore, using a two-tailed test, we are asking if the class characteristics of persons arrested for committing crimes of violence over the decade remained the same or if the distribution of class characteristics changed.

Utilizing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample, two-tailed test in conjunction with Table 24 results in a "D" of .113 with a critical value of .138, which does not permit the

rejection of the null hypothesis. However, a quick look at the distribution shows that there was a statistically insignificant shift in the distribution over time and that the shift was toward the potentially powerful classes. The main point is, however, that the class of the perpetrators of violence has not changed significantly over the decade.

TABLE 24

1960/1970 PERPETRATORS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 perpetrators	16 .056	47 .220	88 .528	101 .881	34 -	286
1960 perpetrators	2 .014	17 .129	42 .415	59 .816	27 -	147
"D"	.042	.091	<u>.113</u>	.065	-	

The other part of our violence concept is comprised of victims. Whereas the alternative hypothesis does not have much to say about the perpetrators of violent crimes, it is much more definite concerning the victims. Increasingly, the middle and upper classes are seen as threatened with violence. It was demonstrated in Chapter VI that violence was not a middle or upper class phenomenon, but that does not answer the question of whether it is becoming more or less a middle-upper class phenomenon. Table 25 addresses itself to this issue.

TABLE 25
1960/1970 VICTIMS

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 victims	132 .147	331 .516	261 .806	149 .972	25 -	898
1960 victims	26 .131	77 .520	41 .727	39 .924	15 -	198
"D"	.016	.004	<u>.079</u>	.048		

A Chi-square statistic of 4.050 results from the conversion of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov "D" for a one-tailed test. With a critical value of 5.99, the distributions are not significantly different at the .05 level. Victims, over time, have been drawn from the same class, which we have described as politically powerless. Over an entire decade, there has been no significant shifting toward the more potentially politically powerful classes.

The position this conclusion places us in may be philosophically interesting, but it is a confusing arena in which to make statements about the specific subject matter. The whole, total involvement with violence, is distinctly different from the sum of its parts, perpetrators and victims. The whole exhibits a significant change over time toward the middle and upper classes; the parts do not. To some extent, the answer lies in the number of cases contained in the whole and the parts. But that answer is itself inaccurate. It would be in a very real sense misleading to

say that, if we had more cases, the parts would show a significant change over time. It would be misleading because: (1) no "sample" had less than 147 cases, (2) the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has a high power-efficiency, especially with regard to small samples,⁴ and, most importantly, (3) the "samples" were not samples at all but the universe of specific incidents which occurred over the period of an entire year. If the data over that long a period of time does not reveal statistically significant changes, who can say that the time period of data collection was inadequate when the entire analysis was limited to a decade? Rather, we must accept the conclusion that these "parts" did not exhibit significant change.

The alternative hypothesis of change in distribution toward the middle classes forces the breakdown of the violence concept further, however, for analytical purposes. The victim index in Table 25 was composed of victims of card arrest, arrest without conviction in nontraffic cases, and victims of violent crimes. These specific types of violence victimizations will be examined over time in the above order. Since the applicability of the alternate hypothesis has been called into question, the following tables will use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample, two-tailed test.

The absence of change in distribution in the card arrest data over the decade evidenced in Table 26 is repeated in the nontraffic, arrest without conviction data presented in

TABLE 26

1960/1970 CARD ARRESTS

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 card arrests	23 .125	59 .446	56 .750	38 .957	8 -	184
1960 card arrests	11 .117	21 .340	25 .606	27 .894	-	94
"D"	.008	.106	<u>.144</u>	.063		
critical value=.172		"D"=.144		cannot reject H_0		

Table 27. Even combining the data in Tables 26 and 27 as was done conceptually to approximate or illustrate systemic violence does not produce a significant change over the decade. That combination results in a "D" of .098 and a critical value of .141.

TABLE 27

1960/1970 ARREST WITHOUT CONVICTION, NONTRAFFIC

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 arrest without conviction	13 .107	50 .516	29 .754	24 .951	6 -	122
1960 arrest without conviction	6 .122	12 .367	14 .653	12 .898	5 -	49
"D"	.015	<u>.149</u>	.101	.053		
critical value=.230		"D"=.149		cannot reject H_0		

On the other hand, significant change can be seen in the distribution of victims of violent crimes even over and beyond the statistical analysis presented in Table 28.

TABLE 28

1960/1970 VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
1970 violent crime victims	96 .162	222 .537	176 .834	87 .981	11 -	592
1960 violent crime victims	9 .164	44 .964	2 -	0 -	0 -	55
"D"	.002	<u>.427</u>	.166	.019		
critical value=	.192	"D"=.427		must reject H_0		

However, it will be noted that the change in distribution is strongly in the direction of the politically powerless class. That direction is the exact opposite of the direction indicated by the overall violence change in distribution and the alternative hypothesis adopted. If we accept the data as accurate, then we must totally reject that alternative hypothesis in its specifics. Rather than there being an objective basis for beliefs concerning middle and upper class involvement as victims of violence, just the opposite is true.⁵ Of all our composite parts of violence, only victims of violent crimes demonstrate any significant change in distribution over the decade, and that distribution shifted toward the politically powerless class.

Overall, violence has seemed to change slightly in distribution over the past decade, to shift a small but detectable amount toward the "middle American" citizen. This movement is detectable in our "universe" of data in arrests for crimes

of violence, in card arrests, and in nontraffic arrests without convictions, but not in statistically significant proportions. Within our violence data, however, the victims of reported illegal acts of violence were being increasingly drawn from the powerless class in statistically significant proportions, a trend which is the reverse of the overall pattern. Nonetheless, to remain consistent, the treatment of political violence must be based upon the entire conceptualization and not upon one of its parts. If the "political" in political violence is to refer to the deviation of violence manifestations from random distributions, then while the violence in Gainesville in 1970 was still very much political violence, it was a little less so than in 1960.⁶

This conclusion differs considerably from the conclusions of most observers interested in political violence, especially conclusions reached in the late '60's.⁷ The difference is primarily the result of concentration on a very specific type of violence which, however academically interesting, tended to overshadow a political significance that violence has always contained. The common, everyday occurrence of violence is far more important in terms of its impact than any or all of the riots of the mid and late '60's.⁸ But whereas the violence we have dealt with in this study is vastly more prevalent, and more important in terms of its role in the ordering of society, to the political

scientist of today who needs an environment which produces rapid change, everyday violence appears as a constant and, as such, is invisible. Even though in this chapter we have established a slight trend in political violence, on the whole it has been delineated as a constant, relative to the status quo, and as such is discoverable only through rejecting the status quo as the primary point of reference. Having first defined political violence from such a different reference point, it was then possible to analyze change within the framework of the status quo-- and to discover the slight shift presented here.

Notes

¹Whereas the choice of equality or randomness as a referent has a basis in normative theory, it is certainly not the intent of this study to derive that benchmark from any historical state of nature. The concept is derivative of man's evolving ability to think abstractly and probably should be seen as much a product of the times as the result of any unchanging attributes or rights of people as people.

²The criminal violence victimization figures do not include simple assaults, and the criminal violence arrest figures include disorderly conduct by words as well as action (fighting). There are no summary data available on arrests with insufficient evidence for extended detention, prosecution, or conviction. What data does exist, for example, on arrests for "suspicion" or "investigation" does not reflect the number of "card arrests" actually on file.

³The situation where "political" referred to the same phenomena would be realized, for example, if difference from the benchmark was what spurred public attention and legislative action.

⁴Siegel, p. 136.

⁵Of course, this drastic change in distribution might also suggest a skewness in the 1960 police data. Individuals in the lower socio-economic category might not have so readily visited hospital emergency rooms, duty nurses may not have been required to call the police, and the police may have been much less conscientious about completing and filing general incident reports-- especially those few that low-status blacks attempted to report.

If documented, a change in police policy toward a more "liberal" stance could possibly explain the recording of more black victims and another phenomenon as well. If the distinction between victims and perpetrators is dropped completely and the data is grouped according to how it was reported, all arrests used in this study can be grouped together: for crimes of violence, by card only, and any nontraffic arrest where a conviction or guilty plea did not result. If this grouping procedure is followed and the data is analyzed in terms of change over time, the result is a χ^2 of 12.558 with a critical value of 5.99. The distribution of recorded arrests has shifted toward the potentially powerful classes. In 1960, only two of fifty-five cases of violent crime victims (3.6 percent) possessed two of the scale characteristics, and none had three or four such characteristics. By 1970, 46 percent of the individual victims had

two, three, or four of the characteristics. The shift in arrests toward the more powerful classes and the shift in reported violent crime could both be the result of the social and racial liberalization of the police force since 1960. However, because there is no other collaboration of this theory in the data, the body of the study must accept the data findings as valid.

⁶The statistically significant change in political violence demonstrated in Table 23 is deemphasized for two reasons. The first reason is to avoid distorting the still high level of political violence revealed in Chapter VII for 1970. The second reason deals with our inability to statistically demonstrate that trend within various manifestations of violence when the concept is broken down. The significance of the trend is enhanced, however, by the fact that over the decade three of the four powerless class characteristics have increased their presence within the city population. The percentage of persons of "arrestable" age, fifteen through thirty years, in the total population increased from 41.2 to 43.7. The proportion of blue-collar workers in the population increased from 9.2 percent to 12.8 percent. And the percentage of persons reporting as laborers or unemployed increased from 2.8 to 3.3. Only the proportion of blacks in the city declined, from 23.1 percent in 1960 to 18.7 percent in 1970. However, at the same time, these variations cannot be given too much significance, as violence recorded in the city also involved noncity residents who were not reflected in the above census figures. In 1960, 88.3 percent of the recorded violence involved city residents. In 1970, the figure was 85.5 percent, the slight change probably reflecting the increased mobility of noncity residents into the city for entertainment, etc.

⁷Certainly not all the observers and all the conclusions were academic, nor can academicians be solely responsible for the increasing emphasis or misemphasis on "creeping violence." For suggestions concerning the dimensions of the problem, see Appendix D.

⁸See Garver, p. 57. Garver cites Kenneth Clark as also perceiving the violence in riots as trivial compared to the violence inherent in ordinary ghetto life.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE GOING

This study has been predicated upon the notion that concepts are creations of people. The progression of knowledge is probably closer to the development of concepts than it is to the facts which are described by them. Consciously or not, people develop new concepts which help them relate other concepts. Academic scholarship may be best described as the conscious development of concepts to fit our needs. In this study, I have attempted to develop a concept of political violence to fill a "void" which has arisen from the treatment of a narrower conceptualization of similar phenomena. That void has created a very "unuseful" impression of the role of violence in social organization.

The Approach

There is a paradox involved in this instrumental view of concepts. On the one hand, the richness of our knowledge depends directly upon the diversity and creativity of the conceptualization process.¹ On the other hand, the instrumental relativism must readily acknowledge that new conceptualizations are meaningful only insofar as they incorporate a common denominator of shared other concepts expressed to

some extent as values and beliefs.² Any political theorist who has attempted to teach Marxism to college freshmen in the United States can appreciate this fact.

On the one hand, therefore, we have tried to avoid the prison of the status quo. We have tried to avoid having our concepts formed by a strict dependence upon what we see as "out there." As Marcuse is saying in One Dimensional Man, if we cannot transcend the phenomena of observables, we become prisoners of our own environment. The transcendence, of course, must be in thought, in conceptualization, for it is here we can be more than "one dimensional." In this study, transcendence of observables was attempted by conceptualizing political violence as unequal or nonrandom occurrences of socially-disorienting actions in a society. This "objective referent" or starting point, equality in the sense of randomness, is not an "observable" in the same sense as is a group of ten or more individuals throwing bricks at policemen. The referent gives us the ability to "discover" or "not discover" the existence of political violence in a community (or country) regardless of what that community was in the past or other contemporary communities exhibit at the same time. It gives us the ability to talk about constants. The concept transcends the present culture and world of observables in a sense that a "purely behavioralistic" study could not, either longitudinally or cross-sectionally.

On the other hand, however, whereas the study rejected basing the concept of political violence on an observable act or a particular point in time as is usually indicated within the behavior school of thought, it did utilize behavioral methods of analysis to empirically test the transcendent conceptualization. Those methods were used to (1) verify the validity of the conceptualization and the consistency of the operationalization, (2) establish the distribution relative to society at large, and (3) trace changes in political violence over time. Thus the study insures that it will be at least partially understood within the "behavioral tradition."

Also the study, in establishing a "nonobservable" basis for its conceptualization, drew upon a large volume of scholarly work in classical and analytical theory. Specifically mentioned were the works of Aristotle, Lasswell, and Easton. By basing the conceptualization upon the works widely used by political scientists, works which stress the distributive nature of political systems, the theoretical presentations of Chapter III are assured understanding. In summary, The Conceptualization of Political Violence attempted to utilize and reestablish a transcendent dimension which has been lacking in behavioral research while at the same time keeping within the existing political science body of knowledge with regard both to the basis of the conceptualization and the empirical analysis of it.

The emphasis on the distributional aspects of politics is not, however, without its complications. To say, as do Lasswell and Easton, that the essence of politics is the unequal allocation of scarce values or resources is to say that the more unequal the allocations, the more "political" the system or process. This is the line of reasoning followed in the conceptualization of political violence, especially in the development of a cross-sectionally comparable statistic in Chapter VII and the longitudinal analysis in Chapter VIII. Beyond the linguistic analysis previously presented, carrying this perspective to its logical conclusion has implications for the concept of political development only hinted at in Chapter III. If the continuum of political development is isomorphic to the continuum of unequal distributions, then supporting descriptions and justifications of political development are compatible with dimensions such as the imposition of order in a very Hobbesian sense.

On the one hand, to the degree that they have accepted the inequality/political development framework, political scientists are forced into the study of the other primary aspect of politics, power, in an attempt to analyze the limitations placed upon political allocations by groups only peripherally in the political arena. Academic study is and has become concentrated on the self-limiting effects of competition for disproportionate representation, the concept of plural elites. The study of plural elites allows us as

political scientists to accept this theoretically-devastating concept of political development by concentrating upon the beneficial effects of having many entities competing for unequal allocations.³ Thus the implications of the distributional perspective of politics are accepted but balanced by concentrating on the power dimension.

Another way of dealing with the implications of the distributional dimension of politics might best be described as Neo-Marxian. Its framework also offers a viable solution to the dilemma in question, but is less accepted by United States' political scientists. Basically, this framework limits the description of political development (as moving along a line of unequal distribution) to capitalist political systems. When the framework is limited in this manner, there is a high degree of compatibility between the findings of this study and Marxian theory in general. (Even the slight decline in the disproportionate allocation of violence can be explained as an insignificant, temporary reversal in the inevitable progression.) Such a perspective can, if necessary, move beyond the actual classifications of political systems in existence, all of which might be classified as capitalist (private or state), to comparisons based on potentials, as were utilized in this study.

The Findings: Summary

Chapter II began the process of establishing an analytical framework eventually encompassing the concepts of

violence and its relationship to the political system. In seeking to isolate the essence of the concept of violence, violence was presented as a particular type of social action, anti-social action, for which there is an individual or collectivity which is responsible in a blamable way. That action constitutes a violation of human rights in an intense manner, accompanied by harm and pain, at a minimum on the level of mental anguish. As a result of his total involvement in such an action which is beyond his control, an individual finds his expectations of social behavior patterns disrupted.

Overall; the experiencing of the action of violence is delineated as a negative, undesirable involvement, regardless of the motivations leading up to it or any beneficial outcomes.

Violence as so defined defies categorization into two frameworks of analysis sometimes utilized by political scientists, the common law tradition or, alternately, the emphasis on subcultural variation. These frameworks would have us understand violence as having very little or very different meaning in significant segments of the population.

In continuing the development of the framework presented in this study, Chapter III examined the place of violence in the political system. Violence was viewed as a negative value whose opposite is of scarce supply and thus is unequally distributed among social classes in society, dependent upon their potential political power status. Such a view is a natural outgrowth of the conjunction of the distributive dimension of politics enunciated by Aristotle and Easton, and

an elitist view of political power held by such diverse scholars as Lasswell, Robert Dahl, and C. Wright Mills. Within the context of distributions for the benefit of the politically powerful, a benchmark of equal in the sense of random distributions of violence was introduced in a way suggested by the writings of Herbert Marcuse. Variations of violence distributions from that benchmark were defined as political, especially inasmuch as anticipated variations are to the benefit of the relatively politically influential classes.

Chapter IV operationalized the conceptual framework developed in the two preceding chapters in the city of Gainesville, Florida. Various examples of violence were selected from records maintained by the Gainesville Police Department. Individuals involved in these selected actions were recorded as to socio-economic, demographic class characteristics. These characteristics were then combined into a scale representing potential political power within a social class context.

The analysis of the distributional consistency of the selected examples or indicators of violence was undertaken in Chapter V. Similar distribution patterns were isolated for violent crime victims, card arrest victims, and those persons arrested for nontraffic-related matters but not convicted. Empirical testing also showed that involvement in "property violence" is of a significantly different

distribution from involvement in personal violence. "Political" violence, as traditionally conceived but in interpersonal situations, could not be distinguished from other personal violence actions through distribution.

Chapter VI discovered that in the data collected, the distribution of perpetrators of violence was statistically similar to the distribution of victims of violence who were hospitalized as a result of that action. From available information on the bias in arrests toward serious violence usually committed by the less politically powerful classes, together with the bias in victim reporting toward more politically powerful classes, resulted in the hypothesis (accepted as a conclusion) that, if all arrests were made and victimizations reported, the two distribution curves would be similar.

The central core of the conceptualization, the overall nonrandomness of the distribution of violence, was empirically tested in Chapter VII. Using United States Census data, comparisons were made on each of the socio-economic, demographic class scale characteristics. On each characteristic, the distribution of violence was found to be significantly different from the proportional/random distribution based upon the occurrence of those characteristics in the City of Gainesville as a whole. In terms of the conceptualization, violence in Gainesville was found to be political.

Having confirmed that core of the conceptualization, Chapter VII then suggested possible ways of developing a

comparative index which could be used in the cross-sectional analysis of a number of communities. In this step, Chapter VII moved into the third phase of the organization of this study, beyond the conceptual framework and its verification, into the usefulness of the conceptualization/operationalization. Chapter VIII continued this phase by analyzing Gainesville violence longitudinally. It concluded that there was a very slight decline in the political nature of violence between 1960 and 1970, not a vast increase as the riot study perspective would have us believe. Overall, however, the chapter analysis recommends conceiving of that political violence as more of a constant than a variable in Gainesville and perhaps other community situations.

As was stated in the "Introduction" and above, the development is in this study threefold: conceptualization, empirical verification, and uses. The conceptualization of both violence and political violence is supported by the empirical analysis, though not "proven" in its entirety. Frameworks are by nature and necessity broader than the data they seek to explain. They are analytical tools for orientation, not statements of truth or falsehood. The empirical analysis aims at verifying only a small part of the framework, and the uses of the conceptualization are only two examples of what can be done with the conceptualization/operationalization. The threefold, pyramidal organization was necessitated by the breadth of the topic examined and approach used.

The base had to rest in many broad concepts which could only be sketched, not empirically derived. The top, in contrast, had to be composed of empirical statements about specific, concrete actions within a given context. Within the limitations imposed by the breadth of the base and the specificity of the top, however, the compatibility of the three levels and support they give to each other are significant.

Uses of the Conceptualization

What is gained by conceptualizing political violence in the manner described in this study? The stock behavioralist answer would be phrased something like "a more accurate picture of the way things really are." Whereas this answer may also approximate the more emotional beliefs of this writer, it is not very satisfying intellectually. It is especially unsatisfying if one identifies with an instrumental school of thought which questions our capacity to know an "out there" except through our own conceptualizations.

Rather, this conceptualization of political violence seems useful in terms of relating to other hypotheses, conclusions, and beliefs prevalent within and outside of the discipline. It seems to reduce an inflated impression concerning the power base of riots, that is, the relative amount of violence they contain and partially direct. This is not to deprecate the study of riots as a unique phenomenon-- only to insure that riot studies do not usurp concepts and meanings which belong elsewhere.

Why do those concepts belong elsewhere? We are confronted by a society, like most societies, which shows a remarkable resistance to socio-political change. To look at riots and their token, if any, political response emphasizes and encourages the examination of such change through a microscope-- and the objects so observed seem to have very little effect on the whole organism. Perhaps, we might suggest, the most important aspect of political violence is not the changes it brings about. Political violence may inhibit socio-political change, or it may have very little to do with change at all. Both alternatives see violence as an output rather than an input in the allocative process. The first alternative, while recognized, has not received much attention within the discipline. The second alternative, which stresses that violence may be an important allocation in its own right even in the absence of a clear, direct relationship with socio-political change, does not even appear as a viable concept in recent literature. Both of these alternatives are possible using the conceptualization of political violence developed in this study.

Implications of the Conceptualization

The objective in the conceptualization of political violence was to develop one new concept, not two. It was hoped that the reexamination of the concept could perform the same challenging posture in relation to political violence as did A. F. Organskii's analysis of the role assigned the balance

of power by scholars of international relations.⁴ In this way, the hope was that a more rigorous examination of the concepts we use would be stimulated. However, it was necessary for the conceptualization to proceed in two distinct stages. It is recognized, therefore, that the conceptualization process may have implications for the terms "violence" and "political," apart from their combination.

There are many concepts in political science which are the subject of controversy as to what they include. For example, scholars interested in authority disagree as to what role legitimacy plays. Similarly, with violence, scholars have disagreed over the role of intentionality, of physical injury, and of the consequences of violence. Violence as a socially-disorienting action served as a common denominator for most violence conceptions while excluding property damage and states of being, in general. In terms of the concept of violence itself, cross-cutting other concepts and adding a different emphasis can only serve to enrich its meaning. If such a conceptualization or reconceptualization was undertaken with other terminology, the results would certainly suggest new or overlooked associations.

With the concept of political, the issue becomes more central. If one were to read the conclusion of this study first, it would surely seem strange to hear political violence used to refer to a particular distribution of violence. In fact, it might sound grammatically incorrect. Yet surely

adjectives can be distributional in nature. It is just as easy to understand someone speaking about a "rare" flower as it is to understand the term a "red" flower. The analogy between these usages, respectively, is not very different from the suggested distributional sense of political violence and the customary view of it as involving a number of persons rioting or an assassination. Nor does viewing political as distributional deprive violence of its nondistributional characteristics. Political violence and lethal violence are analogous to the rare flower and the red flower; one does not limit the meaning of the other.

However, a more reasoned objection could be made to the use of political in a distributional sense to describe violence. What, the argument follows, happens to other concepts using the adjective political? What about the political process, the political system, political man, etc.? Does their meaning change, especially in distorted or unuseful ways? To begin to formulate an answer, it must first be said that the distributional meaning need not be applied to all uses of the term. The language permits many terms which have variations in meaning resting upon a common base. One that comes to mind describes a state of mind, an adjective "mad." To speak of a mad scientist and a mad football coach communicates two entirely different aspects of the state of mind. Similarly, political violence and political might can be referring to two aspects of what we call the political process.

Yet this position can be itself misleading, for it passively accepts the accusation that it is changing the meaning of the term political. This is not the case. All conceptions of what makes things political seem to hinge upon a power or authority aspect, its gain and exercise, or upon a distributional aspect of what the power is used for or what the consequences of its use are. Both themes are usually linked to a minimal application within a society or territorial division. The point is, that has been mentioned, the distributional meaning has always been inherent in the concept of what is political. Calling attention to its presence seems awkward simply because that aspect of politics has fallen into second place behind the power/authority aspect.⁵

Perhaps, we are suggesting, it would be useful to remind political scientists of the distributional nature of the process they study. Leaning toward the power aspect of political concepts seems to link academics closely to the readily visible exercise of that power in the established institutions of government. When scholars do not see decisions being made, there is nothing to study. The area we have come to know as nondecisions has been neglected. It would seem that by emphasizing and studying the distributions of the process and working our way back into the linkage, much of this area of nondecisions could be explored, in areas

not limited to violence allocations. A new battery of concepts could thus be analyzed such as political wealth or political welfare.

Implications of the Transcendent or "Objective" Referent

In this study, not only was violence broadened to a common denominator of many existing meanings, not only was "political" reemphasized as a distributional term, but the total concept of political violence was anchored in a hypothetical state of affairs which had its basis in no existing, observable society, past or present. To some, this may seem to represent a cyclical view of the function of political science-- that what is being advocated is an end goal which we should use our research to work toward-- and we have come full swing to the idea of a policy science. However desirable a random distribution of violence might be as a goal for a society, to visualize this study as normative in this sense is to miss the point of establishing a reference outside of the observable situation. The point is, in Marcusean terminology, to create a healthy conflict between concepts and the phenomena they describe.⁶ The gap is to create a mental perspective, not primarily or necessarily a social direction.⁷

This study is normative primarily in the same sense that all theory is normative. It recommends that we view reality in a specific way.⁸ In the sense that this recommendation is

supported by empirical evidence yet involves a mental perspective rooted in classical theory, perhaps the conceptualization of political violence blurs the oft overstated differences between the two. Closing the gap between the two schools of thought is consistent with the relativism inherent in an instrumentalist view of the discipline. And it is the last of the perceived broad implications of the approach used in the conceptualization of political violence.

Notes

¹Our knowledge develops through the replacement of paradigms of understanding, each successive paradigm radically transforming our perceptions of empirical reality. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), especially pp. 102-104, 159-172.

²"Very simply, one is constrained in his investigations by the substance of the intellectual tradition which embraces the subject matter under discussion." Cnudde and Neubauer, p. 10. See also Frohock, p. 12.

³Another mediating issue between the political scientist's acceptance of the framework and his own value system is that of legitimacy/consensus.

⁴See A. F. Organskii, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), especially pp. 282-299.

⁵See, for example, Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," The American Political Science Review, LXVII, No. 4 (December, 1973), 1142-1161.

⁶See Chapter III, pp. 102-103.

⁷If the distinction between analytical constructs and policy goals is not maintained, the outcome is the confusion produced throughout the 8th edition of the popular James MacGregor, Burns and Peltason, Government by the People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972). The reader is never sure when the pluralist and elitist models will be used for analysis or for advocacy.

⁸This position represents an extension of an argument found in Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), pp. 67-85.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

POLITICAL/NONPOLITICAL PERSONAL VIOLENCE BY CLASS CHARACTERISTICS

Table A1^a
By Age

age group	0-20	21-30	31-45	46-60	61-	total
nonpolitical personal violence	77 .269	116 .675	57 .874	28 .972	8 -	286
political personal violence	16 .410	10 .666	7 .845	6 -	0 -	39
"D"	.141	.009	.029	.027	-	
critical value=.232	"D"=.141			cannot reject H ₀		

^aBecause the data is ordinal only in Tables A1 and A5, they utilize a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Tables A2 and A4 rely on a Chi-square test corrected for continuity by

calculation in the equation, $X^2 = \frac{N(|AD-BC| - \frac{N}{2})^2}{(A+B)(C+D)(A+C)(B+D)}$.

Table A3, which does not meet the assumptions of Chi-square, is analyzed using Fisher's exact test. That statistic is calculated by adding the sum of the observed and all more extreme distribution probabilities derived by the formula:

$$p = \frac{(A+B)!(C+D)!(A+C)!(B+D)!}{N! A! B! C! D!}$$

Table A2
By Race

race	white	black	total
nonpolitical personal violence	85	201	286
political personal violence	14	25	39
	99	226	325
critical value=3.84	X ² =.361		cannot reject H ₀

Table A3^a
By Occupation

occupation	white collar	blue collar	total
nonpolitical personal violence	17	178	195
political personal violence	0	12	12
	17	190	207

$p=.694$ significance level=.05 cannot reject H_0

^aIn employing a two-tailed test, as has been used throughout this appendix, the exact probability of the observed distribution of .347 is doubled to .694. This probability does not allow rejection of the null hypothesis at the .05 level, since for Fisher's exact test the p must be equal to or less than the desired significance level.

Table A4
By Functional Alienation

	functionally alienated	not functionally alienated	total
nonpolitical personal violence	95	191	286
political personal violence	15	24	39
	110	215	325

critical value=3.84 $\chi^2=.220$ cannot reject H_0

Table A5
By Place of Residence

	within city limits	outside lim- its but in Gainesville area	non-Gainesville residents	total
nonpolitical personal violence	234 .833	18 .897	29 --	281
political personal violence	30 .789	2 .842	6 -	38
"D"	.044	<u>.055</u>	-	
critical value=5.99 $\chi^2=.405$ cannot reject H_0				

Tables A1 through A4 demonstrate beyond a doubt that it is unreasonable to separate "political" personal violence from "nonpolitical" personal violence, at least in terms of their class distributions. Table A5 was included to dispel the "outside agitator" theory; it therefore utilized the one-tailed rather than the two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, requiring a conversion of the "D" statistic into a Chi-square distribution.

APPENDIX B

ROBBERY AS AN UNTYPICAL VIOLENCE INDICATOR

Table B1^a
By Age

	0-20	21-30	31-45	46-60	61-	total
robbery victims	22 .195	38 .531	23 .735	25 .956	5 -	113
victims of other crimes of violence	139 .340	132 .663	87 .875	41 .976	10 -	409

"D" .145 .132 .140 .020

critical value=5.99 $\chi^2=7.45$ must reject H_0

^aAs the alternative hypothesis specifies that the robbery victims are of a more potentially powerful class distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests used in this appendix will be one-tailed.

Table B2
By Race

	white	black	total
robbery victims	106	19	125
victims of other crimes of violence	208	258	466
	314	277	591

critical value=3.84 χ^2 , corrected for continuity, =62.25
must reject H_0

Table B3
By Occupation

	blue collar	white collar	total
robbery victims	33	54	87
victims of other crimes of violence	148	37	185
	181	91	272

critical value=3.84 χ^2 , corrected for continuity,=45.17
must reject H_0

Table B4
By Alienation

	functionally alienated	not functionally alienated	total
robbery victims	10	107	117
victims of other crimes of violence	89	289	387
	99	405	504

critical value=3.84 χ^2 , corrected for continuity,=10.99
must reject H_0

Tables B1 through B5 all indicate the empirical rationale for investigating the effect of removing robbery victims from the category of victims of crimes of violence. Tables B1 through B4, above, show the distributions on the individual

class characteristics, whereas Table B5, below, shows those separate distributions consolidated into the class index used throughout this study.

Table B5
By Class Index

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
robbery	38	57	27	3	0	125
victims	.304	.760	.976	-	-	
victims of other crimes of violence	58 .124	165 .478	149 .797	84 .976	11 -	467
"D"	.180	<u>.282</u>	.179	.024		592
critical value=5.99 $\chi^2=31.366$ must reject H_0						

However, one must not allow the empirical distribution differences to override the theoretical reasons for including robbery victims within the conceptualization of violence. Most crime categories are specific enough in nature to exhibit a peculiar bias in their distribution. For example, police reports elucidated a policy of classifying most physical encounters among school children as simple assault, as opposed to aggravated assault or disorderly conduct. The use of the classification in this specific context helped produce a statistically biased distribution of simple assault from the paradigm of violent crime, aggravated assault (see Table B6, below), but this distribution bias toward the

Legend

victims

	category	mean	#cases
1	All victims	1.55	898
2	Violent crime victims	1.48	592
3	Hospitalized victims	2.00	47
4	Aggravated assault victims	1.72	259
5	Simple assault victims	1.49	173
6	Robbery victims	.96	125
7	Card arrest victims	1.72	184
8	Nontraffic arrests without convictions	1.67	122


perpetrators

	category	mean	#cases
1	Arrests for crimes of violence	2.31	386
2	Arrests for aggravated assault	2.45	47
3	Arrests for "political" personal violence	1.90	39
4	Arrests for property violence	1.45	22

APPENDIX C

VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF OBSERVED AND ACTUAL VICTIM/PERPETRATOR DISTRIBUTIONS

Table C1
Observed Distribution as Demonstrated by Mean
Scale Scores^a



^aThe length of each category line indicates the sample size of the category. Each hyphen represents one hundred cases (one hyphen minimum). It is recognized that the mean is not an appropriate statistic for ordinal data. However, to detect small differences in central tendency in a scale of five, the median is not useful. Thus, liberty is taken for this visual presentation.

Pages 171 through 176, Chapter VI, and the shaded areas under the curves (Figure 1, page 174) can be represented by shifting the victim lines down and the perpetrator lines up until the lines one (1) are equal in their mean class scale score. The victim means are forced down by the existence of powerless class unreported victimizations; the perpetrator means are pushed up by the presense in society of unarrested perpetrators of less severe crimes of violence, perpetrators who exhibit fewer powerlessness-indicating class characteristics than do the arrested perpetrators.

When the means of all victims and all perpetrators (with their respective manifestations following suit proportionately) are brought into line, one can visualize Chapter V's elimination of property violence from the concept of violence-- and can see the extremes of victim distributions in robberies on the one hand and hospitalizations on the other.

APPENDIX D

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE

If one accepts the conclusion of Chapter VIII that political violence over the decade has remained the same or slightly declined, then it would seem that there is an obligation to show why so few people came to this conclusion. It has been suggested that scholars are too closely tied to governmental processes. Yet surely the same critique is not applicable to the public at large. What led the general public to perceive violence (or political violence as is often understood) as increasing?

Relying upon the in-depth interview data, the formation of estimates as to the increase or decline of violence can be traced through four transitions. The data upon which this study was based and the sequence they produce are:

(1) socio-economic status, determines the degree of involvement with violence, (2) involvement, effects one's fear of violence, (3) fear, plays a part in the development of the concept of violence one holds, and, (4) the concept, in turn, determines one's estimate of violence over time. The stages are socio-economic status, involvement, fear, concept, and estimate. This appendix will exhibit the data which suggest this sequence. In some tables, the number of cases is too

small or too unevenly distributed to meet Chi-square assumptions about expected cell frequencies, so the raw distributions are presented.

Table D1 presents the data explained in Chapter VII, pages 190 through 191. Socio-economic status is measured, in this case, by family income level, "low" being up to \$6,999 and "high," \$7,000 or more. Involvement is defined by either the interviewee or a close friend or relative having been involved in violence in the previous year.

Table D1
Income Level and Violence Involvement

	involved	not involved
low income	4	5
high income	8	30

Substituting ownership as opposed to rental of home for high as opposed to low income as the socio-economic variable does not alter the suggested hypothesis-- that as the socio-economic status rises, violence involvement declines.

Table D2
Residence Status and Violence Involvement

	involved	not involved
rent home	6	9
own home	6	27

Table D2 does meet Chi-square assumptions, but is statistically significant only at the .3 level.

The second transition suggests that in turn the degree of involvement with violence affects one's fear of the experience. That relationship is represented below.

Table D3
Involvement and Self Fear

	yes	maybe	no
involved (self or close friends or relatives	3	5	3
acquainted with an involved	0	8	4
not involved	0	4	17

The "not involved" category of Tables D1 and D2 has been split into the "acquainted" and "not involved" categories above due to a more even distribution. If the yes and maybe columns of the fear variable above are collapsed into one column, the Chi-square test assumptions are met, and the resulting χ^2 of 10.575 is statistically significant at the .05 level (critical value=5.99). Also supporting the above conclusion that there is a demonstrable relationship between involvement and fear is the distribution resulting when the interviewees' impression is recorded of whether "others like him or her" fear violence in the coming year--since individuals are more likely to project their own fear into others than to admit that fear.

Table D4
Involvement and Other Fear

	yes	maybe	no
involved (self or close friends or relatives)	6	4	1
acquainted with an involved	2	10	1
not involved	6	6	10

Note the shift of the modal category across the diagonal as one reads down the row classifications.

The third step in the progressing analysis of how estimates of violence are formed is the impact of fear of violence upon concept formation. That connection is illustrated in Table D5.

Table D5
Fear and the Conceptualization of Violence

	concept includes systemic violence	concept excludes systemic violence
yes or maybe	12	8
no	4	21

With a critical value of 3.84 at the .05 level and a χ^2 , corrected for continuity, of 7.57, the null hypothesis must be rejected. If a person fears his future involvement in violence (the fear being related to past involvement), he

or she will include the notion of systemic violence in his definition of violence. Specifically, either or both of the following descriptions was/were selected as part of the respondents' definition of violence: (1) a person is detained at the police station for questioning though innocent of any crime and (2) a person is fired from his job which was necessary to support his family.

Fourth and lastly, Table D6, below, suggests a connection between the way persons conceptualize violence and their estimate of whether or not it is increasing. The inclusion of systemic violence within the concept of violence results in most of those persons estimating violence over the decade as having stayed the same or decreased. Inversely, the exclusion of systemic violence results in the commonly perceived increase of violence over the decade.

Table D6
Estimate of Violence Change over Decade

	increase	same or decrease
concept includes systemic violence	6	9
concept excludes systemic violence	21	8

With an N of 44, Table D6 is marginal as to whether or not a correction for continuity is necessary. Without the correction, the X^2 of 4.37 is significant at the .05 level.

With the correction for continuity, the χ^2 of 3.12 is not significant unless the standards are lowered to the .1 level.

If we isolate the hypothetical pure types from this four-fold transition, the individual of low socio-economic status has a relatively high rate of involvement with violence which causes anxiety or fear of future involvement which leads to recognition of many diverse forms of violence which results in the understanding that the advent of riots or a publicized discovery of crime among the middle classes has not produced an increase in the phenomenon. On the other hand, the "upper" social status individual does not often become involved in violence, with some rationality does not fear his involvement, due to his limited experience and anxiety does not comprehend the nature of the violent experience well enough to include systemic violence, and, based upon a more restricted view of violence, sees it as increasing in the United States over the decade. This latter "pure" type is much closer to the majority of citizens than the former. And, in the interview sample, the majority did visualize violence in the United States over the decade as increasing.

On the whole, we are claiming that the interviews, while biased against the black population, have at least the range to suggest the above, four-step sequence. The interviews were distributed on the class index as follows.

Table D7
Interviewee Distribution on Class Scale

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
interviewees	27 .563	19 .958	1 .979	1 -	0 -	48

This is obviously a distinct group from the persons involved in violence we have been analyzing in this study. Their overall distribution was:

Table D8
Persons Experiencing Violence on Class Scale

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
# of persons experiencing violence	148 .125	378 .444	349 .739	250 .950	59 -	1184

However, it does not necessarily follow that because the population is different from persons experiencing violence and the interviewees are different from the persons experiencing violence, that the population and the interviewees are the same. In fact, it is possible to make a rough estimation of how a random sampling of forty-eight adult interviewees would be distributed on the class index. Table D9 compares that hypothetical distribution to the actual interviewee distribution.

Table D9
Interviewee Representativeness Comparison

class	0	1	2	3	4	total
hypothetical random sample of 48	5	29	13	1	0	48
actual inter- viewee sample	27	19	1	1	0	48

The interviewee sample is distributed more to the potentially politically powerful end of the scale than is the hypothetical random sample. Therefore, the strength of the arguments advanced lies primarily in the assumption that the steps leading to the formation of violence estimates are a logical sequence, not affected by the interviews being biased toward the less repressed and probably higher socio-economic status. The Chi-square test utilized is not a parametric statistic. In other words, although the suggested sequence of violence estimate development is the result of a biased interview sample, that sequence may be a useful construct of the process for the entire population.

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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Henry Clarke Dolive was born July 22, 1944, in Orlando, Florida. In 1962, he graduated from DeLand High School, DeLand, Florida, and subsequently served six months with the U. S. Army, before beginning undergraduate study at the University of Florida. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree with a political science major from Stetson University in 1966. From 1966 to 1971, he attended graduate school in political science at the University of Florida, receiving his Master of Arts degree in 1969. While in residence, he directed the departmental data laboratory and was the recipient of a Ford Foundation Fellowship and a National Science Foundation Traineeship.

In 1971-1972, Mr. Dolive served as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Georgia. He is presently serving as Ombudsman and Coordinator of the Office of County Development for Campbell County, Kentucky, in the greater Cincinnati area.


Henry Clarke Dolive is married, and his wife, Linda, is also a political scientist. He is a member of the American Political Science Association.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Manning J. Dauer, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

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O. Ruth McQuown
Associate Professor of Political
Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Keith R. Legg
Associate Professor of Political
Science

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Assistant Professor of Political
Science

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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1974

Dean, Graduate School